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Global climate change poses one of the most urgent challenges of our age. 
The increasing frequency and intensity of weather shocks, such as heat waves, 
droughts, floods, and hurricanes, are all anticipated to adversely affect conditions 
of agricultural production, and jeopardize efforts to achieve global food security. 
In recent years, there has been a rapidly growing body of literature across multiple 
disciplines aiming to quantify and assess the adverse consequences of climate on 
relatively poor rural societies. Building entirely on original primary sources, this 
dissertation provides evidence that weather shocks raised property crime, triggered 
civil conflict and shaped patterns of human settlement in British colonial Africa 
and Asia during the first half of the twentieth century (~1880-1960). By merging 
the theoretical and empirical insights of several strands of literature (e.g. economics, 
history, geography), this dissertation has both academic and social merit. Its academic 
merit lies in its promise to disentangle the net effect of climate on societies from the 
many other contextual factors that may affect them. And its social merit lies in its 
capacity to reveal key factors that can mitigate the adverse consequences of weather 
shocks, enabling tailor-made policy interventions. In sum, the present dissertation 
contributes to a better understanding of long-term agrarian development in tropical 
Africa and Asia, offering fresh input to academic debates on how to mitigate 
the effects of weather extremes.
Kostadis Papaioannou
Propositions 
 
1. Despite two centuries of technological and agrarian progress since the industrial 
revolution, it may come as a surprise that the connection between climate and human 
settlement has remained strong until today.  
(this thesis) 
2. Poverty traps, as well as the subsequent vicious cycles of crime and conflict, could be 
eliminated by the promise of a stable annual harvest. 
(this thesis) 
3. As more and more people get their news exclusively from social media, fact-checking 
appears to be suffering from a slow death.  
 
4. The recent Greek debt crisis demonstrates the pitfalls of relying on external financing, 
which may significantly undermine state sovereignty. 
 
5. The most effective way to increase your life expectancy is to build a strong network of 
good friends. 
 
6. A profound awareness of the inevitability of death and the fragility of life could make 
individuals show more empathy, compassion and solidarity. 
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There are many injustices in the world, but 
there is one of which no one speaks, 
which is that of climate. 
–Albert Camus 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
 
Contents 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction: Climate & Society ..................................................................................... 1 
 
Chapter 2. Climate Shocks & Conflict: Evidence from Colonial Nigeria .................................. 25  
 
Chapter 3.  Weather Shocks & Agricultural Commercialization in Colonial Tropical Africa: 
    Did Export Crops Alleviate Social Distress? ................................................ 67 
 
Chapter 4. ‘Hunger Makes a Thief of Any Man’: Poverty & Crime in British Colonial Asia ..... 127 
 
Chapter 5.  Rainfall Patterns & Human Settlement in Tropical Africa & Asia Compared: 
    Did African Farmers Face Greater Insecurity? ........................................... 177 
 
Chapter 6.  Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 217 
 
 
Summary (English)  ............................................................................................................................ 231 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................................... 234  
Publications ............................................................................................................................................... 235 
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
‘Force of Nature’  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Climate & Society: Past & Present 
The idea that climate may substantially influence human behavior and 
economic performance is a very old one and dates back to the writings of Ancient 
Greeks and Roman historians, enduring in the essays of major figures of the 
Enlightenment. In On Airs, Waters, and Places (400 B.C.E) Hippocrates noted that 
“places where the changes of the seasons are most frequent, and where they differ 
most from one another, there you will find the greatest differences in men’s 
physique, disposition, and temperament”. Similarly, Tacitus in Germania (98 A.D) 
asserted that climate brings about a similarity of manners among people living in 
adjoining lands. He noted that “climatic conditions stamp a certain physique on the 
human body”,1 rendering some of them “accustomed to cold and hunger”, and 
others “unable to bear thirst and heat”. Centuries later, Montesquieu in The Spirit of 
the Laws (1748) set forth to understand how geography and climate interact with 
particular cultures to “produce the spirit of a people”, arguing, among other things, 
that hot climates increase extreme emotionality, immorality and criminality.2 
Besides climate’s impact on individual and social behavior, Montesquieu also 
discussed the adverse economic consequences in productivity levels, highlighting 
that the “heat of the climate can be so excessive that the body will be absolutely 
without strength” causing “indolence” and “sluggishness”.  
Historical processes of agricultural development, trade integration and 
productivity growth were always, to varying degrees, constrained by geographical 
conditions. No civilization in the past flourished for long without an effective 
strategy to cope with climatic variability –i.e. a strategy that would facilitate the 
                                                 
1 “caeli corporibus habitum dedit” (Germania 98 A.D. p. 189 in G. Anderson’s (ed.) 1938) 
2 “You will find in the northern climates peoples who have few vices, enough virtues, and much sincerity 
and frankness. As you move toward the countries of the south, you will believe  you have moved away 
from morality itself: the liveliest passions will increase crime” (Montesquieu 1748/1989, p.234)”. 
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production and trade of food in sufficient quantity and quality. Food surpluses are 
needed to collect taxes, raise armies, wage wars and build cities. Nowadays in 
particular, few would dispute that climate is intrinsically linked to core issues for all 
societies –including health, food production and energy use among others.  
The view that adverse climatological conditions, or ‘geography’ in the broad 
sense of the term,3 have been responsible for disappointing productivity growth in 
tropical agriculture more so than in temperate parts of the world, has been expressed 
for centuries. Such view features prominently in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations 
(1776), where he argues that the lack of opportunities for sea-bound trade and 
related labor specialization have impeded the development of markets and division 
of labor in the tropics, and especially in Africa,4 suggesting that in regions located 
far from coasts and ocean-navigable rivers, transport costs of international trade are 
high. Great thinkers and prominent historians, such as William McNeill (1963), 
Alfred Crosby (1986) and Fernand Braudel (1973; 1995), have also seen geography 
and climate as crucially determining factors in explaining divergent development 
paths between temperate Europe and tropical Africa in the longue durée; or following 
their terms, divergent development paths between geographically and 
climatologically ‘advantaged’ and ‘disadvantaged’ regions. These scholars draw on 
an extensive range of sources to allude Europe’s advantages in maritime 
superiority, temperate climate, agricultural productivity and disease environment as 
fundamental conditions for its take-off and eventual domination of the Americas. 
As Braudel (1995, p.120) eloquently puts it: “in understanding Black Africa, geography is 
more important than history. The geographical context is not all that matters, but it is the most 
significant”.  
Traditionally, a great deal of previous research hinges on the idea that 
Africa’s major disadvantages in coastal trade, navigable rivers, disease ecology, and 
                                                 
3 Geography here is used in the broad sense of the term and refers to the relationships between people 
and their environment including the opportunities and constraints posed by physical conditions along with 
ecological constraints. 
4
 “There are in Africa none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic seas in Europe, [...] to 
carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent” (p.25) 
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soil fertility are mainly responsible for its agricultural and economic stagnation 
(McNeill, 1963; Crosby, 1986; Sachs & Warner, 1997; Landes, 1998; Curtin, 1998; 
Diamond, 1999; McNeill, 2010). More recently, a series of empirical studies have 
investigated the link between climate and agricultural output, suggesting a strong 
adverse effect of tropical ecozones on the market value of agricultural output (see 
Bloom et al., 1998; Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs, 2001; Easterly & Levine, 2003; 
Rodrik et al., 2004). For example, Gallup et al. (1999) show that tropical agriculture 
suffers a productivity decrement of 30 percent to 50 percent compared to 
temperate-zone agriculture (p. 197), concluding that at “the root of Africa’s poverty 
lies its extraordinarily disadvantageous geography”. 
Thus far, a number of factors have frequently been invoked to account for 
Africa’s obstacles to growth. A key factor being the (i) chronically low agricultural 
productivity (especially food production); another one being the (ii) difficulties to 
store food, as food preservation is more challenging in tropical climates than in 
temperate ones. Increased humidity and relatively hot winters reduce the possibility 
to store food for the later months of the year (i.e. long after harvest, known by 
many as ‘hunger months’), thereby limiting opportunities to (iii) transport food and 
produce to distant markets; (iv) a fourth factor being the light and low in nutrients 
soils, which under heavy rains are subject to rapid nutrient leaching. 
That tropical regions have been, and still are, at a disadvantage in agricultural 
development has been widely advocated. Nevertheless, wide variations within the 
tropics exist. Human, plant and animal diseases have been thought to be notably 
worse in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia or tropical America (Diamond, 1999; 
Gallup et al., 1999; McNeill, 2010; Hsiang & Meng, 2015; Frankema, 2015). For 
instance, the Tsetse fly is unique to Africa and transmits a parasite harmful to 
humans and lethal to livestock. Historically, such a disease burden has limited the 
availability of animal manure and animal draft power, which, as a result, has 
hindered the ability of Africans to generate agricultural surpluses. Surpluses that 
constitute a vital element for the growth of historical populations and human 
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settlement, as they stimulate investments in agricultural and transportation 
technology (Goody, 1980; Alsan, 2014; Frankema, 2014).  
Malaria and a number of other tropical infectious diseases have also been 
more severe in tropical Africa than elsewhere. Malaria’s vectors of transmission are 
greatly influenced by certain climatological conditions akin to tropical climates. For 
example, high humidity, enduringly high temperatures –interacted with prolonged 
rainy seasons, attain the mosquito’s ideal range more often, encouraging more 
frequent biting and faster mosquito reproduction. Even today, sub-Saharan Africa 
continues to bear the brunt of the global burden of malaria, being home to 89% of 
malaria cases and 91% of malaria deaths (WHO, 2008). Endemic tropical diseases 
have posed considerable barriers to long term economic growth, since they impede 
agricultural intensification and the exchange of agricultural commodities, effectively 
shrinking the prospects for enhanced division of labor and increasing agricultural 
returns. 
From a climatological point of view, Sub-Saharan Africa is generally dryer, 
experiences droughts more frequently than any other part of the tropical world, and 
faces more erratic rainfall patterns (Bloom et al., 1998; Le Blanc & Perez, 2007). 
Under relatively predictable rainfall patterns, farmers adapt their production 
practices to maximize their yields. However, under high levels of rainfall variability 
(where more frequent and intense shocks occur), such adaptation becomes more 
difficult, hampering long-term investments in soil improvements and other 
technological innovations. And, although there have been two centuries of 
historical dynamics and agrarian change since the industrial revolution, it may come 
as a surprise that the connection between climate and human settlement patterns 
has remained visible up to the present time. 
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the ‘climate-society nexus’, 
which has prompted a wide surge of quantitative analyses seeking to test theories 
and assess the validity of previously proposed linkages. This surge can be partly 
explained by rising public concerns about climate change and its potentially 
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distortive effects on societal cohesion; partly by greater popular awareness of the 
critical role that climate might play in driving economic outcomes; and partly by 
methodological advances and data availability, combined with improvements in 
computing power. As a result, there is a growing body of literature across multiple 
scholarly disciplines –including economics, psychology, epidemiology, geography, 
and history– that aims to quantify and assess the effects of climate on a number of 
socially and economically relevant outcomes (e.g. agricultural yields, mortality rates, 
crime, conflict etc.). This new line of research uses panel methodologies 
(longitudinal data), enabling researchers to exploit high-frequency (e.g. month-to-
month or year-to-year) changes in the climate variables (e.g. rainfall, temperature), 
while simultaneously controlling for space- and time-unobservable effects across 
numerous locations (what economists call fixed effects). This dissertation is part of 
this new research wave. 
Its main contribution lies in the fact that it aims to identify the causal pathways 
that drive the climate-economy relationship and that it provides insights from a 
historical-social context (that of colonialism) that has not yet been subjected to this 
kind of analysis. To achieve that, it addresses a major methodological problem that 
lies at the core of the existing economic and economic-historical literature; i.e. 
endogeneity and reverse causality. The principal advantage of this new panel-data 
approach is identification (see Chapter 4). Identifying the key pathways and impact 
of climate on societies should be particularly valuable to designing modern policies 
that best respond to climatic events.   
Additionally, this newly emerging literature often examines the heterogeneous 
impact of climate on societies and their economies. Heterogeneity may exist with 
regard to the climatic variables themselves, as well as with regard to the outcome 
variables. A good example for the latter is that better institutions or ‘deeper’ trade 
integration could decrease the vulnerability to climate shocks, and that certain 
social groups –such as pastoralists, or export crop farmers– may be less vulnerable 
to these shocks. Investigating and narrowly identifying the conditions that mitigate 
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the impact of these shocks on rural societies, holds great promise as it would help 
target potential effective interventions. In Chapters 2 and 3, we use such an 
approach to review a long-standing and heated debate in economic-historical 
literature: the issue of whether agricultural commercialization was beneficial or 
detrimental to rural livelihoods. Or, to put it differently, whether the cultivation of 
export crops operated as a mitigating mechanism in increasing farmers’ resilience to 
extreme climatic events. Our findings suggest that the surplus revenues generated 
by export crops partially alleviated negative rural income shocks. We believe that 
the more we grow to understand and identify adaptive mechanisms, the better 
responses we can devise. 
 Another notable contribution of this dissertation is the extensive and 
functional use of original archival sources. Besides enabling us to assemble several new 
panel datasets for a wide variety of indicators that are spatially and temporally 
consistent, and internationally comparable, these sources were conducive (a) in 
formulating theoretical hypotheses by taking the local context into consideration, 
(b) in obtaining a more thorough understanding of the important mechanisms 
driving the underlying relationship, and (c) in adding a new layer of robustness by 
backing up the regression results. Unfortunately, virtually all studies in this field are 
solely based on econometric correlations, and make no attempt to contextualize 
their findings. We expect that dual methodological approaches will serve as the 
base for future studies in both climate-economics and environmental history. 
The impact of climate on our societies is a topic of considerable urgency 
today as the process of global climate change accelerates, generating more severe 
and unpredictable climate events. While much work remains to be done in 
developing a road map of adaptation to global warming, carefully understanding 
the key causal pathways and mitigating factors would help target potential interventions. 
Our ambition is that a cautious understanding of the nature, occurrences and 
consequential impact of climatic events will enable societies to assess the “cost 
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function” of future climate change, and to effectively design their contemporary 
adaptive institutions and economic policies. 
1.2 Scientific & Societal Relevance 
Climate change and its potential threatening impacts is one of the major 
concerns of our age. Warming global temperature, changing precipitation schemes, 
expansion of deserts and extreme heat waves are all anticipated to result in a rapid 
decline of habitation, thus increasing public concerns about global food security. 
Such concerns have boosted a great amount of research that seeks to reliably 
quantify the effects of extreme climatic variability on economically and societally 
relevant outcomes (the key trends being: conflict and crime, health and mortality, 
and agricultural yields and productivity). The literature is also inspired by growing 
public concerns about the potentially distortive effects of climate change on 
societal cohesion as it raises awareness of global interrelatedness (Johnstone & Mazo, 
2011). For example, the exceptionally dry winter in China in 2010–2011 led to 
global wheat shortages. These shortages had a particularly severe impact on Egypt, 
the world’s largest wheat importer, where, during the period November 2010 to 
March 2011, bread prices soared to a level that was unaffordable for most low-
income households. This is now believed to have planted the seeds that, along with 
other social, economic and political factors, eventually led to the Arab Spring in 
Egypt and beyond (Sternberg, 2012). 
Rather than accepting a static link between climate and social outcomes, a 
key challenge is to understand which conditions aggravate or mitigate the impact of 
climate shocks, and to learn more about the local determinants of resilience and 
adaptation. Classical economic theory predicts that trade integration stimulates 
employment opportunities in agricultural activities, allowing farmers to diversify 
their risk by marketing their surplus produce (Smith, 1776). Thus, a recurring 
theme in this thesis is whether the agricultural commercialization (adoption and 
expansion of cash crops) that took place in the early twentieth century could have 
increased the resilience of local farmers in withstanding extreme climatic events. 
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Our results are interesting also from a public policy perspective, as they support the 
idea that smallholder-based export cultivation enables farmers to spread risk, 
smooth their consumption patterns, and profit from inter-regional and 
international trade (Chapters 2 & 3). 
Scholars inevitably acknowledge that climatic hazards were, and still are, 
generally more severe in Africa and Asia, if taken on a global comparative 
perspective. Such climate-induced dangers include rapid decline of habitation, food 
shortages and near-famine conditions. Africa and Asia’s rising population densities 
and resurging socio-political instability contribute to making this a most pressing 
concern. As global temperatures are likely to rise substantially over the next 
decades, and more frequent and intense climatic phenomena are expected, 
exposing and identifying these conditions may be essential to allow societies to 
better deal with potential future disastrous shocks and calamities. 
More recently, a few scholars have begun to recognize that the direct effects 
of climate change will differ from region to region around the world and will 
disproportionally impact on the poor farmers of the global south. In a 
predominantly agrarian society, economic prosperity is intimately tied to 
agricultural output, and thus, in the wake of extreme annual climatic events, loss of 
a year’s harvest can easily push poor farmers into extreme poverty. Our findings 
corroborate this line of evidence, since we find that the poorest segments of society 
were hit the hardest (Chapter 4).   
Beyond improving our understanding on local conditions of early twentieth 
century Africa and Asia, the implication of this study may be important from a 
public policy perspective in contemporary developing countries. Taken together, 
the results of this dissertation support the idea of improved high-yield weather-
resistant grains and investments in irrigation technology. The promise of a stable 
annual harvest would potentially eliminate much of the adverse climate-induced 
poverty traps, as well as the subsequent unfolding vicious cycles of crime and 
conflict. Unfortunately, climate change continues and it is going to bring about 
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more erratic climatic events, hitting the poorest smallholder farmers the most. A 
key policy priority should therefore be to aim at a long-term protection of the most 
vulnerable and precarious farmers of the global south. 
1.3 Research Objectives & Key Innovations 
This dissertation aims to make several noteworthy contributions by linking 
an academic challenge (i.e. unravel the net effect of climate on socio-economic outcomes 
from many other potentially influential factors) to a social question of prime 
importance (i.e. reveal key factors that mitigate such adverse effects). Its overarching 
objectives are (a) to quantify and assess the impact of climate on a variety of 
agrarian societies in tropical Africa and Asia, (b) to identify the key causal pathways 
from climate to society, and (c) to reveal key mitigating factors that would enable 
these societies to target their policy interventions and design adaptive institutions. 
Here, we provide a summary of its innovative aspects. First, we quantify and 
assess the effect of short-term climatic variability on several societally and 
economically relevant outcomes (such as conflict, crime and agricultural yields), and 
we causally identify the loss of (agricultural) income as being the most relevant 
mechanism that drives the relationship.  
Its second innovative aspect lies in its interdisciplinary methodological 
approach, as it combines social science methods (econometric analysis) and historical 
narrative, to expose the paramount significance of agricultural commercialization in 
alleviating distress of rural livelihoods in the wake of climate shocks. By merging the 
theoretical and empirical insights of those two strands of literature, we provide 
strong evidence supporting the idea that the surplus revenues generated by export 
crops partially mitigated the negative rural income shocks.  
Third, we refine existing variables of measuring climate shocks. Instead of 
focusing on droughts only, throughout the dissertation we argue that both droughts 
and excessive rainfall (floods) are equally important in explaining the outcomes of 
interest. We conceptualize and econometrically parameterize the principal (climate-
to-society) relationship as being non-linear (U-shaped). Such conceptualizations are 
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also in line with the insights we gained while analyzing the archival sources. 
Although we find a robust and significant curvilinear effect of climatic variability 
on various outcomes, it should be noted that the effect was never fully symmetrical 
and was highly dependent on the context applied (e.g. Africa as opposed to Asia). 
We believe that the empirical methods used for these regions may be applied to 
other regions elsewhere in the world. 
Fourth, this dissertation yields several new panel datasets for a wide variety of 
indicators which are spatially and temporally consistent, and internationally comparable. 
While the climate-economy literature has been steadily rising over the past few years, 
no single study exists for tropical Africa and Asia prior to 1960. One of the key 
objectives of this dissertation is to contribute to a considerable expansion of the time 
horizon to an era before notable global anthropogenic carbon emissions. The 
systematic data collection from primary historical archives enables us to obtain 
information on indicators of climate (rainfall, temperature, solar radiation etc.), 
conflict and crime (theft, assaults, cattle-raiding, prisoners etc.), as well as 
agriculture (rice, wheat etc.), which should prove particularly valuable to the 
construction of original and freely-available data-series for the pre-1960 period.  
To date, we possess hardly any evidence on observed (i.e. from meteorological 
stations) monthly and annual climate data prior to 1960. To overcome such data 
gaps, researchers have developed a number of forecasted weather datasets, using 
either interpolations across space and time or data assimilation algorithms. While 
these procedures offer free and easily imported climate datasets in formats that can 
be used by many researchers (e.g. gridded data), they also increase the statistical 
uncertainty of resulting parameter estimates (Hsiang, 2016). And whereas these 
gridded climate datasets have a high compatibility when the average value of weather 
variables is taken – i.e. areas that are on average cold or hot in a given year-, the 
derived deviations around the mean can be significantly different (Dell et al., 2014; 
Hsiang, 2016). Such differences appear even stronger in tropical settings and in 
precipitation returns (Auffhammer et al., 2013). The latter is due to the fact that 
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rainfall is less smooth than temperature in space and time, which as a result, 
increases uncertainty when extrapolated (see Auffhammer et al., 2013, pp. 5-8).  
Additionally, there are drawbacks from an econometric point of view. These data-
generating processes often display significant spatial correlation and increased risk 
of measurement error. Such statistical concerns may lead to inflated standard errors 
and biased estimated coefficients (Wooldridge, 2010; Auffhammer et al., 2013). 
Thus, the ground meteorological stations should be preferred and our ambition is 
that the newly constructed climatological series could be connected to the existing 
post-colonial climate series, filling this gap of knowledge. 
Fifth, this is the first time that historical data from meteorological stations 
have been used to explore whether the differences in climatic variability between 
tropical Africa and tropical Asia have been of a structural nature and independent 
of high anthropogenic carbon emissions. Research exploring whether African 
farmers in the tropics face higher levels of climatological insecurity than elsewhere 
has mainly made use of contemporary data (Gallup et al., 1999; Otsuka & Larson, 
2014). The use of such data has been criticized for being substantially affected by 
global warming (Hsiang et al., 2013). Thus, by looking at the 1910-1940 period; that 
is, before the first effects of carbon emissions on climate systems were noted, we 
are better able to assess differences in climatic patterns. 
Additionally, we associate these climatic differences to agricultural 
intensification, as proxied by population density, to add supporting evidence to the 
idea that climatological instability breeds higher cultivation risks and worse 
prospects for investments in agricultural technologies. The current findings 
complement those of earlier studies and should prove to be particularly valuable to 
the growing discussion on the origins of the Green Revolution, and whether Africa 
will complete a green revolution of its own.  
Last but not least, throughout this dissertation, we make extensive and 
functional use of primary archival material (a) to formulate theoretical hypotheses 
by taking the local context into consideration, (b) to obtain a more thorough 
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understanding of the important mechanisms driving the relationship of interest, 
and (c) to add a new layer of robustness by backing up the regression results. 
Regrettably, while extensive research has been carried out on the climate-society 
nexus, no single study exists that offers anecdotal evidence.  
1.4 Setting of this study  
1.4.1 Temporal & Spatial Demarcation 
The final decades of colonial rule form an interesting period for a study of 
the African and Asian colonies for several reasons (Figure 1). First, the time frame 
guarantees a rather uniform and stable institutional framework under British 
colonial rule, as the onset of the 20th century marked the end of effective resistance 
to British rule and the establishment of persistent colonial borders, while the 1950s 
and early-1960s marked the beginning of serious internal resistance to colonial 
policies and many independence movements gained real power at the political 
arena —like, for instance, the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya. Second, Britain 
administered a vast empire in the tropics, where the state’s key preoccupations were 
related to law and order, public infrastructure (railways, schooling, hospitals etc.) as 
well as agricultural commercialization, leaving behind an extensive bureaucratic 
legacy. A legacy that provides a unique opportunity for a two-pronged research 
strategy, involving both qualitative and econometric methods.  
Third, within their borders the selected countries contain a wide range of 
geographical (such as agro-ecological zones) and institutional (such as pre-colonial 
political entities) features, which allow us to derive meaningful comparisons, both 
between countries and between continents. Fourth, this setting enables us to review 
a long-standing and unsettled debate in economic-historical literature on the impact 
of agricultural commercialization on rural livelihoods. The literature largely agrees 
that tropical economies have expanded, to varying degrees, in response to 
increasing colonial trade and agricultural commercialization, but the extent to 
which ordinary farmers benefitted from such developments remains unclear. Such 
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unresolved concerns remain pervasive in recent debates on agricultural 
intensification and commercialization in Sub-Saharan Africa and particularly the 
impact of ‘Green Revolution’ technologies and policy interventions on food 
security and rural incomes (Collier & Dercon, 2014; Dawson et al., 2016). Fifth, by 
focusing on an era prior to notable anthropogenic carbon releases and when rapid 
demographic booms and processes of urbanization across the developing world 
were not yet present, we were able to explore whether African farmers in the 
tropics faced higher levels of climatological insecurity.  
Figure 1. African and Asian countries included in our sample, c.1920 
 
Source: Created by the authors in ArcGIS. 
1.4.2 Unit of Analysis  
The British colonizers set up an extensive system of administration in their 
African and Asian dependencies. Territories were divided in provinces, and 
provinces in districts. At the district level, elaborate administrative accounts were 
kept.  Local (district) officers reported biannually, quarterly or even monthly to 
their superiors on a wide range of issues –including meteorology, agriculture, native 
affairs, health,  police and prisons. The consistency and regularity with which these 
reports were kept across colonies, enabled us to create a variety of numerous 
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temporally and spatially comparable district-level panel datasets. 5 To the best of our 
knowledge, these datasets provide the oldest climate-economy record assembled by 
researchers in a historical setting (districts n = 221 and years t = 35). 
1.4.3 Data Sources 
The sources used are the annual reports filed by the colonial administration, 
divided into two distinct categories; the Colonial Office Annual Reports and the Blue 
Books of Statistics. Their purpose was to provide an in-depth overview of local 
conditions and affairs during a calendar year. The reports are consistent in their 
coverage of issues over time and across colonies, and give us a uniquely 
comprehensive insight into local conditions. All variables used throughout this 
dissertation are original and directly obtained from the National Archives in 
London (TNA). Our examination of the colonial administrative record enables us 
to formulate a range of hypotheses and to expose several key mechanisms which 
we then test econometrically.  
1.4.4 A critical note on sources 
A serious weakness is that these reports present information from only one 
side of the story. Therefore, we need to be careful not to follow the leads from 
colonial reports without hesitation. The accounts are also imbued with colonial 
prejudice, paternalistic and derogatory overtones. On top of that, previous scholars 
have pointed at the incentive to focus on ‘progress’ and paint a rosy picture to 
superiors which might have affected the reliability of local administrative accounts. 
For instance, the cultivation of export crops was considered as one of the key 
markers of ‘progress’, so it might in some instances have been in the interest of 
civil servants to downplay negative aspects of its cultivation and to paint an overly 
favorable picture of its beneficial effects on local communities. As a result, 
coverage of events may be incomplete and the representation of certain 
occurrences biased and flawed. These caveats must be borne in mind.  
                                                 
5 We allowed for one major exception to this rule, by including data from the Netherlands Indies which 
exhibit a comparable degree of detail and accuracy. 
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Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that references to episodes of 
famine or unrest were made up. Neither is there reason to believe that relative 
value free figures (such as rainfall, food prices or prisoners) or controllable figures 
(cash crop exports) were deliberately and consistently flawed, although incidental 
mistakes cannot be ruled out. There is also no reason to treat factual information –
a bad harvest or the occurrence of a flood– with great suspicion. The local 
administrator’s representation and interpretation of such incidences, however, 
deserves critical scrutiny and contextualization. Overall, we must bear in mind that 
British colonial services were often understaffed and local administrators had to 
improvise and operate on a shoestring and were hardly capable to administer the 
vast territories they were supposed to control. 
1.5 Theoretical Underpinning 
Theoretical propositions are the backbone of social science. Empirical 
research on climatic variability and socio-economic outcomes is frequently 
criticized for being theoretically underdeveloped (see Seter (2016) for an overview). 
In thinking about the plausible mechanisms underpinning the climate-economy 
nexus, it is important to consider some of the proposed theoretical arguments. By 
highlighting these mechanisms researchers can better understand and identify the 
key elements in the causal argument and proceed by empirically testing them. Solely 
adding new datasets to empirical testing does not necessarily improve our 
understanding of the climate-society linkage. Instead, each tested hypothesis should 
be anchored in theoretical expectations.  
The theoretical mechanisms can be roughly grouped into two main thematic 
categories of argument: resource scarcity and economic hardship. The first strand of 
literature holds that climate-induced scarcity of vital resources, such as food and 
fresh water, intensifies the competition over access to water and land, and increases 
the possibility of conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Miguel et al., 2004; Grossman & 
Mendoza, 2003; Kahl, 2006; Buhaug & Rod, 2006). This strand investigates how 
extreme climate conditions disturb people’s livelihoods, creating conditions that are 
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more prone to increase social tension and distress. Such conditions include general 
population movements (migration), pastoralist mobility and intensified competition 
over scarce resources, such as wells and pasture land.  
While in times of drought, farmers and pastoralists may compete over access 
to fresh water, often resulting in conflict, rainfall shortages can also have a direct 
effect on the number of farm animals, as a result of starvation or dying of thirst 
(Fafchamps et al., 1998). Besides being a source of meat and milk, livestock is also 
indispensable for crop cultivation (for instance, ploughing and harrowing). A sharp 
decline in farm animals can thus have a detrimental effect on non-animal food 
supplies as well.  
Even though rainfall surplus can be beneficial to farmers, extreme levels of 
rainfall are unwanted. Excessive precipitation and subsequent flooding has the 
potential to seriously damage, or even completely destroy the harvest. Harvest 
failures have been repeatedly associated with spectacular food price spikes. 
Moreover, heavy rainfall increases the likelihood of outbreaks of plant diseases, the 
spread of parasitic organisms and the arrival of locusts; especially when rainfall has 
been preceded by a drought spell.  
The second strand of the literature argues that the impact of climate shocks 
on economic hardship can be framed in terms of an opportunity cost model. In simple 
economic theory of crime, originally introduced by Becker (1974), individuals are 
more likely to become involved in criminal activity when they experience a negative 
income shock, as the stolen property might be regarded as a buffer in alleviating 
distress. In other words, as agricultural productivity declines, engaging in conflict or 
crime becomes more opportune relative to participating in ‘peaceful’ economic 
activities (the opportunity cost of crime is reduced and thereby increases its 
incidence). The theoretical underpinnings of this hypothesis have been modelled 
explicitly by Grossman (1991) and Grossman and Mendoza (2003), using a rational 
choice paradigm. In these two articles the authors show that the anticipated future 
resource abundance increases the incremental value attached to survival and, 
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consequently, amplifies the current allocation of time and effort to appropriative 
conflict (something they name the ‘paradox of anticipated abundance’). 
1.6 Methodological Underpinning of the Research Design 
One of the greatest methodological challenges scholars had to address in the 
past was how to accurately estimate the impact of climatic factors on socio-
economic outcomes, given the fact that spatial variation in climate is largely fixed. 
For example, Russia has always been colder on average than Ghana. While there is 
a clear cross-sectional correlation between a country’s climate and its economic 
performance, there may be unobservable features that vary across these two 
countries, which are possibly correlated with temperature (what economists call 
omitted variable bias).  
One approach designed to constrain the influence of omitted variables bias 
is to enter as many variables in the empirical analysis as possible. However, to date, 
no clear guidance nor a statistical test exists which could determine that all key 
determinants have been included in the equation, leaving this approach open to 
criticism (Hsiang, 2016). For instance, many scholars have recently refuted 
previously published findings of papers employing a cross-sectional design by 
simply introducing previously unobserved variables in the equation (Burke et al., 
2015; Hsiang, 2016). Thus, drawing causal inferences on the relationship between 
climate and outcomes of interest using cross-sectional designs, could be very 
misleading.  
Only in the past few years scholars have adopted a new approach that deals 
with such shortcomings and which yields more reliable estimates. This new 
approach uses longitudinal data, exploiting high-frequency changes in climate 
variables, while controlling for space and time unobservable effects (what 
economists call fixed effects). Additionally, the focus has now shifted from 
investigating the effects of long-term climate averages to those of short-term climate 
anomalies.  This manuscript’s research design is part of this new wave. 
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1.6.1 Rainfall as the key climate variable 
The societal impact of climatic variability seems particularly pronounced in 
developing agrarian societies. This is not surprising, as a large share of the 
population depends on rain-fed subsistence agriculture and only a small share of all 
cultivated land is irrigated (FAO, 2015). Extreme rainfall fluctuations in the form of 
either drought or floods can easily destroy harvests, jeopardize food security and 
increase resource competition over cropland and pastures. Consequently, rainfall 
should be perceived as a key climate variable in terms of its impact both on 
agricultural productivity and, as a consequence, on rural livelihoods. In this context, 
thus, the most preferred indicator for measuring climatic variability and climate 
shocks is sharp rainfall anomalies.  
1.7 Thesis Composition & Key Contributions 
The chapters are organized as follows. Chapter 2 offers a historical micro-
level analysis of the impact of climate shocks on the incidence of conflict in 
colonial Nigeria (1912-1945). To measure climate shocks we use the standardized 
deviation from long-term rainfall patterns, capturing both drought and excessive 
rainfall. Annual information of court cases, prisoners and homicides are used to 
capture conflict. Besides a robust and significant curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship 
between rainfall deviation and conflict intensity, we find that the relationship is 
weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops (such as cocoa, 
groundnuts and palm oil) compared to subsistence farming areas. This result 
suggests that agricultural diversification acted as an insurance mechanism against 
the whims of nature. Additional historical information on food shortages, crop-
price spikes and outbreaks of violence is used to explore the climate-conflict 
connection in greater detail. 
In Chapter 3, we gradually zoom out from the geographical scope (from a 
case-study of colonial Nigeria to all British African colonies) to review a long-
standing and unresolved debate in African economic history; namely whether the 
adoption of  export crops by smallholders was beneficial or detrimental to their 
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ability to cope with climate shocks. To that end, we compile a strongly balanced 
panel dataset of 151 districts across West, South Central and East Africa in the 
Interwar Era (1920-1940), and find that the cultivation of export crops had a 
mitigating effect and made rural communities more resilient to climate shocks. In 
this chapter, our primary interest is to causally identify the effect of cash crops on 
social distress. The main challenge arises from the fact that cash crop production 
had to be exogenously determined and not conditionally on other local 
characteristics. Our findings were robust to using the crop suitability index 
obtained from FAO (2015) Global Agro-ecological Zones (GAEZ), as well as to 
using our own newly constructed cash crop per capita indicator. Such findings 
increase our confidence that the greater resilience to climate shocks observed in the 
cash crop regions is, in fact, caused by the adoption of cash crops.  
Chapter 4 is concerned with the impact of poverty on crime across the rice-
economies of South and South East Asia (1910-1940). We use rainfall variation as 
an instrumental variable for paddy-rice production to estimate the impact of 
poverty on different types of crime. In line with a growing body of literature on the 
climate-economy nexus, we offer evidence that loss of agricultural income is one of 
the main causal channels leading to property crime. Previous studies have been 
unable to resolve the key econometric identification issues and have been 
potentially subject to bias due to reverse causality and omitted variables, both of 
which distort simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates either downward or 
upward. In our findings we show that simple OLS estimates are, indeed, biased 
downward and underestimate the impact of poverty on crime to a substantial 
degree. The main innovation of this study lies in using rainfall shocks as an 
exogenous source of variation in food production to identify the relationship 
between poverty and crime. Although this article’s aim is to apply this approach in 
economic history, it may also be extended to present-day developing countries. 
In Chapter 5, we assess the long-standing idea that certain climatological 
conditions in tropical Africa were, on the whole, less conducive to agricultural 
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productivity growth than in tropical Asia. We conduct a multivariate regression 
analysis to venture more deeply into the various aspects of rainfall variability, and 
especially the frequency and intensity of shocks. We find that in an era preceding 
notable global anthropogenic carbon emissions and the demographic explosion of 
the second half of the 20th century (i.e. 1910-1940), African farmers were 
confronted with greater climatological instability than their Asian counterparts. 
Rainfall shocks in tropical Africa were both more frequent and more severe. 
Controlling for mean rainfall levels, these shocks explain part of the variation in 
population density and thus support the idea that climatological instability has 
created adverse conditions for agricultural intensification. Chapter 6 reviews the 
main lessons learned from each chapter, discusses the policy implications and 
proposes various venues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Climate Shocks & Conflict: 
Evidence from colonial Nigeria 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter offers a historical micro-level analysis of the 
impact of climate shocks on the incidence of civil 
conflict in colonial Nigeria (1912–1945). Primary 
historical sources on court cases, prisoners and 
homicides are used to capture conflict. To measure 
climate shocks we use the deviation from long-term 
rainfall patterns, capturing both drought and excessive 
rainfall. We find a robust and significant curvilinear (U-
shaped) relationship between rainfall deviations and 
conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agro-
ecological zones that are least resilient to climatic 
variability (such as Guinean Savannah) and where (pre-
)colonial political structures were less centralized. We 
find evidence that the relationship is weaker in areas that 
specialize in the production of export crops (such as 
cocoa and palm oil) compared to subsistence farming 
areas, suggesting that agricultural diversification acts as 
an insurance mechanism against the whims of nature. 
Additional historical information on food shortages, 
crop-price spikes and outbreaks of violence is used to 
explore the climate–conflict connection in greater detail. 
 
 
 
Publication Status: Papaioannou, K. J. 2016. Climate shocks and conflict: Evidence from 
colonial Nigeria. Political Geography, 50, pp. 33-47. 
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2.1 Introduction  
“With few stocks in hand, one year’s shortfall could easily be translated into a famine” 
–Megan Vaughan (1987, p. 5) 
There is a growing body of literature across multiple scholarly disciplines, 
including economics, political science and geography, that aims to better 
understand the impact of climate change on human and social behaviour. This 
literature is inspired by growing public concerns about the potentially distortive 
effects of climate change on societal cohesion. The potential impact of climate-
induced resource scarcities is even larger in sub-Saharan Africa. As many as 95 
percent of the crops cultivated today are rain-fed, while less than 5 percent of all 
cultivated land is suitable for irrigation (Calzadilla et al., 2013). Consequently, 
extreme rainfall anomalies in the form of either drought or floods can easily destroy 
harvests, jeopardize food security and increase resource competition over cropland 
and pastures. 
In this chapter, a case study approach was adopted to gain a detailed 
understanding of the impact of climate shock on conflict. The contribution of this 
chapter to existing empirical analyses is fivefold. First, it measures climate shocks 
through deviations from long-term rainfall patterns in a nonlinear (U-shaped) 
relation, capturing both drought and excessive rainfall, instead of focusing on 
droughts only. Second, it introduces a new set of conflict variables. The standard 
conflict measure usually takes the form of a dummy variable (0,1) on the basis of an 
arbitrary threshold of 25 deaths in order to fit econometric specifications (Buhaug, 
2010; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Raleigh et al., 2010). However, such dichotomous 
variables neglect a great deal of additional information on the severity of conflict, 
since the incidence of one more than 25 battle deaths is set equal to, for instance, 
125 battle deaths. In this chapter, we adopt four different continuous dependent 
variables to capture varying magnitudes of conflict. Third, the literature is 
dominated by large cross-country regressions that use rather short time frames; 
these fail to shed light on more localized effects of climatic variability in the long-
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run. Such research designs are mainly invoked by data availability problems. 
Although the present historical study is also constrained by data limitations, using 
colonial Nigeria as the case allows us to conduct a panel analysis on a sub-national 
level for a period of over 30 years (1912–1945). Fourth, almost all studies in this 
field are solely based on econometric correlations, and make no attempt to 
contextualize their findings using qualitative evidence. In this chapter, we use 
primary historical sources (newspapers, government reports) to track food 
shortages, crop-price spikes and outbreaks of violence, in order to back up the 
findings of the regression analysis. 
Last but not least, with this study we aim to expand existing research 
agendas to historical periods by merging the theoretical and empirical insights of 
two strands of literature: the environmental security literature, which seeks to 
investigate whether climate-induced scarcities lead to conflict; and the economic 
historical literature, which assesses the welfare effects of different colonial 
institutional arrangements and modes of economic specialization (such as the 
cashcrop revolution). The environmental security literature has not reached consensus 
on the linkage between climate and conflict. Hsiang et al. (2013) claim that climate 
change may be partly responsible for occasional outbreaks of violence and, more 
generally, greater economic and political instability. Previous studies have blamed 
climatic variability for increasing the likelihood of civil wars, or even for directly 
causing them (Burke et al., 2009; Miguel et al., 2004). These findings have been 
criticized by other researchers who have pointed to weaknesses in the construction 
of the climatological variables (Ciccone, 2011), and the level of aggregation of the 
conflict variables used (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012). In line with Fjelde and von 
Uexkull (2012), we will not argue that climate shocks lead to widespread civil 
conflict, but rather that the enhanced competition over scarce resources leads to 
disputes and clashes on a smaller communal scale.  
The term “conflict” will be used in its broadest definition in order to 
encompass a wide range of violent incidents. We observe two distinct categories of 
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communal conflict: (a) civil unrest, such as theft, raiding of livestock, assaults, land 
disputes between individual resource users, homicides and general armed violence, 
and (b) small scale communal violence between identifiable social/ethnic groups, 
such as violent and non-violent actions to evict certain resource users, land disputes 
between cattle-herders and farmers and largescale destruction of villages. In spite of 
their calamitous impact on civilian life and property, non-state inter and 
intercommunal conflicts have received limited attention in the literature. 
The economic historical literature largely agrees that African economies have 
expanded, to varying degrees, in response to increasing colonial trade and 
agricultural commercialization. Yet, the extent to which ordinary Africans have 
benefitted from such developments remains unclear (Hopkins, 1973; Rodney, 
1978). This debate has led to two rather opposing views. The “neo-Marxists” or 
“dependency theorists” hold that the introduction of new cash crops (such as 
cocoa) or the expansion of existing cash crops (including palm oil, rubber, coffee 
and cotton) in Africa has destroyed farmers’ traditional insurance mechanisms by 
inhibiting food production, without replacing them with any new form of security 
(Vaughan, 1987;Watts, 1983). The alternative view maintains that crop 
commercialization has provided the means to increase farmers’ incomes through 
the increased benefits reaped from international and inter-regional trade. This 
diversified farmers’ production and therefore limited the vulnerability of cash-crop 
farmers to the vagaries of climate (Berry, 1975; Fafchamps, 1992). In this chapter, 
we use closely documented historical sources to answer the underlying question 
stemming from the aforementioned debate: “Were the cashcrop provinces more –
or less– susceptible to climate-induced conflict? Did the introduction of cash crops 
benefit the local societies, or did it make them more vulnerable to erratic weather 
fluctuations?” 
Colonial Nigeria offers an interesting case for several reasons. As West 
Africa’s largest and most populous nation, it contains within its borders a wide 
range of geographical (such as agro-ecological zones) and institutional (such as 
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political entities) features; consequently, meaningful comparisons can be derived. 
Additionally, the time frame of this study guarantees a rather uniform institutional 
framework under British colonial rule; 1912 marked the end of effective resistance 
to British rule and the establishment of the borders of the Nigerian colonial state, 
while 1945 saw the start of serious internal resistance to colonial policies before the 
independence movement gained any real power. 
The sources used are the annual reports filed by the colonial administration. 
These reports were filed by political departments, and give information and 
explanations on all incidences of resistance and conflict considered worthy of 
mention, along with their likely causes. This information will be supplemented and 
supported by the reports of the police, prison and military departments. Moreover, 
these reports provide substantial information on both the background and returns 
of climate-related data, which allowed us to create balanced panel data (n = 20, t = 
35) of all the administrative provinces in colonial Nigeria. 
Overall, the results suggest a strong relationship between rainfall deviations 
and conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agro-ecological zones that are 
least resilient to climatic variability (such as Guinean savannah) and where (pre-) 
colonial political structures were less centralized. We also find evidence that the 
relationship is weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops. 
This is a topic of considerable urgency today as the process of global climate 
change accelerates, generating more severe and unpredictable weather events, as 
well as more erratic rainfall patterns. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it reviews the theoretical and 
empirical environmental security literature, and discusses the Nigerian colonial 
context in terms of geographical characteristics, political structures and economic 
activity. Next, it describes the baseline model, the data and the estimation 
methodology. Then, it reports the empirical results of the various measures. Finally, 
it provides detailed evidence from a number of historical cases in colonial Nigeria, 
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and identifies the mechanisms through which climate-induced scarcities led to 
conflict. A discussion on future research directions concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Theory 
The primary theoretical relationship between climate shocks and conflict 
runs via the increased scarcity of vital resources such as food and fresh water. A 
harvest failure leading to food shortages or unexpected declines in freshwater 
supplies intensifies the competition over access to water and land, and increases the 
possibility of conflict (Homer-Dixon, 1999). The principal criticism of this simple 
theoretical argument is that it neglects socio-political and economic contextual 
factors that play a role in mediating or aggravating the effects of climate-induced 
scarcities (Bachler et al., 1996; Gleditsch, 1998). This criticism has led to the 
development of more specific, context-dependent, theoretical mechanisms to 
explain the causal pathways between climate, demography, environment and 
conflict (Kahl, 2006). 
Even though a large volume of recently published studies aims to link 
climate-induced scarcities to different incidents of conflict, there is no consensus 
yet on precisely how these mechanisms operate (Buhaug, 2010). The problem is 
that most of the research so far has focused on large-scale conflict, such as civil 
wars (Burke et al., 2009; Miguel et al., 2004). The use of civil war as the dependent 
variable has been severely criticized on both methodological grounds (Ciccone, 
2011) and those of the proposed causal mechanisms (Buhaug, 2010; Gleditsch, 
1998). Kahl (2006) and Homer-Dixon (1999) have pointed out that demographic 
and environmental pressures are more prone to cause inter-communal mini-scale 
conflict than to cause widespread civil conflict. Recent research has been gradually 
moving away from larger cross-national conflict studies to use more disaggregated 
sub-national measures of conflict (Blakeslee & Fishman, 2013; Raleigh & Kniveton, 
2012; Theisen, 2012; Voors et al., 2016). In addition, these studies pay more 
attention to qualitative evidence in order to contextualize their empirical findings, 
and provide a more subtle argument about the role of climate shocks in outbreaks 
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of communal conflict. The present study can be seen as a contribution to these 
tendencies. 
The last decade has seen interest in the relationship between rainfall 
variability and conflict (Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Miguel 
et al., 2004). Even though this relationship has become a prominent research issue, 
it still remains ill-understood and has been highly contested (Klomp & Bulte, 2013), 
occasionally suggesting contradictive findings (Buhaug, 2010). For instance, several 
scholars have found that rainfall scarcity increases the likelihood of widespread civil 
war (Miguel et al., 2004) and subnational conflict (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012). In 
the same way, other scholars have argued that rainfall abundance increases conflict 
(Witsenburg & Adano, 2009), or similar to our findings, that rainfall variability has 
a curvilinear effect to civil conflict (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012). In sharp contrast, 
recent studies have concluded that rainfall and natural disasters have little or no 
effect on conflict (Buhaug, 2010; Koubi et al., 2012). 
Moreover, past research on African pastoralist drylands has established 
correlations between both more and less precipitation and conflict. Concerning 
pastoralist areas two arguments oppose each other. Witsenburg and Adano (2009) 
argue that livestock raiding in Northern Kenya (Marsabit district) is more probable 
during wet seasons when pasture and water are abundant, when the livestock is in 
good health, and hence, the competition to access scarce productive areas 
increases. On the contrary, Ember et al. (2012), by applying the same methodology 
to a neighbouring district in North-western Kenya -i.e. the Turkana district, argue 
that rainfall scarcity leads to higher intensity of violence- drier months and drought 
years have higher intensities of violence. 
Using the parameter of rainfall variability to assess the climate-conflict 
nexus, findings are more irrefutable now (Hsiang et al., 2013), and suggest that 
sharp rainfall deviations, on a subnational level, regardless of the sign of the rainfall 
variation, trigger conflict (Blakeslee & Fishman, 2014; Devlin & Hendrix, 2014; 
Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012; Theisen, 2012). In other 
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words, rainfall should be perceived as a key climate variable in terms of its impact 
both on agricultural productivity and, as a consequence, on livelihoods. 
2.3 Contextual conditions 
In thinking about the possible mechanisms underpinning the climate-conflict 
nexus in colonial Nigeria, it is important to consider some of the underlying agro-
ecological, economic and political conditions. The first condition is that the great 
majority of the Nigerian population during colonial times relied on rain-fed 
agriculture. This implies that rainfall shocks had a potentially dramatic and direct 
impact on food security. In terms of historical barriers to the internal transport of 
imported foodstuffs, this potential impact was almost certainly larger than it is 
today. The prime hypothesis is that both droughts and excessive rainfall have 
reduced the productivity of arable land and that, in addition, droughts have reduced 
the availability of fresh water. The hypothetical relationship thus takes a U-shaped 
form, as illustrated in Figure 1, and will be estimated accordingly (see Data and 
method section). Deviations from the long-term rainfall mean are thought to have 
increased the probability of violent clashes between or within communities over 
increasingly scarce resources (Detges, 2014; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; 
Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). 
Figure 1. Rainfall Shocks & Conflict Intensity 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. See main text. 
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The suggested climate-conflict relationship depends on many contextual 
factors. Although Nigeria lies entirely within the tropics, it covers different agro-
ecological zones, characterized by different rainfall patterns (see Map 1). Since 
temperatures fluctuate much less in tropical than in temperate climate zones, 
seasonal cultivation strategies and crop-specific harvests tend to depend primarily 
on rainfall. Subsistence farmers, commercial farmers and pastoralists have come to 
specialize in different cropping systems in different agro-ecological zones; all of 
these variations have contributed to variegated conditions in terms of how people 
cope with climate-induced scarcities. For instance, livestock breeding broadens the 
opportunities to store wealth, mediate risks and increase land productivity. 
However, the presence of the tsetse fly has constrained cattle-keeping to only few 
parts of Nigeria. 
The southern part of Nigeria stretches across the rainforest belt and the 
freshwater swamp zone. In this area, cash crops such as cocoa, palm oil, and tubers 
dominated agricultural production (Berry, 1975). In the northern part, which is the 
Sudan–Sahel savannah, groundnuts were the principal colonial export crop, 
especially in the heavily populated provinces of Kano, Zaria and Sokoto (Watts, 
1983). Groundnuts were combined with millet and guinea corn for human and 
animal consumption. To the south of the Sudanese savannah, the Guinean 
savannah, food production was dominated by cereals, roots and tubers, along with 
a wide range of complementary food crops (Hopkins, 1973). In “normal” years, 
this area produced a surplus of cassava, yam, guinea corn and millet, which were 
traded to other regions of Nigeria. The colonial officials named this region the 
“Market Garden of Nigeria” (CO657/38, p. 72), because vast quantities of 
foodstuffs were exported to both the northern and southern provinces. We argue 
that the combination of highly vulnerable production systems in northern Nigeria, 
with a surplus area next door, increases the probability of widespread inter-
communal conflict in cases of climate-induced scarcities in the North. 
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In political terms, colonial Nigeria can be divided into three different areas 
that correspond with the British administrative divisions of the country (see Map 
A-1, Appendix S1). The northern and western regions had established traditions of 
centralized power capable of exerting military influence and demanding allegiance 
and tribute from surrounding territories. The Muslim-dominated North was 
controlled by the long-established emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, and was the 
largest region in terms of both area and population (Falola, 2009). 
Map 1. Agro-ecological Zones in Nigeria. 
 
Source: Iloeje & FAO 2001, created in ArcGIS. 
The South can be roughly divided into two sections. In the West, a number 
of Yoruba kingdoms and the kingdom of Benin exercised changing degrees of 
central power. Although this region lacked political unity, states with sophisticated 
economic, political and cultural identities had already been developed since the 
15th century (Iliffe, 1995). Their wealth was principally based on trade and tributes 
from subordinate territories (Hopkins, 1973). On the contrary, in the East, political 
authority rarely extended beyond the village level (Afigbo, 1972). The dominant 
group was the Igbo. This region was characterized, on the one hand, by some of 
the densest rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa and, on the other, by a lack of large 
centralized political units (Papaioannou & Dalrymple-Smith, 2015). The most 
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significant problem that the British faced here was how to govern a territory that 
had no existing state apparatus by which they could induce local leaders to rule on 
their behalf. The colonial solution was the disastrous “Warrant Chief” system 
(Afigbo, 1972). The principle was that village chiefs would rule on behalf of the 
British. They were, according to the 1906 political report, to be “selected from the most 
influential amongst the Native chiefs selected by the chiefs and people of the district and approved 
by the district commissioner” (CO592/4, p. 314). The political structure of colonial 
Nigeria can thus be roughly summarized as a highly centralized structure in the 
North, compared to a semi-centralized south-western area and a completely 
amorphous south-eastern area. 
These differentiated structures are essential to understand why areas reacted 
differently to the encroachment of colonial rule. Especially in areas with weak pre-
colonial states, centralization resistance was endemic (Falola, 2009). It may thus be 
expected that the East and areas of the North outside the Emirates were more 
prone to conflict per se, even if these conflicts were unrelated to climate shocks. 
Moreover, in the centralized state structures of the North, which were 
characterized by higher social cohesion (higher local accountability) and stronger 
political institutions (state legitimacy and capacity), the British applied a more 
stringent version of indirect rule, in which the Islamic territories were granted a 
greater deal of autonomy (Watts, 1983). 
Finally, there is empirical evidence that sees more politically centralized 
entities to be more coherent and less violent (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Osafo-
Kwaako & Robinson, 2013). The econometric results of this chapter show that in 
areas where the institutional arrangements were weak and did not extend beyond 
the village level, the competition over land and water was more severe, and led to 
higher levels of civil unrest. Whereas in areas where there was a central power 
capable of exerting its influence to other surrounding territories, climate shocks did 
not give rise to as many instances of conflict. 
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2.4 Plausible mechanisms 
In discussing the plausible mechanisms that link climate shocks to conflict in 
colonial Nigeria, it is important to emphasize that extreme rainfall shocks may work 
in both directions, either through negative rainfall deviations leading to drought, 
potential crop failures and freshwater shortages, or through positive rainfall deviations, 
which can damage crops through flooding, mudslides or waterborne crop diseases. 
In a severe drought scenario, farmers and pastoralists may get into conflict over 
access to fresh water (Detges, 2014; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Rainfall shortages can 
have a direct effect on the number of farm animals, as a result of starvation or 
dying of thirst. Besides being a source of meat and milk, livestock is also 
indispensable for crop cultivation (for instance, ploughing, harrowing). A sharp 
decline in farm animals can thus have a detrimental effect on non-animal food 
supplies as well. 
Even though rainfall surplus can be beneficial to farmers, extreme levels of 
rainfall are unwanted. Floods, mudslides or waterborne diseases can destroy 
harvests and part of the food stock for farm animals. The most notable waterborne 
disease in Nigeria was the “Black Pod Disease,” which spread in the rainforest 
(cocoa zone) belt. This disease arises from exceptionally heavy and continuous rain 
usually during the months of July to September. For example, it occurred in 1933 
in Ondo (rainfall deviation +2.03), where the losses sustained by farmers in this 
area were very heavy; it was estimated that more than 30 percent of cocoa was 
destroyed by this disease (CO657/36). 
Another mechanism through which both types of rainfall shocks may lead to 
conflict is through increasing the market price of food. Food-price spikes can make 
food inaccessible, and even the mere expectation of (climate-induced) crop failures 
can drive up prices. Market prices of foodstuffs in Nigeria were subject to seasonal 
fluctuations and could be doubled within a year (CO657/40). Figure 2 illustrates 
how millet prices in Kano (northern Nigeria) were concurrent with climate-shock-
related harvest conditions. Environmental security theory suggests that when 
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societies face food shortages, price disputes emerge between rural producers and 
urban consumers increasing pressure on both sectors. The rising price of staple 
crops creates greater price inflation that undermines the purchasing power of urban 
dwellers (Berry, 1975; Hopkins, 1973). For instance, the Agricultural Annual Report 
of colonial Nigeria in 1915 observed that “...the total production of main food crop –yams, 
maize and millet– in many parts of Nigeria was undoubtedly lessened by the shortage in the early 
rains…the shortage of rain had a serious effect on the crops...naturally the price of food in some of 
the larger towns has risen to an extent which could cause serious hardship”(CO657/ 12, p. 17). 
Figure 2. Climate Shocks & Millet Prices 
 
     Source: CO657/1-35. 
A third mechanism that may instigate or aggravate conflict is the migration of 
people out of affected areas toward lesser-affected areas. Increasing demographic 
pressure can intensify the competition over food, water or land.6 For example, 
during the severe drought spells of 1928 in the Sudanese Sahel, people from the 
North were forced to move southward, in the hope of finding uncultivated land 
and more favourable climatic conditions (Watts, 1983). Colonial officers observed 
many such movements, and stated that “...an increase of 48,947 in the population is due 
                                                 
6
 It is important to stress here that (a) not all migration movements lead to higher incidence of unrest and 
(b) not all climate shocks lead to higher levels of violence. The Nigerian historiography has been rich and 
filled with notable violent events that were not instigated by climatic conditions, such as the Egba 
rebellion against taxation in the West in 1918, or the Women’s War in the East in 1929. 
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chiefly to the return of many who had migrated from the province (Kano) owing to failure of the 
harvest” (CO657/22, p. 46). 
2.5 Cash crops: mitigating risk? 
The extent to which specialization in cash crops has mitigated or aggravated 
the threat of climate-shock-induced conflict is prone to debate. In Vaughan’s view 
(1987 pp. 9 and 77), “Commercialization has distorted ‘subsistence’ economies and destroyed 
the insurance mechanisms in-built in these, without replacing them with any new form of security” 
and “this… [commercialization]…had had an inhibiting effect on production, village food stocks 
had been run down, and one bad season was enough to topple down the country into disaster”. In 
the same vein, Watts (1983) pointed out that the capitalist development (in 
particular, crop commercialization) in Nigeria created an unprecedented 
vulnerability to famines. Through a closely documented analysis of the peasant 
society for both the precolonial and colonial Hausaland, Watts portrayed the pre-
colonial African subsistence economy as self-sufficient, autonomous and 
cooperative. 
This view is supported by Richards (1990), who points out that there exist 
local (social) strategies that households follow in order to cope with hunger by 
requesting assistance from the members of a close kin. Repayment then is normally 
expected in the form of mutual assistance to households facing similar problems. A 
systematic attempt to model these mutual networks and solidarity in pre-capitalist 
societies has been put forward by Fafchamps (1992), who suggests that peasants 
would be willing to assist their kinsfolk because next year their luck may change 
and they too may need help from others. In the words of Evans-Pritchard (1940), 
“it is scarcity not sufficiency that makes people generous”, which, in practice, suggests that 
informal solidarity mechanisms tend to emerge naturally, in cases of natural 
calamities where the economic and social conditions are substantially uncertain, and 
the survival of a household is endangered. 
In this “moral economy”, mechanisms and social systems were developed to 
insure local peasants against possible food disasters by having a “set price” for 
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essential foodstuffs in the market. This price-setting implied that it was more 
important to a community to have a traditional “fair” price rather than a “free” 
market, where surpluses could be sold at a higher price. Raynaut (1977) stressed 
how the colonial rule profoundly disrupted social aspects of African farmers, as it 
changed long-established methods of distribution and circulation of vital foodstuffs 
among communities. According to Raynaut (1977), these methods were socially 
established and well respected within coherent collective groupings (families, ethnic 
and political units), and were disrupted by the introduction of cash crops, thus 
limiting the capacity of the African subsistence economies to withstand climate-
induced food shortages.  
On the other side of the debate, scholars have argued that crop 
commercialization provided the means not only to increase agricultural output but 
also to increase farmers’ incomes, thereby limiting the vulnerability of cash-crop 
farmers to the vagaries of climate. For example, Gusten (1968) argued that cash-
crop areas could support both their rural and urban populations, since most cash-
crop farmers, especially cocoa farmers, did not abandon food crops when 
extending their cash-crop plantations (see Map 2).  
  Map 2. Crop Commercialization in Nigeria 
 
Source: Iloeje & FAO 2001, created in ArcGIS. 
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In the same vein, Galletti et al. (1956) provided evidence from 187 families 
located around the cocoa belt in Southern Nigeria, which showed that 175 of them 
(almost 93 percent) produced some kind of food crop for consumption on the side, 
such as yams, maize and cassava (1956, pp. 410–411). Berry (1975, 170–171) stated 
that “...the fact that the cocoa belt as a whole imports food-stuffs need not imply that cocoa has 
supplanted food crop production in these areas; it may instead reflect increased consumption, owing 
to growing population or to higher incomes, or both.” She based her argument on the 
potential increasing benefits reaped from (inter-regional) trade, and on the 
diversification of domestic production, to conclude that economic specialization 
(that is, crop commercialization) limited the vulnerability of the cash-crop areas. 
2.6 Data and method 
To estimate the regression model, we use the system-generalized method of 
moments (system-GMM) developed by Bond et al. (2001), because it takes into 
account the time-series dimension of the data, the non-observable province-
specific effects, a lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables, and 
the possibility that all explanatory variables are endogenous (Roodman, 2006). The 
functional form of the dynamic panel model can be summarized as follows: 
 
Conflict_variablei,t = γ Conflict_variablei,t-1 + β1 rain_devit  
+ β2 rain_dev_SQit + δZi′t + νi + μt + λXit + εit  (1) 
i = 1,…, 20 and t = 1,…, 34    
 
where Conflict_variablei,t denotes the four different conflict variables in province i 
and year t. β1 and β2 are the coefficients of interest to be estimated. Z′it is a vector 
of geographical, institutional and economic determinants of conflict -which need to 
be controlled for- measured during this period. Province fixed effects (νi) control 
for all time-invariant differences between provinces, and year fixed effects (μt) 
control for factors that may affect levels of conflict across all provinces in the same 
year; a good example of when higher incidences of conflict might be expected in a 
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given year may be during the World War years, or years with extremely low export 
prices during the Great Depression.  
Moreover, Xit denotes a province-specific time trend; that is, an interaction 
term between unobservable province characteristics (νi) and a linear time trend (t). 
In this way, we control for the possibility that (a) colonial authorities have become 
more efficient in inhibiting conflict over time, and (b) previous conflicts have 
promoted distrust among certain social groups, in such a way that this distrust may 
affect future attitudes and conflict intensity between particular groups. εit is the 
error term. To address autocorrelation concerns relating to climate shocks, the 
standard errors are clustered at various levels: the province level, the year level, and 
both the province and year levels. 
The effect of climate shocks is estimated on four continuous dependent 
variables: the number of prisoners admitted during the year, the number of court 
cases, the number of homicides, and a newly constructed index named socio-
political conflict (SPC), which combines the former three variables using principal 
component analysis. All of the dependent variables are standardized using 
provincial population estimates. The data were collected from the colonial 
bluebooks of statistics, administration reports and sessional papers from the 
National Archives in London.7 Clearly a serious weakness is that these reports 
present only one side of the story (that of the colonizers). However, African 
accounts are unfortunately scarce. Therefore, when possible, we used secondary 
accounts and scholarship by African academics to corroborate the primary sources. 
There have been cases where the figures are widely inaccurate, such as the 
population numbers, and noted by African scholars (Frankema & Jerven, 2014). 
The general consensus is that they are huge underestimates, as colonial 
demographers did not work extensively outside of large towns or settlements and 
                                                 
7
 The sessional paper and the administration reports provide detailed descriptive and statistical 
information on almost every aspect of colonial rule. Among the subjects covered are: the economy and 
public revenue; the judiciary and police; demographics; public works; agriculture and meteorological 
observations. The reports include many statistical tables, graphs, and maps. The Bluebooks collection 
provides a summary of the various statistics and returns which fall under the categories described above. 
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many people were understandably not keen on being counted, and therefore taxed. 
However, it also appears that the inaccuracies are fairly standard, and thus allow for 
at least a comparison of the relative populations of the different provinces under 
review. Despite that, we believe that the data used in constructing the two core 
variables (conflict and rainfall) should be seen with a degree of reliability. For 
example, the rainfall statistics were also used from the Agriculture and Medical 
departments for their own purposes, to either efficiently invest in experimental 
crop farms (e.g. cotton) or to associate them with outbreaks of malaria and other 
diseases. Similarly, the Prison and Criminal departments had to publish figures both 
for annual prisoners’ admission and the reason of imprisonment, as well as the 
duration of imprisonment, indicating at least some attempt at accurate reporting. 
Rainfall anomalies are measured as the annual standardized rainfall deviation 
from the long-term mean over the years 1912–1945. The data were collected from 
36 meteorological stations across Nigeria on a provincial level documented in the 
Administration Annual Reports. Annual rainfall totals range from 120 inches in the 
South to less than 40 inches in parts of the extreme North (see Map A-3, Appendix 
S1). Even though we acknowledge the fact that one or two meteorological 
station(s) per province may not fully reflect the climatological conditions, we 
believe that the volume of data acquired -that is 34 years for over 20 provinces, 
resulting in a panel dataset with nearly 700 matching observations, increases the 
confidence in this study’s findings. If any, we strongly believe that these 
inaccuracies down-bias our results. 
The rainfall deviation variable is constructed using the following formula: (Xi,t 
−Ẍi)/σi, where Ẍi is the long-term mean of each panel, Xi,t is the annual rainfall in 
time t for province i, and σi is the standard deviation of each panel, that is, for every 
i. The rainfall deviation variable ranges from −3.46 to 3.68, and has a mean of 
almost zero and a standard deviation of 1. The advantage of the standardization of 
the variable is that it accounts for cross-provincial differences, as well as for within-
province variation. 
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From an econometric point of view, we expect no endogeneity between the 
dependent and the main explanatory variable, as conflict cannot affect rainfall. We 
also expect a low risk of omitted variable bias, since it is highly improbable for any 
unobserved feature to influence both the amount of rainfall and conflict 
simultaneously. We employ three sets of controls in order to avoid potential 
omitted variable bias, and to increase the explanatory power of the model. These 
three controls are: institutional, geographical and economic. 
(a) Institutional controls 
Many studies have found a relationship between low (pre-) colonial 
centralization and various forms of resistance, hostility, agitation and political 
protest (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007). We use a categorical variable [political_structures] 
to capture the variation across provinces, and expect a negative result. Easterly and 
Levine (1997) considered differences in ethnic fragmentation as a substantial 
explanation for divergences in political instability and conflict. We include a 
categorical variable of ethnic homogeneity [ethnic_homogeneity] to control for regional 
differences in ethnic composition. We also control for the imposition of direct 
taxation [direct_taxation] in 1929, which has spurred anti-colonial sentiments in 
various places. Finally, we control for the number of police staff [police_staff], which 
varied over time, as we expect that more police officers would have been assigned 
to politically instable provinces, and that part of their presence was related to tax 
collection. 
(b) Geographical controls 
We expect access (distance) to the sea [coastal_distance] to mitigate the impact 
of climate shocks by offering cheaper access to international trade (Gallup et al., 
1999). Imports can mediate temporary shortages, and thus reduce conflict risks. 
Additionally, we include a categorical variable, [agro-ecological_zones], which ranges 
from 1 to 5, in order to control for differences in the resilience of agro-ecological 
zones to climatic shocks (Fenske & Kala, 2015; Seo et al., 2008). Finally, we include 
the coefficient of variation of rainfall [cv] in order to control for the possibility that 
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a climate shock impacts differently on agricultural production in the northern 
provinces than in the southern ones. 
(c) Economic controls 
We expect that the construction of railways would reduce the potential 
magnitude of famines by opening up areas to food trades. While some scholars 
have argued that railway construction related merely to the exportation of goods, 
and may have been responsible for the 1913 famine in Kano (Apeldoorn, 1981), 
others have argued that it was used for food distribution policies. In either case, 
there is a possible link between railway construction and conflict intensity. We 
therefore assign a dummy variable to every province with a train station 
[railway].We control for levels of road density [road_density] following a similar 
reasoning, using a continuous variable of constructed roads for each province. 
Additionally, Herbst (2000) argued that higher investments in public infrastructure 
raise the opportunities for broadcasting state power. Hence, higher road-density 
levels can also be expected to be associated with quicker interventions by local 
police forces.  
The presence of livestock [livestock] may mitigate the effects of scarcity in a 
particular province, by providing an alternative source of food. In the same vein, 
more diversified agricultural production, which can be achieved by cultivating cash 
crops on the side, may also mitigate the impact of climate-induced resource scarcity 
in a particular province and we therefore include a newly constructed variable 
[Type_of_crop%]. This variable was constructed by bringing together information 
from historical maps, offered by expert scholars in the field of West Africa, 
commodity production data from the colonial annual reports, and the use of GIS 
(see online Appendix S1 for more details). Finally, it may be that areas with larger 
populations and rapid demographic transformations are more prone to political 
disorder (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Kahl, 2006); thus, two continuous variables 
([population_density] and [population_growth%]) are used to control for these effects, 
respectively. In both instances, a positive correlation is expected. 
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Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the baseline and extended 
models are reported in Table 1. These statistics provide the context in which to 
assess the magnitudes of the econometric results. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel (a): Dependent Variables      
Conflict_index_SPC 512 0.008 1.000 -0.461 6.513 
Prisoners_1000 620 1.103 2.059 0.004 15.344 
CourtCases_1000 547 2.161 5.903 0.001 42.096 
Homicides_1000 520 0.021 0.023 0.001 0.109 
Panel (b): Independent Variables      
Rainfall_deviation 607 0.001 1.002 -3.351 3.102 
Police_staff 603 162.816 203.801 0.000 940.000 
Population_density 680 80.912 68.913 4.390 363.020 
Population_growth (%) 660 1.820 14.589 -43.247 194.708 
Agro-ecological_zones 680 2.600 0.970 1.000 4.000 
Ethnic_homogeneity 680 0.670 0.141 0.400 1.000 
Political_structures 680 2.300 0.781 1.000 3.000 
Type of Crop (%) 680 0.351 0.477 0.000 94.500 
Coefficient of Variation (CV) 680 0.207 0.044 0.131 0.294 
Road_density 680 5.657 3.565 0.070 16.178 
Coastal_distance 680 371.454 288.310 0.000 936.300 
 Source: see main text. 
2.7 Empirical results 
The first set of regressions is reported in Table 2. The rainfall deviation 
square is highly statistically significant in all specifications, and confirms a U-shaped 
association between all four dependent conflict variables and climate shocks. In all 
the regressions, we included lags of the main explanatory variable in order to test 
whether climate shocks in the preceding years (t-1) affect conflict at time t. A 
statistically significant correlation here would mean that extreme weather variability 
is not the main trigger of conflict. However, the estimated coefficients of those lags 
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do not indicate any significance, which supports the argument that climate shocks 
almost immediately translate into higher levels of conflict. 
The control variables behave largely as expected, and their significance levels 
remain consistent among different econometric specifications. The police variable 
yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Road density yields a 
negative and significant coefficient. Finally, population growth yields an expected 
positive and significant sign. 
Table 2.  Conflict & Rainfall Deviation 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Conflict_Index_SPC Prisoners_1000 CourtCases_1000 Homicides_1000 
Lagged_dependent (t-1) 0.1771 0.1869 0.2109 0.1087 
       [5.99]***     [2.58]**     [2.71]**  [1.89]* 
Rainfall_deviation -0.0221 -0.0819 -0.0797 -0.0232 
  [-0.29] [-1.53] [-1.38] [-1.41] 
Rainfall_deviationSQ 0.1878 0.2691 0.3562 0.0428 
     [2.36]**     [3.86]***      [4.58]***     [3.76]*** 
Rainfall_deviation, lagged(t-1) 0.1045 0.1071 0.1242 0.0968 
  [1.37] [1.56] [1.34] [1.05] 
Rainfall_deviationSQ, lagged(t-1) 0.0766 0.1151 0.1007 0.0397 
  [0.59] [0.77] [0.64] [0.81] 
Police_staff 0.0036 0.0038 0.0035 0.0011 
       [4.13]***     [3.75]***       [4.83]***     [2.66]** 
Road_density -0.0621 -0.0536 -0.0317 -0.0792 
     [-2.53]**   [-2.23]**    [-2.06]**    [-2.16]** 
Population_growth(%) 0.0032 0.0025 0.0022 0.0019 
    [2.30]**    [1.98]**  [1.84]* [1.80]* 
Geographical controls Y Y Y Y 
Fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y 
Province-specific effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of Observations 484 522 522 498 
Number of Provinces 20 20 20 20 
Number of Instruments 27 28 29 28 
AR1 statistics (p-value) 0 0 0 0 
AR2 statistics (p-value) 0.296 0.318 0.378 0.348 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.924 0.931 0.947 0.843 
Notes:  - System-GMM estimation for dynamic panel data-model. Sample period: 1912–1945. 
- Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1 percent;  **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. 
- Second (and latter) lags were used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their once-lagged 
first differences were used in the levels equation. 
 - Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples using Windmeijer (2005) 
correction.  
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 - Time dummies, province-specific effects and a time trend are included in all regressions. Geographical 
controls include distance to the coast, distance to the nearest port, navigable river dummies, and the rainfall 
coefficient of variation (cv). 
 
The findings are straightforward, and confirm a direct and causal impact of 
climate shocks on conflict. An example serves to highlight the potential magnitude 
that one particular climate shock had on conflict levels. Column 4 of Table 2 
displays a positive correlation between the main explanatory variable (estimated 
coefficient: +0.0428) and the number of homicides per 1000 of the population, 
suggesting that an additional increase of rainfall deviation led to an average of 62.4 
additional homicides.8  
Columns 1-9 of Table 3 show the results of the baseline regression model, 
adding various control variables one by one.9 The results show that the estimated 
coefficient of rainfall deviation squared remains positive and statistically significant 
in all specifications, confirming a robust U-shaped climate-conflict relationship 
(using the Conflict_index_SPC). The agro-ecological zone variable yields the 
expected positive effect, but is not statistically significant. The railway dummy 
yields a negative, but insignificant, correlation. Direct taxation yields an expected 
positive sign, but is statistically insignificant. The ethnic homogeneity variable yields 
the expected negative sign, and is significant. Additionally, the dummy for livestock 
is statistically significant, indicating that there seems to be less conflict in the 
Northern provinces of Nigeria, where the absence of the Tsetse fly allows for 
(more) cattle keeping. The significant estimated coefficient of political 
centralization indicates that in cross-region variation differing political structures 
suggest considerable explanatory power, and confirms the idea that politically 
centralized entities are more coherent and less violent. 
In column 9 of Table 3, a dummy variable is included in order to assess 
whether provinces with cash-crop producers, as compared to subsistence farmers, 
have experienced different degrees of conflict under similar climatic conditions. 
                                                 
8 The analysis was also carried out by normalizing all three conflict measures. It is reassuring that this 
transformation did not change the results in a significant way. 
9 This depicts a cautious way to avoid any multicollinearity bias in the estimate models. We used the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) test to assess the presence of multicollinearity; in all model specifications, 
no evidence of multicollinearity was detected. 
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The type of crop variable is statistically insignificant, and therefore is not further 
interpreted here; however, this distinction is further examined in the next set of 
regressions. Finally, in column 10 we have included all of the control variables 
described above in order to test whether the effect of climate shocks on conflict 
disappears via the joint inclusion of these controls. The results did not change in 
any significant way. Finally, we tested for cross-sectional dependence after each of 
the above-mentioned set of regressions, as suggested, by Conley (1999). The reason 
for this is that there may be a concern that shocks to one province may spill over 
into adjacent provinces, which could eventually provide inconsistent estimated 
coefficients. The results suggest that cross-dependence is not a major concern. 
‘F
o
rc
e 
o
f 
N
at
u
re
’ 
 
4
9
 
 N
o
te
s:
 S
im
ila
r 
w
it
h
 T
ab
le
 2
. 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
  
(1
) 
(2
) 
(3
) 
(4
) 
(6
) 
(7
) 
(8
) 
(9
) 
(1
0
) 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t_
In
d
ex
_
S
P
C
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
 
  
  
  
C
o
n
fl
ic
t_
In
d
ex
_
S
P
C
, 
la
gg
ed
 (
t-
1
) 
0
.1
8
6
9
 
0
.2
1
0
9
 
0
.1
2
8
7
 
0
.1
7
6
6
 
0
.2
0
5
5
 
0
.1
6
7
9
 
0
.2
3
2
4
 
0
.2
1
1
4
 
0
.1
7
5
1
 
  
  
  
[2
.5
8
]*
* 
  
  
[3
.7
1
]*
**
 
  
 [
2
.1
8
]*
* 
  
 [
2
.7
4
]*
* 
  
  
[3
.2
2
]*
**
 
  
[2
.8
1
]*
* 
  
  
 [
4
.3
2
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
6
.0
9
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
2
.8
9
]*
**
 
R
ai
n
fa
ll_
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 
-0
.0
8
1
9
 
-0
.0
7
9
7
 
-0
.0
7
8
8
 
-0
.0
7
6
8
 
-0
.0
8
0
6
 
-0
.0
8
9
7
 
-0
.0
4
5
4
 
-0
.0
5
0
4
 
-0
.0
7
1
4
 
  
[-
1
.5
3
] 
[-
1
.6
8
] 
[-
1
.4
1
] 
[-
1
.3
1
] 
[-
1
.4
3
] 
[-
1
.2
2
] 
[-
0
.8
2
] 
[-
0
.8
3
] 
[-
1
.0
3
] 
R
ai
n
fa
ll_
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
S
Q
 
0
.2
9
9
1
 
0
.3
0
6
2
 
0
.3
1
2
8
 
0
.3
2
2
1
 
0
.3
0
5
5
 
0
.3
0
4
4
 
0
.2
8
1
1
 
0
.2
7
1
8
 
0
.2
6
1
3
 
  
  
 [
3
.8
6
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
4
.5
8
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
3
.7
6
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
3
.7
5
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
4
.3
6
]*
**
 
  
  
  
[4
.1
9
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
3
.8
5
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
3
.3
2
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
2
.7
4
]*
**
 
R
ai
n
fa
ll_
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
, 
la
gg
ed
(t
-1
) 
0
.1
0
7
1
 
0
.1
2
4
2
 
0
.0
9
6
8
 
0
.0
9
5
9
 
0
.1
1
5
6
 
0
.1
1
0
1
 
0
.1
8
6
6
 
0
.1
5
4
5
 
0
.1
0
3
4
 
  
[1
.5
6
] 
[1
.3
4
] 
[1
.0
5
] 
[1
.0
6
] 
[1
.4
7
] 
[1
.4
1
] 
[0
.9
2
] 
[1
.0
6
] 
[0
.8
6
] 
R
ai
n
fa
ll_
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
S
Q
, 
la
gg
ed
(t
-1
) 
0
.1
1
5
1
 
0
.1
0
0
7
 
0
.1
0
9
7
 
0
.1
0
0
9
 
0
.1
1
0
4
 
0
.1
0
5
4
 
0
.0
6
7
1
 
0
.0
7
5
 
0
.0
9
8
7
 
  
[0
.7
7
] 
[0
.6
4
] 
[0
.8
1
] 
[0
.6
1
] 
[0
.7
8
] 
[0
.7
3
] 
[0
.6
3
] 
[0
.7
3
] 
[0
.5
4
] 
P
o
lic
e_
st
af
f 
0
.0
0
3
8
 
0
.0
0
3
5
 
0
.0
0
2
9
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
0
.0
0
3
7
 
0
.0
0
3
9
 
0
.0
0
3
1
 
0
.0
0
3
6
 
0
.0
0
2
7
 
  
  
  
 [
3
.7
5
]*
**
 
  
  
  
[4
.8
3
]*
**
 
  
  
[2
.6
6
]*
* 
  
  
[2
.5
5
]*
* 
  
  
 [
3
.6
8
]*
**
 
  
  
  
[3
.5
7
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
4
.6
6
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
4
.9
2
]*
**
 
  
  
 [
3
.1
1
]*
**
 
R
o
ad
_
d
en
si
ty
 
-0
.0
8
2
1
 
-0
.0
7
3
6
 
-0
.0
9
1
7
 
-0
.0
7
2
3
 
-0
.0
6
9
2
 
0
.0
3
1
9
 
-0
.0
5
2
9
 
-0
.0
4
3
1
 
-0
.0
2
4
8
 
  
  
 [
-2
.2
3
]*
* 
  
  
 [
-1
.9
6
]*
* 
  
  
[2
.1
6
]*
* 
  
  
[2
.0
4
]*
* 
  
[-
2
.3
9
]*
* 
  
 [
2
.0
8
]*
* 
[-
1
.7
1
]*
 
  
[-
2
.1
4
]*
* 
  
[-
2
.0
9
]*
* 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
_
gr
o
w
th
(%
) 
0
.0
0
1
8
 
0
.0
0
1
1
 
0
.0
0
2
2
 
0
.0
0
2
2
 
0
.0
0
1
9
 
0
.0
0
1
5
 
0
.0
0
1
3
 
0
.0
0
3
3
 
0
.0
0
2
8
 
  
 [
2
.0
5
]*
* 
  
[1
.9
1
]*
 
  
  
[2
.0
1
]*
* 
  
  
[1
.9
9
]*
* 
 [
1
.8
8
]*
 
  
  
[2
.0
6
]*
* 
  
[1
.8
5
]*
 
  
[1
.9
1
]*
 
  
[1
.9
4
]*
 
A
gr
o
-e
co
lo
gi
ca
l 
zo
n
es
 
  
0
.1
0
2
4
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
0
.0
8
2
4
 
  
  
 [
1
.2
4
] 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 [
1
.3
1
] 
R
ai
lw
ay
 
  
  
-0
.1
4
5
9
 
  
  
  
  
  
-0
.1
0
5
1
 
  
  
  
[-
0
.5
5
] 
  
  
  
  
  
[-
0
.4
4
] 
E
th
n
ic
_
h
o
m
o
ge
n
ei
ty
 
  
  
  
-0
.3
1
0
7
 
  
  
  
  
-0
.2
1
5
6
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 [
-2
.8
6
]*
**
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 [
-2
.9
1
]*
**
 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 
  
  
  
  
-0
.3
9
9
8
 
  
  
  
-0
.3
0
1
1
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 [
-2
.8
4
]*
* 
  
  
  
  
  
 [
-2
.5
1
]*
* 
D
ir
ec
t_
ta
xa
ti
o
n
 
  
  
  
  
  
0
.1
9
0
2
 
  
  
0
.1
6
6
2
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
[1
.1
5
] 
  
  
[1
.0
1
] 
P
o
lit
ic
al
_
st
ru
ct
u
re
s 
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0
.1
0
6
3
 
  
-0
.1
4
3
3
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
[-
3
.0
0
]*
**
 
  
  
  
  
[-
3
.0
2
]*
**
 
T
yp
e_
o
f_
cr
o
p
 (
%
) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
-0
.2
4
1
8
 
-0
.1
3
1
9
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 [
-1
.0
4
] 
 [
-0
.9
8
] 
G
eo
gr
ap
h
ic
al
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
F
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
N
O
 
T
im
e 
d
u
m
m
ie
s 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
P
ro
v
in
ce
-s
p
ec
if
ic
 e
ff
ec
ts
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
Y
E
S
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s 
4
8
4
 
4
8
4
 
4
8
4
 
4
8
4
 
4
8
4
 
4
5
2
 
4
8
4
 
4
8
4
 
4
5
2
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
P
ro
v
in
ce
s 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
2
0
 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
In
st
ru
m
en
ts
 
2
4
 
2
8
 
2
8
 
2
8
 
2
8
 
2
7
 
2
7
 
2
8
 
3
5
 
A
R
1
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
(p
-v
al
u
e)
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
0
 
A
R
2
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
(p
-v
al
u
e)
 
0
.3
4
4
 
0
.3
4
8
 
0
.3
7
8
 
0
.4
0
4
 
0
.3
4
8
 
0
.3
5
5
 
0
.2
9
1
 
0
.2
4
7
 
0
.4
4
9
 
H
an
se
n
 t
es
t 
(p
-v
al
u
e)
 
0
.8
5
4
 
0
.9
3
1
 
0
.9
4
7
 
0
.9
2
8
 
0
.9
1
7
 
0
.9
8
2
 
0
.9
1
7
 
0
.8
1
7
 
0
.9
2
1
 
T
a
b
le
 3
. 
C
on
fli
ct
 I
nd
ex
 &
 R
ai
nf
al
l 
D
ev
ia
ti
on
 
 
Climate Shocks & Conflict 
50 
 
2.8 Further explorations 
This section will first outline the heterogeneous effects climate shocks have 
on conflict, conditional on geographical, institutional and economic characteristics; 
it will then investigate whether the climate-to-conflict effect is symmetrical. A large 
body of literature has emphasized the role of agro-ecological zones (Seo et al., 
2008), pre-colonial structures (Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013) and crop 
commercialization (Watts, 1983) in shaping and explaining various instances of 
conflict. 
2.8.1 Heterogeneous effects 
Recent literature has suggested that some agro-ecological zones are less 
resilient to climate shocks than others (Kala et al., 2012; Seo et al., 2008). This body 
of literature emphasizes the supply-side of environmental shocks and suggests that 
the harvests of crops in less resilient regions can more easily be destroyed (Fenske 
& Kala, 2015). As a result, extreme climate shocks in these regions are more likely 
to jeopardize food security, raise resource competition over cropland and pastures, 
and trigger conflict. 
In the case of colonial Nigeria, the Guinean savannah appears to be the most 
conflict-prone ecological zones, where communal conflict arose between the cattle-
keeping Fulanis and the agriculturalists of the Guinean savannah over access to 
land. The Fulanis and their livestock drifted southward in search of water and food, 
which resulted in the destruction of the Guinean farmlands and spurred increased 
communal clashes. Even though there have been permanent tensions between 
farmers and herders, such issues have been more prevalent during years of higher 
rainfall deviations (Detges, 2014; Ember et al., 2012; Witsenburg & Adano, 2009). 
Our results support this argument. 
Column 1 in Table 4 shows the results of the baseline regression with the 
inclusion of the AEZ categorical variable. The insignificance of the estimated 
coefficients of this variable does not confirm an environmental deterministic 
hypothesis; thus, different agro-ecological zone by themselves cannot explain cross-
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regional conflict variation. However, when they interact with rainfall deviations 
from the long-term mean (column 2), differing agro-ecological zones gain more 
explanatory power, and one of these zones -the Guinean savannah- yields a 
positive and statistically significant relationship with conflict. The Guinean 
savannah interaction term also yields the highest estimated coefficient (+0.4491). 
In column 3 of Table 4, the significant estimated coefficient of the political 
centralization variable suggests that different political structures predict different 
levels of conflict. This finding corroborates with previous literature that sees more 
politically centralized entities to be more coherent and less violent (Osafo-Kwaako 
& Robinson, 2013). Furthermore, we include two interaction terms to capture 
whether different political entities react differently to the occurrence of climate 
shocks (column 4). It seems that there are more climate-induced conflicts in areas 
with weak pre-colonial institutions (in this case the eastern provinces), compared to 
areas with strong pre-colonial institutions (in this case the provinces around the 
Sokoto Caliphate). 
In column 5 of Table 4, the results show that different types of crops do not 
account for conflict variation across provinces unless they are affected by a climatic 
shock. The dummy variable of food crop does not yield a significant correlation. In 
column 6, however, the estimated coefficients indicate that the provinces in which 
food crops are cultivated, while being affected by extreme climate shocks, 
witnessed higher levels of conflict compared to the cash-crop areas. 
These results do not confirm the alleged disruptive and calamitous impact of 
crop commercialization on African farmers, and suggest that in the Nigerian case, 
the introduction of new cash crops neither destroyed the insurance mechanisms 
nor intensified the risk of food shortages. On the contrary, it seems that crop 
commercialization limited the vulnerability to climate shocks because it diversified 
production and income, which enabled farmers to reap the increasing benefits from 
inter-regional and international trade. This conclusion does not provide evidence 
with respect to whether crop commercialization was good or bad for the African 
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farmers in the long run; rather, it argues that the vulnerability of the cashcrop areas 
was considerably reduced due to agricultural diversification. 
Table 4. Interaction Terms & Rainfall Deviation 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Conflict_Index_SPC                                             
Conflict_Index_SPC, lagged (t-1) 0.2109 0.1645 0.2324 0.2354 0.1689 0.1619 0.2872 0.2751 
      [3.71]***     [2.64]**      [4.32]***     [3.60]*** 
      
[3.50]***    [2.86]** 
      
[5.23]*** 
    
[6.24]*** 
Rainfall_deviation -0.0797 -0.0827 -0.0454 -0.0211 -0.0242 -0.0741     
  [-1.68] [-1.38] [-0.82] [-0.29] [-0.38] [-1.29]   
 Rainfall_deviationSQ 0.3062 0.2738 0.2811 0.4154 0.2525 0.1456     
       [4.58]***     [2.31]**      [3.85]***      [3.16]***     [2.68]** 
     
[4.76]***     
Rainfall_deviation, lagged(t-1) 0.1242 0.1228 0.1866 0.0836 0.1545 0.1218     
  [1.34] [1.06] [0.92] [0.47] [0.53] [1.26]     
Rainfall_deviationSQ, lagged(t-1) 0.1007 0.0965 0.0671 -0.0081 0.0519 0.1153     
  [0.64] [0.75] [0.63] [-0.10] [0.85] [1.10]     
Police_staff 0.0035 0.0043 0.0031 0.0026 0.0034 0.0039 0.0018 0.0017 
        [4.83]***       [2.93]***      [3.66]***     [2.24]** 
     
[4.14]*** 
     
[4.95]*** 
    
[4.31]*** 
    
[3.19]*** 
Road_density -0.0736 -0.0641 -0.0529 -0.0234 -0.0717 -0.0692 -0.0178 -0.0175 
       [-1.96]**  [-1.79]* [-1.71]*     [-2.21]**     [-1.89]*     [-1.80]* [-1.44] [-1.75]* 
Population_growth(%) 0.0011 0.0091 0.0013 0.0037 0.0017 0.0011 0.0005 0.0001 
    [1.91]*   [1.87]*  [1.85]*   [0.67]     [2.01]**  [1.88]* [0.33] [0.02] 
Agro-ecological zones 0.1024               
  [1.24]               
Dummy_mangrove_swap                 
                  
Rainforest^   -0.5585             
    [-1.03]             
Dummy_rainforest   0.0467             
    [0.19]             
Guinean_Savannah^   0.4491             
        [2.33]**             
Dummy_Guinean_Savannah   0.4612             
          [3.99]***             
Sudan_Savannah^   -0.3964             
       [-1.76]*             
Dummy_Sudan_savannah   -0.2346             
    [-1.34]             
Political_structures     -0.1063           
          [-3.00]***           
West_medium_centralized^^       -0.1495         
        [-0.77]         
Dummy_medium_centralized       -0.1421         
        [-0.24]         
‘Force of Nature’ 
 
53 
 
North_high_centralized^^       -0.1559         
            [-1.98]**         
Dummy_high_cenralized       -0.3785         
           [-2.44]**         
Food_crop (reference category)         -0.1091 0.1739     
          [-0.69]     [1.99]**     
Food_crop^^^           0.3735     
                [2.49]**     
Negative_climatic_shock 
(Drought)             0.1639   
              [1.94]*   
Positive_climatic_shock 
(Excessive)               0.2077 
                
   
[2.03]** 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geographical controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Province-specific effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of Observations 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 484 
Number of Provinces 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of Instruments 24 33 27 32 30 29 34 34 
AR1 statistics (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AR2 statistics (p-value) 0.344 0.384 0.291 0.302 0.301 0.652 0.329 0.303 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.854 0.927 0.917 0.958 0.977 0.923 0.971 0.926 
Notes:  - System-GMM estimation for dynamic panel data-model. Sample period: 1912–1945. 
- Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1 percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. 
Second (and latter) lags were used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their 
once-lagged first differences were used in the levels equation. 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples using Windmeijer 
(2005) correction. 
- Time dummies, province-specific effects and a time trend are included in all regressions. 
Geographical controls include distance to the coast, distance to the nearest port, navigable river 
dummies and the rainfall coefficient of variation (cv). Controls include all variables used in Table 
3.  
- (^) denotes four interaction terms: mangrove swamp, rainforest, Guinean savannah and Sudan 
savannah. 
- (^^) denotes three interaction terms: high, moderate and low centralized political structures. 
- (^^^) denotes two interaction terms: cash- and food-crop provinces. 
2.8.2 Symmetrical effect 
The curvilinear (U-shaped) climate–conflict relationship is not fully symmetrical. 
Although the estimated coefficients in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 are both 
statistically significant, their coefficients vary considerably. It appears that conflict 
has been more acute in wetter years (+0.208) than in drier years (+0.164). This 
result is in line with Theisen (2012) findings for Kenya. A possible explanation for 
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this (perhaps somewhat counterintuitive) finding is that in years of excessive 
rainfall farmers would lose their entire harvest in a very short time (such as a couple 
of days), whereas in years of drought farmers could hope and wait for late rains. 
Therefore, in the former scenario farmers may be more directly concerned with 
survival and fighting than in a drought scenario, which results in an increase to the 
conflict time frame. Another possible explanation may be that excessive rainfall 
destroys infrastructure, particularly unpaved roads, thereby limiting the ability of 
colonial police patrols and military escorts to respond quickly to violence. 
2.9 Qualitative evidence 
In this section we back up our regression results with qualitative historical 
evidence. We use historical newspapers and government reports to explore food 
shortages, crop-price spikes and outbreaks of violence. We combine and triangulate 
data from these historical sources in three stages. First, by looking at the rainfall 
patterns of a particular year and indicating whether moderate and/or severe climate 
shocks occurred. For this, we follow the Standardized Precipitation Index 
classification (Wu et al., 2005) to categorize different-magnitude shocks into three 
groups: (1) when the deviation is more than ±1, it is considered to be a mild shock; 
(2) more than ±1.5 indicates a moderate shock; and (3) more than ±2 is seen as an 
extreme shock (see Appendix S1, Tables A-4a-c). Second, we use information from 
the annual agricultural reports from the colonial government to investigate whether 
these climate shocks actually led to deficient harvests and to crop-price spikes. 
Third, turning to those years and provinces which were severely affected, we read 
through the police, prison and military reports and use the statistics to back up the 
underlying mechanisms and hypotheses. 
For the period 1912–1945, we documented 203 shocks in the whole of 
colonial Nigeria; 97 of these were owing to excessive rainfall, and 107 were due to 
mild, moderate or extreme droughts. Naturally, these shocks were not evenly 
spread out. In 1916, 1929 and 1935 there were no shocks of any serious magnitude. 
In 1913, on the other hand, the situation was disastrous, with extreme droughts 
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extending across large parts of West Africa. It is worth noting that the colonial 
reports only recorded conflicts of major importance (CO657/17, p. 67); that is, 
outbreaks of violence that were a serious concern to the authorities as they 
potentially threatened the colonial social order. At the end of the harvest period the 
Nigerian Pioneer of September 4, 1913 mentioned: “The absence of rain seems general 
throughout Nigeria, and is causing some uneasiness. Should there be no adequate rainfall during 
the later rains, the ensuing harvest will be of a poor description” – a speculation that became 
true later that year. In 1913, there were many moderate and severe climatic shocks 
in several provinces. In Kano, for example, there was an extreme drought (rainfall 
deviation: –2.40). According to the Agriculture Report (CO657/1, p. 10): “the 
rainfall during the year was abnormally low and, in consequence, agriculture suffered throughout 
the country, but more particularly in the province of Kano where the failure of the food crops caused 
a famine”. 
The social consequences of this drought became visible in a sharp increase 
of prisoners and court cases during the year. The number of prisoners admitted to 
government jails in the Kano province was 455, as compared to 212 in 1912 (an 
increase of 114 percent) and 190 in 1911; 13 of these prisoners were incarcerated 
for debt, 39 for security reasons, and 403 were sentenced to penal imprisonment. 
Out of the total number of offenders serving sentences of penal imprisonment 
there were 288 for terms over two years, while the same figure during the preceding 
year was just 68. The military operations report of that year summarized that “...a 
patrol was despatched to the Fagge district of the Kano Province in September, where inter-tribal 
fighting was taking place and some towns were reported to be in a state of anarchy. There were 
numerous casualties – 39 natives killed, and 7 wounded...” (CO657/1, p. 32). 
Looking back on the 1913 famine in Kano, Hastings (1925, p. 111) noted: 
“...the ghost of famine stalked aboard through Kano and every other part. The stricken people tore 
down the ant hills in the bush to get the small grains and chaff within these storerooms [...] they 
made use of every poor resource their ingenuity could think of, and ravenous in their hunger, seized 
on anything they could steal or plunder [...] for the pasture had dried up and cattle were just skin 
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and bone...”. This is a vivid description of what was happening in a province severely 
affected by famine. Local inhabitants, in need for food, plundered and stole 
everything in their way. 
Turning to the local market conditions for buying food, Table 5 
demonstrates the price spike for millet, which rose to an incredible high of 3d per 
pound (CO657/1, p. 45). Other grain prices in rural markets exhibited an increase 
of at least ten times above 1912 levels. The fact that millet prices, and prices of 
cereals in general, spiked dramatically meant that the vast majority of people were 
without food, or the means for obtaining it. The urban poor and other low-income 
groups must have suffered terribly due to food price inflation. 
Table 5. Cereal price data in Kano Market (millet) 
Year Price (pence per pound ) 
1911 0.11 
1912 0.38 
1913 3.01 
1914 0.27 
        Source: CO657/1 
Figure 3 shows how rainfall deviation is related to a higher number of 
prisoners and court cases, whereas in “normal” years such levels were not recorded. 
Figure 3. Rainfall Deviation & Conflict 
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Kano province was not the only area affected by the drought of 1913. In 
Bornu province (rainfall deviation: −1.65), a moderate drought also resulted in a 
severe food crisis. The lack of food supplies induced migration to other provinces 
–a trend confirmed by the population figures shown in Table 6. It seems that local 
inhabitants drifted southward, depopulating Bornu and seeking for more 
favourable climatic conditions, and relatively better lands to cultivate (see Table 6). 
However, for those who stayed behind, the Chief Commissioner of the native 
authority prison stated: “there was an increase in the number of prisoners...this was due 
mainly to the growth of praedial larceny that last year’s food shortage brought about” (CO657/1, 
p. 69). 
Table 6. Population, Bornu province 
Year Population 
1910 674,000 
1911 672,342 
1912 513,388 
1913 481,759 
1914 626,500 
1915 700,451 
 Source: CO657/1-4 
The Bauchi province faced a moderate climate shock as well (rainfall 
deviation: −1.64). The police report noted that: “a police patrol was sent to the Tangali 
District of the Bauchi Province, in November, to deal with a section of pagans who had set upon a 
native official and a peaceful village, killing 11 and wounding 12 of them. 9 of the aggressors had 
been killed and several wounded in the affray. 9 more were killed and 7 wounded when opposing 
the patrol” (CO657/1, p. 53). 
A systematic look at the reported judicial, prison population and criminal 
statistics reveals a high year-to-year variation in almost all provinces (see Appendix 
S1, Figure A-1). For instance, the judicial statistics show that in the aforementioned 
northern provinces the number of offenses against the police dropped from 2967 
in 1913 to 2246 in 1914, and that the number of people brought before the 
Magistrates decreased from 2892 to 2190, a reduction of ca. 25 percent. The annual 
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prisoners’ report also confirms that the largest daily prisoner averages could be 
found in the Kano and the Bornu provinces in 1913 (CO657/1, p. 50). 
After examining an extreme drought scenario, we will now focus on the 
variation between “moderate” years, and highlight outbreaks of violence following 
the three-stage approach discussed above. For instance, we will examine the two 
climate shocks in Ondo and Ogoja provinces in 1923, a year which, according to 
the colonial officials “can be overall regarded as being a prosperous one regarding local 
farmers” (CO657/9. p. 12). In Ogoja, the rainfall deviation of +2.14 marked a severe 
shock. The police report of 1923 stated that “three escorts for major purposes” had been 
sent to the province during the year, all of whom were accompanied by a high-
ranked commissioner of the police. In particular, “in July...a party of Bamenda traders 
en route from Ikom to Ogoja were brutally murdered on the main road when passing through the 
Bansara country..., an escort of 25 other ranks was despatched with the District Officer to 
investigate the matter. The result was that twenty people were arrested and returned for trial, 
several of whom were executed.” Further, it was reported that “other escorts for minor 
purposes were also supplied in the Ogoja province in September...in keeping the peace between the 
Afungbonga and Obubra tribes”(CO657/9, p. 43). Crime statistics in the Ondo 
province (rainfall deviation: −1.74) recorded a substantial increase, “where there were 
15 murders as against none in the preceding year,” and the number of prisoners doubled 
from 205 to 417 (CO657/9, p. 44). 
Another example is taken from the Kano province in 1920 (rainfall 
deviation: −1.56), where the reduced yield of groundnuts can be attributed to 
climatic causes: “Kano farmers were unfortunate in experiencing a drought just after sowing, 
while subsequently the exceptionally heavy rains damaged the crop”(CO657/6, p. 15). 
Moreover, the world market price for groundnuts was very low and would not bear 
the cost of transport from places far removed from the railway (CO657/6, p. 7). 
Turning to the criminal statistics of the year, the amount of stolen property was the 
highest ever recorded at ₤2.221. In the following year, Kano’s figure for stolen 
property decreased by ca. 60 percent – lower than that of 1920 (CO657/6, p. 49). 
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The provincial report of 1926 in the Benue province (rainfall deviation: 
−1.87) recounted: “there was a food shortage in several Benue Districts for a considerable part 
of the year, and unfortunately there is the possibility of a recurrence in 1927,” and continued 
“...disturbances entailing the use of armed force occurred during the year...on one occasion an 
attempt was made to ambush the Political Officer.” The Nigerian Pioneer of 30 March 1926 
confirmed the prevalent disorder in the province: “...a mob attacked the police station 
and the police were compelled to fire with the result that one rioter was killed.” Additionally, in 
the Bauchi, where there was a significant drought (−1.51) in the same year, the 
number of provincial court cases increased by ca. 40 percent. The agricultural 
report noted that: “famine conditions in some of the Northern provinces caused some 
distress...and food prices became greatly inflated” (CO657/17, p. 14); further, “the conditions 
were certainly not such as is conveyed by the word famine, but there was a definite shortage which 
caused the price of grain to soar to three or four times the normal price” (CO657/17, p. 17). 
The consequences of these high food prices can be depicted through the annual 
police report of 1926, which noted that “...of the seventy-eight offences of homicide in the 
whole of Northern Nigeria, fifty-nine were cases of murder. The very great majority of these cases, 
namely forty-four, occurred in the pagan districts of Benue and Bauchi provinces...” (CO657/17, 
p. 107) –this represents a shocking 75 percent of the total registered murder cases. 
The following two cases were selected to offer a comprehensive impression 
about the temporal dimension of the advent of climate-induced civil unrest. We argue 
that the majority of violent incidents usually occur during and immediately after the 
rainy season (June–September), when the farmers realize that their yields are going 
to be deficient or of a complete failure, and the opportunity cost for violent 
uprising declines. For instance, in Onitsha province (+1.73), the agricultural report 
summarized “...the season was exceptionally wet. August and September proved to be together 
months of exceptional wetness, there being only about 3 days in each on which rain did not fall. 
Such an extraordinary wet spell proved fatal to the young crops. July was likewise wet enough to 
cause an unusual amount of rotting of the seed in the ground. The result was a crop failure and, it 
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is probable that the year 1917 will be memorable for a serious failure of many crops” 
(CO657/4, p. 8). 
Turning to the police and criminal report of the year “in early September...three 
police escorts were necessary to deal with unrest among the Ibeagu-Ezzi clan...it was known that 
the Ibeagu suffered 25 casualties” (CO657/4, p. 88). Moreover, “...a regrettable incident 
occurred in the Enugu Division late in September. Arising out of disputes over farming areas 
between the towns of Onicha-Agu and the Umunevu quarter of Amagunze...a chief of Onicha-
Agu, who was a member of the Native Court, was murdered in the main street of Umunevu on 
his way home from court...9 ringleaders were murdered too” (CO657/4, p. 91). Therefore, 34 
homicides took place right after a severe crop failure, a figure which accounts for 
85 percent of the total homicides (40) registered that year in Onitsha. 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the linkage between climate shocks and the 
incidence of conflict in colonial Nigeria. It makes several contributions to the 
current literature. We measured climate shocks through deviations from long-term 
rainfall patterns in a nonlinear (U-shaped) relation, capturing both drought and 
excessive rainfall, and introduced a new set of continuous conflict variables. We 
argued that climate shocks enhanced competition over scarce resources, which led 
to disputes and clashes on a smaller communal scale; in spite of their calamitous 
impact on civilian life and property, non-state communal conflicts have received 
limited attention in the literature to date. 
To the best of our knowledge, this case-study is the first to provide both 
qualitative and quantitative evidence on climate-induced subnational conflict in a 
historical setting. It presents a considerable amount of detailed qualitative evidence, 
which adds robustness to the econometric results, and supports the suggested 
mechanisms leading from climate shocks to conflict in the context of colonial 
Nigeria. Finally, this chapter expands the existing research agenda to historical 
periods by merging the theoretical and empirical insights of the environmental 
security and the economic historical literature. 
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Overall, the results indicate that there exists a robust and significant 
relationship between rainfall deviations and conflict intensity, which tends to be 
stronger in agro-ecological zones that are least resilient to climatic variability (such 
as Guinean savannah), and where (pre-) colonial political structures were less 
centralized. There is evidence that the relationship is weaker in areas that specialize 
in the production of export crops compared to subsistence farming areas, 
suggesting that agricultural diversification acted as an insurance mechanism against 
the whims of nature. 
Several long-term implications stem from the results of this chapter, and 
need to be further investigated. First, we need to retrieve previously unexplored 
archival data to measure climatic variability and conflict in a more precise way. 
There is scope for better understanding the climate-to-conflict relationship, by 
adding a substantial historical perspective. Second, we need to create a benchmark 
of the nature of violence by investigating how it changes over time and over the 
long run. This will enable us to draw safer conclusions for present-day outcomes. 
Has climate change been a recent phenomenon, or short term climatic variability 
instead has been responsible for higher outbreaks of conflict? 
Third, we predict that future studies could explore the extent to which the 
introduction of new cash crops (such as cacao, tobacco, etc.) in Africa destroyed 
the traditional insurance mechanisms of farmers. Has the introduction of cash 
crops mitigated or aggravated the threat of climate-induced conflict over time? 
Have areas with a substantial cash-crop export sector performed better in declining 
poverty rates over the long run, compared to areas primarily dedicated to food 
crops? To conclude, the results from this chapter seem to suggest that crop 
commercialization provided the means to increase farmers’ income through the 
additional benefits reaped from international and inter-regional trade, and in turn 
this diversified farmers’ production and limited the vulnerability of the cashcrop 
areas to the vagaries of climate. 
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Appendix. Supplementary material 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2015.07.001.  
Historical Sources 
Statistical yearbooks and government reports 
The Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, Blue Book. Lagos: Government Printing 
Office, various issues, retrieved from The National Archives, London (Department 
code: CO 657, Series number: 1–56). 
____________ Annual Report. Lagos: Government Printing Office, various issues, 
retrieved from The National Archives, London (Department code: CO 660, Series 
number: 1–35). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Weather Shocks & Agricultural Commercialization in 
Colonial Tropical Africa: 
Did Export Crops Alleviate Social Distress? 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates how weather shocks triggered social distress in 
British colonial Africa. Further, it intervenes in a long-standing and 
unsettled debate concerning effects of agricultural commercialization 
on the abilities of rural communities to cope with exogenous shocks. 
We collect novel qualitative evidence from annual administrative 
records to explore the mechanisms that lead from weather extremes to 
harvest failures and, in turn, to social distress. For our econometric 
analysis, we construct a panel dataset of 151 administrative districts 
across west, south-central and east Africa in the Interwar Era (1920-
1939). Our findings are twofold. First, we find robust evidence that 
rainfall anomalies (both drought and excessive precipitation) are 
associated with spikes in imprisonment (our proxy for social distress). 
We argue that the key causal pathway is the loss of agricultural income, 
which results in higher imprisonment for petty crime, civil unrest, debt 
and tax default. Second, we find that the impact of weather shocks on 
distress is partially mitigated by the cultivation of export crops. We argue 
that, even in a British colonial context, smallholder export crop 
cultivation led to higher private incomes as well as greater public 
investment. Our findings speak to a topic of considerable urgency 
today as the process of global climate change accelerates, generating 
more severe and unpredictable climatic extremes. We believe that 
increased understanding and identification of adaptive and mitigating 
factors would assist in targeting policy interventions and designing 
adaptive institutions to support vulnerable rural societies. 
 
Publication Status: Papaioannou, K. J. & De Haas, M., 2017. Weather Shocks and Agricultural 
Commercialization in Colonial Tropical Africa. Did Export Crops Alleviate Social Distress? 
World Development 94(1), pp. 346–365. 
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3.1 Introduction  
“...the year had gone mad. Rain fell as it had never fallen before. For days and nights together it 
poured down in violent torrents, and washed away the yam heaps [...] The blazing sun returned, 
more fierce than it had ever been known, and scorched all the green that had appeared. The earth 
burned like hot coals and roasted all the yams that had been sown [...] He watched the sky all 
day for sign of rain clouds and lay awake all night. In the morning he went back to his farm and 
saw the withering tendrils.” 
Chinua Achebe, When Things Fell Apart (1994, p.16) 
For centuries, many thinkers and scholars have sought to understand 
whether and how climatic conditions influence societies and the economy. Any 
understanding promises insights into why some economies have thrived historically 
while others languished, how contemporary societies can design effective policies and 
institutions to shield against current climate extremes, and how future climate 
change may impact human habitation. In recent years, a proliferation of rigorous 
studies has emerged aiming to quantify and assess the effects of climate extremes 
on economic and social outcomes (Hsiang et al., 2003; Dell et al., 2014). This surge 
can be explained, partly by rising public concerns about climate change and its 
potentially ensuing distortive effects on human development, partly by a greater 
popular awareness of the critical role climate might play in affecting social and 
economic outcomes, and partly by methodological advances and data availability, 
aided by  developments in computing power.  
The adverse impact of climatic variability on social outcomes has proven 
particularly pronounced in developing countries, with Sub-Saharan Africa 
(henceforth abbreviated to Africa) being the most vulnerable region. This does not 
come as a surprise, as a large share of the population depends on rain-fed 
subsistence agriculture, with less than 5% of the cultivated area being irrigated 
(FAO 2014). In such a context, climate-induced harvest failures appear to be tightly 
related to food insecurity, economic distress and social destabilization. Africa’s 
rising population densities, pervasive climate change and resurging socio-political 
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instability make this prolonged vulnerability to the vagaries of climate a most 
pressing concern (Morton, 2007).  
While this growing body of research has demonstrated that climate extremes 
significantly impact societies, human affairs are not uniformly determined by climate. 
The effects of climate on the society are mediated by a wide variety of geographical, 
cultural, institutional and commercial factors (Sen, 1981; Thompson, 1971; Watts & 
Bohle, 1993). The key question, then, is which factors enable the mitigation of 
adverse impacts of climate extremes, and how such factors can be propagated 
through targeted policy interventions (Adger, 2000; Folke, 2006; Gallopin, 2006).  
Whether agricultural commercialization aggravates or mitigates the 
vulnerability of rural communities is the subject of a multifaceted, heated and long-
standing debate among historians, policy makers and social scientists (Von Braun & 
Kennedy, 1994; Govereh & Jayne, 2003). This study aims to use Africa’s past 
experience with smallholder-based export production during the colonial era to 
generate new insights on the impact of agricultural commercialization on the 
abilities of rural communities to cope with weather shocks. We provide new 
district-level evidence on the link between weather shocks and social tension and 
distress in British colonial Africa during the interwar era (1920-1939), as well as on 
the mediating  role of smallholder-based export crop production.  
The data for our analysis have been compiled from annual Colonial Blue Books 
and Administration Reports, stored in The National Archives of the UK in London. 
Data was collected for over 200 sub-national administrative units in Botswana, 
Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. 
Exploiting the extensive and consistent administrative records that remain from 
Britain’s African empire, we are able to provide new material on a world region for 
which systematic data collection is notoriously difficult, and, as a consequence, 
contribute to a considerable expansion of the historical time horizon.  
Our research strategy has both a qualitative and econometric component. 
First, we critically examine the colonial administrative records to improve our 
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understanding of the mechanisms that explain the impact of drought and excessive 
rainfall on harvest outcomes and distress. Second, we econometrically test the link 
between weather shocks and social distress, as well as the mediating impact of 
export crop cultivation. To that end, we obtain observations on annual rainfall and 
imprisonment, and  construct a novel panel dataset at the sub-national level. We 
also construct two indicators to measure each  district's involvement in export crop 
cultivation. To measure social distress, we use annual fluctuations in imprisonment 
at the district level. While colonial prisons locked people up for a wide range of 
distress-related behaviours,  such as debt, tax and fine default, petty thefts and civil 
disobedience (Bernault, 2007; Hynd, 2008),  imprisonment spikes in the wake of 
weather shocks provide us with a particularly valuable inroad to capturing social 
distress.  
Justification for our selection of interwar British colonial Africa is made on a 
number of grounds. First, Britain administered a vast African empire. The 
extensive bureaucratic legacy has allowed us to construct a consistent district-level 
dataset, spanning approximately one-fifth of Africa’s landmass and one-third of its 
population in this period. Second, the geographic and temporal scope provides data 
for over 200 sub-national administrative units. In some of these units, crops were 
grown on a considerable scale for export, while in others agricultural production 
was primarily geared towards subsistence. Our temporal scope encompasses the 
interwar period, a period of relative calm between the violent early-colonial 
conquest and the highly politicized post-war road to independence (Killingray, 
1986).  
Our qualitative evidence suggests several different mechanisms through 
which both drought and excessive rainfall result in harvest failures, adversely 
affecting agricultural incomes and provoking distress. The econometric estimates 
for our full sample, using fixed-effects models, confirm this relationship and reveal 
a robust U-shaped impact of weather shocks on different measures of 
imprisonment. The effect is not symmetrical. A ‘negative rainfall shock’ (drought), 
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measured as a one standard deviation decrease from the long-term rainfall mean, is 
associated with 16.0 per cent increase in total imprisonment, and a ‘positive rainfall 
shock’ (excessive rainfall), measured as a one standard deviation increase from the 
long-term rainfall mean, is associated with an even stronger 24.8 per cent increase 
in total imprisonment. These effects are similar in magnitude to accumulated 
evidence from other studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013). The results are robust 
to using two different indicators of annual rainfall anomaly, as well as range of 
alternative formulas for parameterizing rainfall shocks.  
Having established a robust overall relationship between rainfall anomalies 
and annual spikes in imprisonment for our full dataset, we test if this relationship is 
mediated by smallholder-based export crop cultivation. The results show that a one 
standard deviation change in rainfall (in either direction) is associated with 10.2 
percentage points change in total imprisonment in districts with substantial export 
crop production, as compared to 33.9 percentage points change in districts with 
negligible or no export crop production. This finding suggests that imprisonment 
spikes in districts with relatively high amounts of export crop income per capita 
were significantly less affected by weather shocks. We argue that this finding 
indicates commercialization of smallholder agriculture did have a mitigating effect on 
rural communities’ vulnerability to weather shocks. The fact that our findings pass 
a wide range of robustness tests, increases our confidence in the actual production 
of export crops playing  a crucial role in mitigating the impact of weather shocks.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places our 
study in the context of several related literatures. Section 3 introduces our 
qualitative evidence on the link between climate extremes, loss of agricultural 
income and distress. Section 4 discusses the data for our econometric analysis. 
Section 5 econometrically demonstrates a causal link between rainfall and 
imprisonment. Section 6 econometrically demonstrates that export crops mitigate 
the effect found in section 5. Section 7 discusses the implications of our findings 
and concludes.  
Did Export Crops Alleviate Social Distress? 
72 
 
3.2 Related Literature 
3.2.1 The Impact of Climate on Economy & Society. 
Over the past decade, the scholarly debate on the impact of weather 
anomalies on societal outcomes has expanded considerably. Scholars and policy 
makers have become increasingly aware of the short-run and long-run impact of 
climatic factors on a wide range of economic, social and political outcomes. The 
goal of this sub-section is not to systematically report all  studies in this rapidly 
expanding literature, but rather to provide a brief contextual overview of the links 
between climatic fluctuations and key research trends. For a more profound 
summary on the new climate-economy literature, we encourage readers to consult 
Dell et al. (2014) for a general discussion, Burke et al. (2014) for conflict outcomes, 
Deschenes (2014) for health outcomes, Auffhammer et al. (2013) for climatic 
modelling, and Hsiang (2016) for nuances on climate econometrics.  
While some scholars dispute the evidence linking weather to conflict 
outcomes (Klomp & Bulte, 2013; Buhaug et al., 2014), a range of studies have 
found that climatic variability not only triggers conflict (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 
2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Papaioannou 2016a), crime (Iyer & Topalova, 
2014; Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015; Papaioannou, 2016b), and full-blown civil war 
(Blattman & Miguel, 2010), but also processes of democratization (Brückner & 
Ciccone, 2011). Scholars are divided on the mechanisms that explain the ‘climate-
society nexus’ (Almer & Boes, 2012; Buhaug, 2010), but harvest failures are found 
to be a prime candidate, especially in settings where people’s incomes rely heavily 
on rain-fed farming and where small fluctuations in crop yields can have 
devastating effects on livelihoods (Barrios et al., 2010; Iyer & Topalova, 2014; 
Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015; Miguel et al., 2004; Schlenker & Lobell, 2010; 
Papaioannou, 2016b).  
Recent contributions have begun to investigate different time periods 
(Papaioannou, 2016a; Jia, 2014), employ a more fine-grained, sub-national scope 
(Harari et al., 2013; Raleigh & Urdal, 2007) and use more non-binary indicators as 
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the dependent variable (Papaioannou, 2016a; 2016b). Moreover, a number of 
studies have employed detailed case study analyses to uncover the key mechanisms 
leading from weather variability to social distress, civil unrest and political upheaval 
(Adano et al., 2012, Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Ember et al., 2012; Witsenburg & 
Adano, 2009). Among those who take precipitation as the key independent 
variable, some find that drought is the prime reason for societal destabilization 
(Couttenier & Soubeyran, 2011; Maystadt & Ecker, 2014), while others argue that 
both droughts and excessive rainfall fuel higher social tension (Papaioannou, 2016a; 
Papaioannou, 2016b; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012).  
The effects of climate extremes on local societies are not uniformed nor 
predetermined, but instead mediated by geographical, cultural, institutional, 
commercial factors (Sen, 1981; Watts & Bohle, 1993). In the words of E.P. 
Thompson, social unrest should not be seen as a mere “spasmodic” response to 
adverse conditions, and “a bad harvest, or a down-turn in trade” are not in 
themselves sufficient explanations of  social outcomes (Thompson,1971). The key 
question, then, is which factors mitigate the impact of weather shocks, and how 
such factors can be propagated through targeted policy interventions. The 
mitigation of vulnerability to climate extremes has been a key priority issue in 
recent literatures investigating sustainable rural livelihoods (Chambers & Conway, 
1992; Ellis, 1993; Scoones, 2009) and adaptive strategies to cope with climatic 
variability and change (Adger, 2000; Folke, 2006; Gallopin, 2006; Ahmed et al., 
2009).  
Our contribution here is fourfold. Firstly, we use qualitative evidence to 
explore the mechanisms running from weather shocks to social distress. Second, our 
dependent variable (imprisonment) is continuous and fine-grained, and allows us to 
pick up relatively minor fluctuations in social distress in the wake of these shocks. 
Third, we provide new data on a historical period that is so far understudied. 
Fourthly, and most importantly, we econometrically test for the mitigating effect of 
agricultural commercialization on vulnerability to weather shocks. 
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3.2.2 Agricultural Commercialization & Weather Shocks in a Colonial 
Context. 
It seems obvious that agricultural production systems play a particularly 
crucial part in determining societies' abilities to cope with exogenous shocks. 
However, the ways in which agriculture may enhance the resilience of African 
communities, in a context of erratic and changing weather conditions, has been a 
particularly contentious issue among scholars and policy makers (Bryceson, 2002; 
Collier & Dercon, 2014; Giller et al. 2009; Raikes & Gibbon, 2000). Evidence on 
the impact of agricultural commercialization on resilience to weather shocks is 
mixed. On the positive side, increased openness to external markets has been 
associated (a) with higher incomes, and (b) with farmers’ improved abilities to 
‘smooth consumption’ and diminish short-term risks (Burgess & Donaldson, 2010; 
Fafchamps, 1992; Myint, 1958). Agricultural commercialization has also been 
argued to provide rural communities with access to new crops, inputs and 
agricultural technologies and to incentivize governments to invest in infrastructure, 
famine prevention and extension services, each with the potential to alleviate 
feasible adverse effects of volatile climatic conditions (Govereh & Jayne, 2003; 
Maxwell & Fernando, 1989). At the same time, scholars have drawn ample 
attention to the fact that market access is far from a uniform blessing to vulnerable 
rural communities. When attention is diverted from subsistence production, 
production for markets may induce hunger and malnutrition, while 
commercialization may result in the erosion of ‘traditional insurance mechanisms’, 
induce stratification, and facilitate external exploitation and extraction, each of 
which in fact makes societies more vulnerable to weather-induced shocks (Bates, 
1981; Scott, 1976; Vaughan, 1987; Von Braun & Kennedy, 1994; Watts, 1983).  
The literature on African history has exposed numerous mechanisms that 
influence the effect of export-based agricultural commercialization on distress in 
the wake of weather shocks. We do not claim to test the validity of the individual 
mechanisms proposed on either side. Instead, we take a previously underexplored 
angle and methodology and empirically test the ‘weighted’ or ‘net outcome’ of the 
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variegated mechanisms running from export crop cultivation to vulnerability to 
weather shocks. In statistical terms, we tease out an ‘average’ or ‘overall treatment effect’ 
of export crops on types of distress that resulted in imprisonment in interwar 
British colonial Africa.  
While we argue that our findings have broader implications and are relevant 
for contemporary debates on agricultural commercialization, it is also important to 
acknowledge the particular context from which our results are drawn. The volume 
of agricultural exports expanded markedly during the era of colonial rule (~1880-
1960) (Tosh, 1980). In many cases, colonial rulers attempted to introduce or 
expand export crops through coercion and exploitation. In some, such as Kenya or 
Zimbabwe, settlers expropriated land and barred African smallholders from 
producing the most profitable crops (Mosley, 1980). In others, such as Mali, Congo 
or Mozambique, rural communities were forced to cultivate and sell crops for 
export rather than subsistence (Isaacman, 1980; Roberts, 1996; Likaka, 1997). 
However, uniformly equating the ‘export crop revolutions’ in early twentieth 
century Africa with colonial exploitation would not do justice to the agency and 
initiative of African smallholders (Tosh, 1980; Austin, 2014a).  
The expansion of cocoa production in Ghana and Nigeria was driven by 
African rural capitalists (Hill, 1982; Austin, 2014b), while the expansion of 
commercial groundnut production in the Gambia and Northern Nigeria, as well as 
the introduction of tobacco and cotton in Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi, were 
conditional on the productive choices of millions of African rural households 
(Bryceson, 1981; Hogendorn, 1978; Mandala, 1990, Swindell & Jeng 2006; Wrigley, 
1959). In northern Nigeria, smallholders massively took up groundnuts, while 
British colonial interests preferred to see cotton exported (Hogendorn, 1978). The 
cultivation of cotton in Uganda and groundnuts in the Gambia were primarily 
driven by indigenous agents, and their cultivation attracted scores of migrants from 
across the colonial borders (Swindell & Jeng, 2006; Wrigley, 1959) 
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A number of characteristics were common to the great majority of export 
crop cultivating smallholders during the colonial era. Firstly, they were cultivating 
in a land abundant context, in which labour was the primary factor constraining 
further expansion (Austin, 2008). Secondly, farmers continued to cultivate food 
crops and to pursue food self-sufficiency (Tosh, 1980). A typical cotton growing 
household in eastern Uganda, for example, only devoted 2.5 out of its total 8.0 
acres cropped annually to cotton, and the remainder to food crops such as millet 
and groundnuts, primarily for home consumption (De Haas, 2016). Cocoa farmers 
in Nigeria and Ghana were, perhaps, the exception to this rule, due to the high 
profitability of cocoa, although even they cultivated considerable amounts of food 
crops alongside their cocoa trees (Austin, 2014b). Thirdly, export crops were 
cultivated with basic technology (hand cultivation, few external inputs and mostly 
unimproved seeds) (Tosh, 1980). As a result, yields were typically modest, but at 
the same  time, smallholders did not have to incur large debts in order to 
participate in export crop cultivation. In some cases, export crops were explicitly 
‘state sponsored’, and inputs such as cotton seeds or coffee seedlings were freely 
distributed.  
While the introduction and expansion of export crops in British colonial 
Africa may not have exclusively, or even primarily, been driven by colonial policies, 
smallholders’ productive choices were undoubtedly shaped by colonial occupation. 
Even though households were not formally obliged to cultivate crops in most 
cases, they were often pressurized to do so by chiefs and local administrators, or 
subjected to indirect force by the required payment of colonial taxes to market their 
produce (Wrigley, 1959; Bryceson, 1988; Mandala, 1990). Therefore, colonial state 
interventions may well have prevented some of the potential gains of agricultural 
commercialization from accruing to rural producers themselves.  
Colonial rule also affected the spatial distribution of agricultural 
commercialization. In some areas, the introduction of motorized transport and new 
agricultural technologies under colonial rule may have enhanced the productive 
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capacities of rural producers, while in others, it is possible that the lack of 
investment, the outmigration of young men and the introduction of taxes spurred 
rural impoverishment, contributing to a deepening of regional inequalities. This 
possibility suggests that, without colonialism, these districts would have benefited 
even more from agricultural commercialization, or that districts culminating in 
marginalized subsistence economies during the colonial era would have fared better 
if colonial states had made more efforts to increase their access to external markets.  
 Our finding that regions growing export crops are more resilient to weather 
shocks, begs (rather than answers) further questions about the interfering role of 
colonialism. For now, we simply face the reality that there is no empirical 
counterfactual at hand to answer such questions (Heldring & Robinson, 2012).  
3.3 Qualitative Evidence 
3.3.1 Weather Shocks, Harvest Failures and Social Distress 
Our sources provide a unique opportunity to engage with the different 
perspectives on the debate over the effects of weather anomalies on rural African 
societies. The British colonizers set up a hierarchically organized system of 
administration in their African dependencies. Territories were subdivided into 
provinces and districts. The maintenance of law and order was largely left to 
African policemen, prison guards and native authorities, who operated as ‘indirect 
rulers’ under the supervision of British administrative officers. Elaborate 
administration accounts were kept, and local officials reported on a regular basis to 
their supervisors on a range of issues. We use annual administrative reports 
obtained from the departments of agriculture, native affairs, police, justice and 
prisons. These reports are consistent in their coverage of issues over time and 
across colonies, giving us a uniquely comprehensive insight into local conditions 
across a wide area and a timespan of 20 years. 
 The reports are rich in relevant content. At the same time, we must be 
aware of the colonial context in which these reports were produced. British colonial 
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services tended to be understaffed, and local administrators’ accounts reveal strong 
prejudice and paternalistic and derogatory attitudes towards local populations. On 
top of that, previous scholars have pointed out that civil servants, in order to inflate 
their achievements and benefit their own careers, had incentive to focus on 
‘progress’ and paint a rosy picture to superiors, which may compromise some of 
the reliability of local administrative accounts (Killingray, 1986). We read the 
reports critically, and argue that some statements in the colonial reports can be 
more readily accepted than others. For example, an agricultural officer describing 
the impact of drought on seed germination seems to us more unproblematic than a 
district commissioner attributing starvation to “the apathy of an ease loving people” 
(Sierra Leone 1923), or an episode of social unrest to the “idleness and nomadic 
instinct” of the groups involved (Kenya, 1933).  
The impact of weather conditions on agricultural outcomes is extensively 
discussed by colonial administrators, who make regular note of weather-induced 
agricultural failure, resulting in higher levels of distress. Both too little and too 
much rainfall are routinely proffered as causes of depressed agricultural incomes. 
Droughts are frequently mentioned as a catalyst for suppressed yields. In severe 
cases, drought is also associated with complete crop failure, dust storms and soil 
erosion. For instance, the agricultural report of 1920 Gold Coast states that the 
food crops in Volta River “were exceedingly scarce” as “the drought during the early part of 
the year is causing many of the crops to fail and all crops realised high prices.” (Gold Coast, 
Agricultural Report 1920). Similarly, in 1927, the commissioner of Zaria District 
(Northern Nigeria) noted that the “considerable decrease [in foodstuffs] is accounted for 
by a drought which occurred after planting had taken place” which made it “impossible for 
peasants to cultivate their land” (Nigeria, Provincial Report 1927).  
Diminished water supplies to wells, surface water sources and pastures, also 
associated with lack of rainfall, negatively impacts upon livestock. To prevent 
starvation, people moved with their livestock, which in turn increased their 
susceptibility to disease and further weakened underfed herds. An administrative 
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account discusses how these varied drought effects simultaneously struck Baringo 
District (Kenya): “The year 1933 has been one of the worst in living memory. A complete 
failure of the long rains caused enormous losses among stock, ruined the crops in the low-lying parts 
and made the harvest on Masop very late. It is safe to say 50 per cent of the cattle died” (Kenya, 
Native Affairs 1933).  
 Regular mention is also made of the adverse effects of excessive rainfall on 
agriculture, running via different mechanisms. Heavy precipitation and resulting 
floods damaged crops and created adverse conditions for harvesting, storage and 
transportation of agricultural produce. In 1936, the Rufiji District (Tanzania) 
suffered “a great flood”, which “destroyed the main crops of one-third of the population” 
(Tanganyika, Native Affairs 1936). Similarly, “a truly phenomenal rainfall” in Owerri 
Province “severely injured the crops” and led to “widespread shortage of available food 
supplies” (Nigeria, Agricultural Report 1922). In The Gambia, as a result of abnormally 
heavy rainfall, the groundnut crop “suffered severely during the ripening and reaping period. 
[...] Fermentation was rapid and much damage was done to the nuts and to the quality of soil. 
The extent of this damage was widespread and felt throughout the country” (The Gambia, 
Agricultural Report 1927).  
Administrative accounts also link heavy rainfall to increased prevalence of 
plant diseases. In Ondo Province (Nigeria), ‘black pod disease’ destroyed an 
estimated 30 percent of the cocoa harvest during a year of heavy rainfall (Nigeria, 
Agricultural Report 1933). Reports also recount how parasitic organisms thrived 
under conditions of heavy rainfall. A serious increase in weevil infestation in the 
Trans Nzoia District (Kenya) was attributed to “abnormal[ly wet] weather conditions” 
(Kenya, Agricultural Report 1930).  
Examples of the negative impact of droughts as well as excessive rainfall on 
agriculture can be found in both very wet and very dry regions. That positive and 
negative rainfall shocks compromise agricultural outcomes in a wide range of agro-
ecological settings makes sense, considering that smallholders built their farming 
systems around an expected rainfall pattern. The choice of the crop mix and 
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farming methods were calibrated on the basis of this expectation. Similarly, the 
physical environment was also conditioned by an expected level of rainfall. While 
lots of rain may seem beneficial to a dry savannah, its soils may be incapable of 
absorbing the precipitation, resulting in run-off, floods and waterlogging. For 
example, Machakos (Kenya), a district with an average annual rainfall of only 40 
inches, experienced an exceptionally wet year after a number of consecutive years 
of drought. A colonial officer noted that “despite the very heavy rain during the year, the 
condition of the Reserve has not improved; it has in fact degenerated further, particularly in regard 
to water supply. Owing to large areas being denuded of grass, the erosion caused by the heavy rains 
must have been enormous” (Kenya, Native Affairs 1930).  
The administrative accounts frequently link the adverse impact of rainfall to 
food price spikes and subsequent social distress, which took the shape of increased 
petty crime and livestock raids and thefts. In Northern Nigeria in 1927, “the rainfall, 
which was considerably below the average, caused a partial failure of the guinea corn and yam 
crops in certain districts of the province. There was a definite shortage which caused the price of 
grain to soar to three or four times the normal price [from 0.12 to 0.65 pence per bag]” 
(Nigeria, Provincial Report 1927). The district commissioner concluded that “with the 
high prices which prevailed the native had a hard time to make both ends meet and a certain 
amount of distress has been apparent.” The police report of that same year reported that 
“petty theft was frequent in Kano. About April petty theft reached alarming proportions and 
special efforts were made to combat it.” The annual imprisonment rates exhibited an 
increase of about 61%, forcing the Commissioner to state that “there is no doubt that 
the reason for the increase of crime is mainly economic” (Nigeria, Police Report 1927). 
Examples like the one above can be drawn systematically from the sources. 
The native commissioner of Turkana district, a pastoral area in Kenya, pointed out 
that the shortage of water and grazing resulting from a drought in 1929, “led to more 
migration and possibly more squabbles, crime and bloodshed than usual” (Kenya, Native 
Affairs 1930) Only four years later, “a phenomenal drought” led to “famine and 
poverty” as well as a “constant anxiety of raids and massacres on the frontier. [...] The 
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Turkana have been driven in unprecedented numbers to encroach on the grazing and water 
supplies of their more fortunate neighbours” (Kenya, Native Affairs 1933). In that same 
year, the severe drought and resultant stock mortality in the Masai District (Kenya) 
“led to an increase in crime. Actual hunger caused many sheep thefts and raids into Tanganyika 
Territory. Counter raids have proven serious.” The local imprisonment rate of the year 
exhibited a sharp increase from 255 to 408 convicts (Kenya, Native Affairs 1933). 
The Kenya police report of 1933 points out that “stock theft shows a 60 per cent. 
increase in the number of cases brought to court, while the number of persons convicted has nearly 
doubled. This large increase may be attributed to the difficult times experienced by the natives 
owing to the failure of the rains” (Kenya, Police Report 1933). 
An episode of abnormally high rainfall in Saltpond and Winneba District 
(Gold Coast) resulted in crop damage, failure and ‘resultant stress’, ‘shortage of the 
food supply’ and high prices. The incarcerated population increased by 25% and 
37%, respectively (Gold Coast, Agricultural Report, 1925). In Rufiji District 
(Tanganyika) in 1930, “for a considerable period 15,000 natives were homeless owing to the 
floods and many lost their houses, stock and crop.” The local police commissioner noted 
that “there was an increase of cattle theft, perhaps due to the shortage of food” and that “cases of 
theft predominated” mainly owing to the food shortage. The number of thefts rose to 
1028 compared to 600 the previous year  – an increase of approx. 71% 
(Tanganyika, Native Affairs 1930). 
Conversely, colonial officers sometimes also explicitly attributed the absence 
of tension and distress to low prices due to favourable weather, which can be 
assumed to have positively impacted food production. The Gambia police, for 
example noted that 
 
“with such favourable weather conditions coupled with the low 
price of foodstuffs, it was only to be expected that the crime 
figures should be satisfactory and never in the past 30 years has 
the total number of reports of serious crime been so small as in 
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1934. It is too much to hope that such a peaceful state of affairs 
can become normal” (Gambia, Police Report 1934).  
 
While we find such causal inferences by colonial officials more plausible and 
satisfactory than the essentialistic assessments of the local population’s ‘natural 
responses’ to adverse conditions  mentioned above, we should still receive them 
with a degree of scepticism, since attributing social tension and distress to 
exogenous weather variation also conveniently diverted attention from the 
potential negative impact of colonial interventions themselves. 
3.3.2 Cash Crops & Vulnerability 
Our study of the administrative record highlights that the impact of export 
crops on resilience in the wake of exogenous shocks was already a contested issue 
among colonial administrators. A southern Nigerian agricultural director expressed 
the concern that cocoa “considerably reduced the output of food”, and increased 
smallholders’ vulnerability to weather anomalies. An episode of “great shortage of 
food” was attributed “partially to the cocoa boom and partially to the drought” (Nigeria, 
Agriculture 1930). Likewise, the agricultural commissioner of Gold Coast stated in 
1921 that “with the successful development of cocoa-growing there has been a marked tendency to 
neglect the cultivation of foodstuffs and to depend on imported provisions. In an essentially 
agricultural country this is not satisfactory or what one might expect. In the same interior districts 
a shortage of foodstuffs is actually felt.” He argues that the shortage of food crops 
became so pronounced that “the value of local grown products has soared to unheard of prices 
in recent years,” leading to “widespread distress” (Gold Coast, Agriculture 1921).  
 Other colonial administrators were more optimistic, highlighting the 
diversification of risk that came with the adoption of export crops. A drought in 
Central Kavirondo (Kenya) “proved disastrous to food crops”, while the cotton 
crop “fared better [...]. The failure of the food crops accentuated the value of cotton, for those who 
had it to sell were able to subsist on their own resources” (Kenya, Agriculture 1937). In 
addition, several native officers of Tanganyika reported that farmers only began 
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cultivating export crops “when they had ensured for themselves and their dependents an 
adequate food crop” (Tanganyika, Native Affairs 1930). The colonial officers also noted 
that smallholders prioritized food security over cash income, as “the planting of food 
crops is the first consideration” and that “poor rains very often cause unavoidable delays in the 
planting of export crops such as cotton with the result that low yields are obtained” (Tanganyika, 
Native Affairs 1933).  
While we find that colonial reports are rather unambiguous when it comes to 
the adverse impacts of negative and positive rainfall shocks on agriculture and, with 
some reservations, social tension and distress, we conclude that the reports are 
more ambiguous and problematic when it comes to the adverse impact of weather 
shocks. This ambiguity in the colonial sources reflect similar ambiguity in the 
scholarly literature. We conclude that the reports are insufficiently impartial and too 
imprecise to provide us with much guidance in the process of assessing how export 
crop adoption affected the vulnerability of rural districts to weather fluctuations. 
Previous studies have used unpublished correspondence, fieldwork or oral 
history to probe beyond, and provide a counterweight to, the biases and limitations 
inherent in colonial administrative records. The labour intensive nature of such in-
depth research has confined most studies to one particular colonial territory or 
district. We opt for a different research strategy by collecting quantitative data 
covering a wide geographical scope for econometric analysis. While we 
acknowledge that a wide range of, potentially opposing, mechanisms will underpin 
our overall findings, and that such mechanisms deserve full attention of scholars 
and policy makers, we find it equally worthwhile to draw up the balance, and take 
stock of the overall treatment effect of export crops on social tension and distress. 
3.4 Data 
Our key variables of interest are imprisonment (the number of individuals 
admitted in year t) and rainfall (annual precipitation in inches in year t). We 
standardize both variables by computing their z-scores. Figure 1 provides a simple 
scatter-plot of the standardized rainfall anomalies against standardized annual 
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imprisonment. Without any additional econometric testing, the figure brings out 
the non-linear (U-shaped) relationship between the two variables for the full 
sample. In other words, when rainfall deviates from the expected mean in either 
direction, the number of imprisoned individuals also spiked. We further explore 
this relationship econometrically in section 5 and include our export crop 
interaction effect in section 6.  
Figure 1. Weather Shocks & Social Distress in British Africa 
 
Notes: Both indicators are the result of ‘standardizing’ process using the z-
score computation: (xi,t - x̄i) / σi , where x̄i is the long-term mean of each 
district, xi,t is the annual observation in time t for district i, and σi is the 
standard deviation of each panel, that is for every i. 
 
All variables, including our observable and unobservable controls are discussed below. 
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.  
3.4.1 Rainfall 
To measure rainfall shocks, we use annual precipitation data from 
meteorological stations. The great majority of districts under British rule contained 
at least one such station. Our main explanatory variable is the absolute value of 
standardized rainfall deviation from the long-term mean (AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t), 
which yields comparable results with the current economic literature (Hsiang  et al., 
2013; Dell et al., 2014). In order to capture the non-linear effect of rainfall shocks 
on imprisonment, we also present the results using the rainfall deviation square 
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term (RainfallDeviationSquarei,t). We also employ drought and excessive rainfall 
dummies, defining ‘negative rainfall shock’ as a dummy which takes the value of 1 
when annual rainfall exceeds more than one standard deviation below, and ‘positive 
rainfall shock’ as one standard deviation above the long-run mean. This approach is 
similar to Iyer and Topalova (2014), Blakeslee and Fishman (2015) and Jia (2014), 
among other. The summary statistics of the weather indicators are presented in 
panel (b) of Table 1. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics: District by Year Data 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Panel (a): Dependent variables      
Prisoners deviation 2714 0.00 1.00 -2.60 3.70 
Debt deviation 2076 0.00 1.00 -1.70 3.50 
Conviction for less than 3 months 2671 0.00 1.00 -2.30 3.80 
Conviction for more than 3 months 2672 0.00 1.00 -2.80 3.90 
      
Panel (b): Independent variable of interest      
Rainfall long-term mean Stations 2900 46.91 24.12 15.80 144.10 
Rainfall deviation Stations 2529 0.00 1.00 -3.20 3.30 
Rainfall deviation squared Stations 2529 1.00 1.32 0.00 10.89 
Absolute rainfall deviation (Linear) Stations 2529 0.80 0.58 0.00 3.30 
Rainfall long-term mean (Matsuura and Wilmott) 3200 47.01 21.73 12.70 139.70 
Rainfall deviation. (Matsuura and Wilmott) 3200 0.00 1.00 -3.50 3.30 
Rainfall deviation squared (Matsuura and Wilmott) 3200 1.00 1.33 0.00 12.25 
Absolute rainfall deviation (Linear) (Matsuura and 
Wilmott) 3200 0.81 0.58 0.00 3.50 
Negative rainfall shocks 2529 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Positive rainfall shocks 2529 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Export crop production value(£) per capita 3220 0.52 1.47 0.00 10.10 
Export crop suitability (FAO-GAEZ) 3220 3.57 0.12 3.09 3.86 
Food crop suitability (FAO-GAEZ) 2680 2.73 0.16 2.12 3.17 
      
Panel (c): Control variables (time-varying)      
Population density (persons per square mile) 3260 52.98 74.60 0.13 801.44 
Whites per 1000 of the population 3240 5.28 20.37 0.00 395.10 
World market prices of relevant export crops  2176 100.76 40.12 31.00 303.00 
      Panel (d): Control variables (time-invariant) 
     Rainfall coefficient of variation (CV) 2900 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.40 
Pre-colonial chiefdom (Murdock) 3180 2.45 0.94 1.00 4.00 
Railway dummy 3260 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Settler agriculture dummy 3260 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Cocoa cultivation dummy  3260 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Coastal dummy 3220 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Livestock units per 1000 of the population 3260 706.27 2197.98 0.00 24528.70 
Source: See main text.      
Our annual rainfall indicator does not capture the effects of years of normal 
annual rainfall with unfavourable distribution as well as years with below or above 
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annual rainfall in which the abnormal precipitation occurred outside the growing 
season. Despite these limitations, we find the use of annual data largely 
unproblematic. The use of annual rainfall data is widely accepted in the economic 
literature (Miguel et al., 2004; Hsiang et al., 2013; Dell et al., 2014). Moreover, using 
annual rainfall figures for over ~2,500 observations is unlikely to result in a type I 
error (finding a relationship when there is none), but rather to underestimate the 
effect. A concern with our collected rainfall data could be that historical records 
have a tendency to suffer from under-reporting and observer’s bias (Daly et al., 
2007). Such bias may distort an annual total appear as a drought, when there really 
was none. To address such concerns, we sought to replicate our results with rainfall 
data obtained from the University of Delaware dataset (Matsuura & Wilmott, 
2009), which has been corrected for measurement bias.  
3.4.2 Imprisonment 
We collect annual district-level data on total imprisonment (including 
remand prisoners), as well as three subcategories: (1) short imprisonments (3 
months or less), (2) long imprisonments (>3 months) and (3) imprisonment for 
debt. Each district we include in our dataset has at least one prison within its 
borders. If more than one prison was present, we take the sum. Unfortunately, we 
do not possess specific information about convictions for different types of 
offenses. Yet, we argue that the convictions for petty property offences and tax and 
fine defaults dominate the short imprisonments, whilst violent offences are likely to 
be much more prevalent among the long imprisonments. Following Blakeslee and 
Fishman (2015) and Papaioannou (2016b), who find that property crimes respond 
more strongly to economic distress than violent crimes, we expect the ‘short 
imprisonment’ variable to be more responsive to weather shocks than the ‘long 
imprisonment’ variable.  
It is important to state upfront that our research design (1) does not (intend 
to) capture variation in absolute levels of imprisonment across colonial districts, and 
(2) does not imply that colonial imprisonment should be attributed primarily to 
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harvest failures, let alone climate. Colonial coercive capacity varied considerably 
from place to place (both across districts and colonies), and incarceration happened 
to an extent at the discretion of local administrative officers or native authorities. 
Colonial imprisonment was an instrument of social control, used to lock up 
criminal, deviant and destitute elements of society, including debt, tax and fine 
defaulters (Bernault, 2007; Branch, 2005; Hynd, 2008; Killingray, 1986).  
Within this context, we can exploit annual fluctuations of imprisonment to 
assess the impact of rainfall extremes on distress. If weather extremes result in loss 
of agricultural income, and if people have no buffer to cushion this loss of income, 
we may expect a rise in behaviours and activities that result in imprisonment, 
including: (1) incidences of distress-induced petty property theft (cf. Papaioannou, 
2016b), (2) tax, debt and fine defaults resulting in imprisonment (Hynd, 2008); and 
(3) rebellion and civil disobedience in responses to the fact that rulers prove unable 
to provide people with a basic level of security and income. Note that our 
interpretation explicitly accounts for the fact that behaviours resulting in colonial 
imprisonment may not have been perceived as ‘criminal’ by African populations, 
and that we consistently use the descriptive term ‘imprisonment’ rather than the 
more contentious ‘crime’.   
We exploit the following logic to test if weather shocks have a different 
impact on social tension and distress (i.e. imprisonment) in districts with 
smallholder-based export crop cultivation compared to districts without. When, in 
a particular district, imprisonment spikes are pronounced during years of weather 
shocks (i.e. inflated numbers of debt, tax and fine default, petty thefts and 
incidences of civil obedience), we take this as an indication that this district is 
particularly vulnerable to such shocks. If, in another district, imprisonment spikes 
are mild or absent in years of weather shocks, we take this as an indication that 
people were able to (1) prevent a fall in agricultural income, for example by 
cultivating a more diversified or weather-resistant crop portfolio, or (2) cushion the 
impact of such a fall, for example through the presence of a food relief campaign, 
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or the availability of savings to compensate for falling income. More discussion on 
potential mechanisms is provided in the conclusion.  
We are aware that imprisonment is an imperfect measure of social distress. 
Males were strongly overrepresented in Africa’s colonial prisons, so we are 
unfortunately not able to capture the gendered impact of weather shocks, which is 
a particularly regrettable omission considering women’s crucial role in agricultural 
production (Carswell, 2003; MacKenzie, 1999; Vaughan, 1987). Similarly, our data 
also does not allow us to assess the heterogeneous impact of weather shocks on 
different social classes or occupational groups. Finally, we have no information 
about the exact reasons of imprisonment. Despite these limitations, the variable 
also has its own pronounced strengths. Imprisonment figures are highly responsive 
to small fluctuations, and the data is uniquely consistent over a considerable 
geographical and temporal scope. Moreover, we have no reason to believe that the 
link between annual rainfall and imprisonment statistics was somehow the result of 
systematic and purposeful manipulation by colonial officials (who could not have 
fathomed that future research would use yet-to-be-developed econometric 
techniques to investigate the relationship between rainfall shocks, imprisonment 
and export crops). Our quantitative results, therefore, are much less susceptible to 
the kind of colonial manipulation that biases the narrative record. 
3.4.3 Export Crop Production 
To measure the impact of agricultural commercialization on vulnerability to 
weather shocks, we have constructed a new indicator to estimate export crop 
production at the district level. This indicator is based on the average value (1920-
1939) of colony-level exports of export crops (Frankema et al., 2015), divided over 
the districts within the colonies on the basis of colonial maps and smallholder 
acreage and production estimates that tell us where export crops were cultivated. 
We standardize the values using district population estimates. More details are 
provided in Appendix B. Figure 2 shows the value per capita of smallholder-grown 
export crops for each of the districts in our dataset, divided into four quartiles (and 
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the top decile separated from the remainder of the first quartile). The spatial 
distribution resulting from this exercise is in accordance with our expectations. 
Smallholder export crops in interwar British colonial Africa were concentrated in 
the Gambia (groundnuts), coastal Gold Coast (cocoa), coastal Nigeria (cocoa and 
palm oil), northern Nigeria (cotton and groundnuts), the Lake Victoria area (cotton 
and coffee), coastal Tanganyika and Zanzibar (cotton, copra and cloves) and 
southern Nyasaland (cotton and tobacco). As expected, the cocoa growing regions 
in Ghana and Nigeria produce the highest export values per capita.  
Figure 2. Export Crop Production 
 
Sources: Map constructed by the authors in ArcGIS on the basis of digitized colonial 
maps. See online Appendix 2 for further information. 
In the remainder of our analysis, we split our dataset in halves, the bottom 
half representing districts in which smallholder production was subsistence 
oriented, and the top half those in which smallholders cultivated significant 
amounts of export crops. We have made sure that our results are not driven by a 
random cut-off point by using alternative cut-off points, quartiles and trimmed 
samples. Still, we admit that the distinction between “export” and “subsistence” 
districts is rudimentary. Some districts which did not cultivate crops for export 
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were involved in the commercial production of food crops for local markets. For 
example, Carswell (2003) argues that smallholders in Kigezi District (Uganda) 
cultivated ‘food crops as export crops’. We maintain, however, that the income 
from commercialized food crop cultivation tended to be small compared to income 
from export crops, for the following reasons: (1) marketing infrastructure in the 
colonial era was geared towards export and not interregional food trade, (2) 
markets for food crops were small due to low urbanization rates and land-
abundance, (3) universal cultivation of food crops resulted in low market value in 
good years and food scarcity in bad years (Binswanger & McIntyre, 1987; De 
Janvry et al., 1991). The main source of income in non-export crop districts tended 
to be labour migration to more commercialized areas. Our dataset also includes 
some districts which were dominated by settler agriculture, urban centres or mining 
areas, for which we control in our analysis (by excluding them from subsamples). 
While measurements on the district level may brush over within-district variation, 
our approach is much more refined than most contributions covering similarly 
large areas and distinguishes ‘peasant’ and ‘settler’ economies at the country level 
(Bowden et al., 2008; Moradi & Baten, 2005), and even classifies Africa into macro-
regions (Amin, 1972). 
To provide more robust evidence for the causal impact of export crop 
cultivation, we construct an alternative export crop indicator which is exogenously 
determined. This indicator is based on crop suitability indices for the most important 
export crops (cocoa, coffee, cotton, tobacco, palm oil, groundnuts and coconuts) 
obtained from the FAO-GAEZ project. This suitability index runs from 1 (most 
suitable) to 8 (least suitable). Similar to other studies that have successfully 
exploited the exogenous nature of the crop suitability indicators to proxy for 
adoption or production of various types of crops (Nunn & Qian, 2010; Jia, 2014; 
Fenske & Kala, 2015), we take the average of the gridded suitability values within 
the borders of each colonial district. We construct our indicator by combining all 
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relevant export crops,  using the average suitability for all export crops for each 
districts.  
Using export crop suitability should increase our confidence that 
institutional factors drive our results. However, districts which were more suitable 
to export crops may have been those with generally more suitable land, better soil 
and more favourable rainfall patterns. To rule out the possibility that our indicator 
of export crop suitability captures general agricultural suitability (which may in its 
own right result in higher weather-shock resilience), we also construct an indicator 
of food crop suitability, equally based on FAO-GAEZ data. We include, maize, 
millet, sorghum, cassava, yam, potato, sweet potato and rice, and follow a similar 
procedure as described above for our export crop suitability indicator. 
3.4.3 Control Variables 
We include a number of time-variant controls, reported in Table 1, panel (d). 
Firstly, annual total population is estimated on the basis of colonial ‘native’ census 
data, and expressed in terms of population density (per square mile). White 
population per 1000 of the population is estimated on the basis of ‘non-native’ 
censuses. World market prices of relevant export commodities are taken from 
Wageningen African Trade Database (forthcoming). Secondly, we include a range of 
observable time-invariant controls, reported in Table 1, panel (e). Pre-colonial 
centralization is based on the variable “Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond Local 
Community” in Murdock’s ethnographical atlas. Pre-colonial chiefdoms and states 
are defined as places with more than one level of jurisdictional hierarchy beyond 
the local community. Livestock per 1000 of the population is estimated on the 
basis of the district averages of livestock censuses (1920-1939). We use observable 
time-invariant controls to control for the interaction of several observable district-
specific characteristics with a linear time trend to take into account their 
heterogeneous impact (if any) over time. For example, districts with high presence 
of livestock may become more (or less) resilient in 1939 than in 1920, due to stock 
accumulation.  
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Thirdly, we use unobservable time-invariant controls, reported in Table 1, 
panel (f). This set of controls is estimated by interacting each district with a linear 
time trend and labelled district-specific effects (DSE). They control for any other 
unobservable characteristics that we may expect  to change over time, such as the 
possibility that (a) colonial authorities extended their coercive capacity over time 
(Branch, 2005); (b) previous episodes of distress have made districts more 
vulnerable, affecting future responses to weather shocks; (c) regions with higher 
incomes are better off over time because they are able to store wealth; and (d) 
distress may have been attenuated by the gradual expansion of public infrastructure 
such as roads and railways, facilitating food relief programs.  
3.5 Results: Rainfall & Imprisonment 
3.5.1 Model 
To test the effect of rainfall shocks on social distress, we estimate the 
following specification:  
 
Y i,t    β1 AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t   δZˊi,t  νi  μt  
 (observable  time)i,t   (unobservable  time)i,t  εi,t .   (1) 
 
where Yi,t denotes the annual standard deviation of imprisonment. 
AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t  denotes the absolute rainfall deviation of each district i 
from the historical long-term mean of the same district. Zˊi,t denotes a vector of 
institutional and economic determinants of tension which we control for in order 
to avoid any potential omitted variable bias. νi and μt are district and year fixed 
effects, respectively. We use these to control for omitted heterogeneity at the level 
of districts and time periods. These controls are crucial in controlling for factors 
that may affect the levels of prisoners across all districts in the same year, such 
distress caused by the Great Depression. To address autocorrelation concerns of 
weather shocks the standard errors are clustered by district.  
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Moreover, (observable  time)i,t  denotes the observable district specific 
characteristics when interacted with a linear time trend (t) and (unobservable  time)i,t 
denotes district-specific effects (DSE), in other words an interaction term between 
unobservable district characteristics (νi)  and a linear time trend (t). εit is the error term. 
Finally, in all estimations we have controlled for spatial correlation (cross-sectional 
dependence) by adjusting standard errors following Hoechle (2007). This way we 
deal with the issue of migration and spatial spill-overs of upheaval. We control for 
any potential spillovers (for example ‘hunger’ migration across district borders) and 
allow this effect to decay smoothly with distance. 
3.5.2 Baseline Results 
Table 2 presents our main results, which indicate a robust and significant 
effect of weather shocks on social distress.  
Table 2. Weather Shocks & Social Distress 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Prisoners deviation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation 0.2919 0.2744 0.2700 0.2509 0.1698 
 
   [8.55]*** [6.71]*** [6.66]*** [6.41]*** [3.74]*** 
Population density     
0.0024 
    
[0.82] 
Whites per 1000 of the population     
0.0059 
    
[0.31] 
World market prices      
-0.0015 
    
[-0.71] 
District FE N Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N  N Y N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)     N                  N N Y Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335 2246 2335 1665 
Number of districts 143 143 137 143 104 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which 
the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered 
at the district level. We adjust standard errors for spatial dependency following Hoechle (2007). 
The absolute term of rainfall deviation yields a positive sign, and maintains a 
highly statistical significant coefficient, throughout our different specifications 
(columns 1-5). The results in column 4 indicate our preferred and most robust 
specification. A standard deviation increase (or decrease) in rainfall causes a 25% 
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increase in social distress. This result is crucial not only for its statistical significance 
but also for its economic significance. As shown in Figure 3, the magnitude of the 
effect ranges over time from 0.43 to 0.21. 
 
Figure 3. Rolling Coefficient of the Main Effect 
 
Notes: Regression coefficient in blue. Confidence level = .05 (upper bound in 
green, lower bound in red) time window is 5(year). 
 
In Table 3, we include the square term of RainfallDeviationi,t and find that the 
effect of weather shocks on imprisonment is curvilinear (U-shaped), meaning that 
both drought and excessive rainfall give rise to higher levels of conviction (columns 
1-5). We also test for the symmetricity of the effect by including the ‘positive 
rainfall shock’ and ‘negative rainfall shock’ variables into the analysis. A standard 
deviation increase in rainfall beyond the mean causes a 0.33 standard deviation 
increase in imprisonment. Likewise, a standard deviation decrease in rainfall causes a 
0.25 standard deviation increase in imprisonment. A possible explanation is that in 
years of excessive rainfall farmers would lose their entire harvest in a relatively 
shorter time, whereas in years of drought farmers could hope for late rains.  
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The impact of a rainfall shock on distress may not be immediate but only felt 
the next year. Table 4 presents the results when we also include lagged weather 
shocks as determinants of imprisonment.  Column 1 shows that social distress is 
not associated with lags of rainfall shocks. In column 2, none of the interactions 
have a significant impact on imprisonment and they are jointly not statistically 
significant (with a p-value of 0.25). This suggests that the observed spikes in 
imprisonment in our data are caused by weather shocks in that particular year 
(leading to immediate losses in agricultural income), rather than prolonged episodes 
of adverse weather. 
Table 4. The Impact of Lagged Weather Conditions 
Dependent variable  (1) (2) 
Prisoners deviation  OLS OLS 
Positive rainfall shock t  0.3404 0.3772 
   [4.99]*** [5.25]*** 
Negative rainfall shock t  0.2422 0.2422 
  [3.71]***   [3.58]*** 
Positive rainfall shock t - 1  0.0184 0.0563 
  [0.36] [1.04] 
Negative rainfall shock t - 1  0.0700 0.0697 
  [1.16] [1.10] 
Positive rainfall shock t   positive rainfall shock t - 1    -0.2407 
   [-1.64] 
Negative rainfall shock t   negative rainfall shock t - 1    -0.0128 
 
  
[-0.08] 
District FE 
 
Y Y 
Time dummies 
 
Y Y 
Observable controls  year 
 
 N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)                                       Y Y 
Number of observations  2178 2178 
Number of districts  143 143 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; 
and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. We adjust standard 
errors for spatial dependency following Hoechle (2007). 
 
In Table 5, we show the results after distinguishing among the different 
types of prisoners. As argued before, we expect short term imprisonments to be 
most responsive to weather shocks. This is confirmed by our estimation. The effect 
of weather shocks on petty crime (proxied by convictions of maximum 3 months) 
is almost twice as large as the effect for convictions above 3 months (columns 1-2). 
‘Force of Nature’ 
 
97 
 
Debt is also statistically significant, which suggests that weather-induced loss of 
incomes resulted in higher levels of debt default (column 3).   
Table 5. Results with Alternative Dependent Variables 
Dependent variable: 
(1) (2) (3) 
Convictions    
<3 months 
Convictions   
>3 months 
Debt 
Absolute rainfall deviation 0.2114 0.1281 0.1005 
     [4.77]***    [2.99]*** [2.89]*** 
District FE Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N  N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  
year) Y Y Y 
Number of observations 2250 2280 1797 
Number of districts 142 144 109 
Notes: OLS-FE estimator. Sample period: 1920–1939. Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-
statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  
percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. We 
adjust standard errors for spatial dependency following Hoechle (2007). 
3.5.3 Robustness Checks 
We perform a range of robustness exercises reported in the Appendix. In 
Table A-1, we show that the results are largely unchanged when we replace rainfall 
anomalies obtained from meteorological stations with an alternative measure of 
rainfall obtained from the Matsuura and Wilmott (2009) world rainfall database. In 
Table A-2, we distinguish between limited drought and excess rainfall (one standard 
deviation from the long-term rainfall mean) and exceptional drought and excessive 
rainfall (one and a half standard deviation from the mean). The results show that 
the impact of limited drought and excessive rainfall is smaller than the impact of 
exceptional drought and excessive rainfall. The effect increases gradually as the 
deviation becomes larger, suggesting that the data on weather shocks make intuitive 
sense. In Table A-3 we include the lag of the dependent variable and run a dynamic 
panel data model (system-GMM). This specification gives nearly identical results. 
Table A-4, reports the impact of different combinations of the lags and leads. The 
effect remains unchanged when we control for the impact of lagged rainfall shocks 
at time t - 1 and t – 2. Drought and excess rainfall in the lags and leads did not have 
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any significant impact on distress. In Table A-5, we show that the results are robust 
to clustering standard errors at different levels; standard errors are clustered at the 
year level, country level, as well as two-way clustered at both the year and the 
country level. Again results resemble our baseline.  
3.6 Results: The Mitigating Effect of Export Crops 
3.6.1 Model 
To test the mitigating effect of cash crop cultivation on social distress, we 
estimate the following specification:  
 
Yi,t     β1 AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t + π (CashCropProduction  AbsoluteRainfallDeviation)i,t  
+ δZˊi,t + νi + μt  + (observable  time)i,t + (unobservable  time)i,t + εi,t .  (3) 
 
where (CashCropProduction  AbsoluteRainfallDeviation)i,t  denotes the interaction of 
above median export crop production with absolute rainfall deviation (linear). The 
remainder of the variables in this specification is discussed in section 5. 
3.6.2 Results 
The results are presented in Table 6. They strongly suggest that access to 
export crops mitigated the effect of weather shocks on social distress (columns 1-
3). We also examine whether the effect remains unchanged when we use the export 
crop suitability index (columns 4-6). Indeed, districts where export crop suitability was 
high (above median) were less severely affected in years of weather shocks. The 
lower coefficients of our suitability indicator may reflect the fact that not all areas 
suitable for export crop cultivation were actually exploited in this way. These results 
conform with our finding that the overall treatment effect of export crops on local 
farmers was positive. Column 3, which is our preferred estimation, shows that 
export crops attenuated the effect of weather shocks on social distress by 24.5. 
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Table 6. The Mitigating Effect of Export Crops 
Dependent variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Prisoners deviation OLS  OLS  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation 0.3393 0.3416 0.3178 0.3173 0.3236 0.2990 
  [7.21]*** [7.41]*** [7.22]*** [6.66]*** [6.93]*** [6.75]*** 
Export crop production  absolute rainfall 
deviation 
-0.2376 -0.2765 -0.2456    
[-2.80]*** [-3.26]*** [-3.02]***    
       
Export crop suitability  absolute rainfall 
deviation 
   -0.1507 -0.2456 -0.1709 
    [-1.99]** [-2.26]** [-2.08]** 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N Y N N Y N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)          N                    N          Y N N Y 
Number of observations 2335 2246 2335 2335 2246 2335 
Number of districts 143 137 143 143 137 143 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. The standard errors are  clustered at the district level. 
Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level. 
3.6.3 Robustness Checks 
Before making any claims about causality, one would like  to know more 
about the relationship between export crop production and other district specific 
characteristics. Was the cultivation of export crops endogenously determined by an 
underlying variable that may also explain our results? To put it differently, was the 
cultivation of export crops conditional upon institutional, geographical or 
economic district characteristics that may also  have had a direct mitigating effect on 
weather-induced vulnerability? A strong overlap between centralized political 
institutions and export crop production, for example, may raise a concern that such 
institutions explain both higher levels of export crop production, and lower 
vulnerability to weather shocks. In other words, our export crop indicator would 
capture the effect of an omitted variable. To mitigate such concerns, we provide a 
number of robustness tests. First, we provide  a simple OLS estimation to see if the 
production of export crops is determined by any observable district characteristics. 
We proceed by estimating the following specification: 
Cashcrop Productioni   Cashcrop Suitabilityi + φVi + θi   (2) 
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where Vi  is a vector including the different categories of district characteristics. The 
characteristics are divided in three categories: institutional, economic and 
demographic. Institutional characteristics include the colonial presence measured by 
whites per 1.000 of the population; pre-colonial centralization measured with data 
taken from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas; the coercive capacity of the colonial 
state measured by a twenty year-average of prisoners per 1.000 of the population; 
and colonial investments measured by the existence of a railway (dummy). 
Geographical characteristics include controls for the length of the rainy season; degree 
of aridity/humidity of the climate, measured by the 20 year-average rainfall per 
district; the variability of rainfall using the coefficient of variation (CV) of rainfall 
for each district; direct access to international trade measured by a coastal dummy; 
and the suitability for food crops. Economic characteristics include alternative sources 
of income, including livestock measured per 1.000 of the population; rural wage 
labour measured by the presence of settlers (dummy); and population density as a 
proxy for land scarcity.  
The correlations are presented in Table 7. Column 1 presents the strong 
correlation between export crop suitability and actual export crop production, 
which serves as an important validation of the empirical strategy. This practise 
illustrates that our measure of cash crop production and crop suitability are highly 
correlated at the 1% level of significance and with a coefficient greater than 0.95). 
For robustness, instead of taking the average of all cash crops, we only include the 
single most suitable cash crop per district (results do not change and are not 
reported). Columns 2-4 present the results from the institutional, geographical and 
economic controls in turn. Column 5 presents the results when we jointly include 
the controls. The results suggest that there are no statistically significant 
correlations between the district characteristics and export crop production.  
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Table 7. Correlations between Export Crops and District Characteristics 
 
Dependent variable Export Crop Production 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS  OLS  OLS OLS OLS 
Export crop suitability  0.9521 1.0677 0.9090 0.9492 1.1987 
  [6.62]*** [6.67]*** [5.73]*** [6.21]*** [6.13]*** 
Institutional controls 
     
     
Colonial Presence  -0.0014   -0.0012 
  [-0.44]   [-0.40] 
Pre-colonial chiefdom  0.2062   0.0264 
  [0.95]   [0.13] 
Coercive capacity  0.0162   0.0116 
  [1.57]   [1.25] 
Railway dummy  0.0746   0.0773 
  [0.33]   [0.31] 
Geographical controls      
Length of rainy season   0.1287  0.1004 
   [1.62]  [1.24] 
Rainfall zones   -0.0001  0.0032 
   [-0.02]  [0.51] 
Rainfall variability CV   -1.3015  -1.7054 
   [-1.34]  [-1.03] 
Coastal dummy   -0.4003  -0.5392 
   [-1.34]  [-1.51] 
Food crop suitability   0.182  0.153 
   [0.77]  [0.64] 
Economic controls      
Livestock per 10.000 
population 
   -0.0001 -0.0001 
    [-0.47] [-0.76] 
Settler farming    -0.2650 -0.5392 
    [-0.93] [-1.70]* 
Population density    -0.0002 -0.0015 
  [-0.17] [-0.93] 
Number of observations 159 153 141 158 135 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. The standard errors are  clustered 
at the district level. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 
10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
 
Additionally, we interact alternative explanations with absolute rainfall deviation 
(linear) and include this term in the regression. The most important results are 
presented in Table 8. Since our export crop indicator is cross-sectional, we were 
concerned that the mitigating effect of export crops was concentrated either at the 
beginning or end of our period (1920-1939). To deal with this concern, we interact 
absolute rainfall deviation (linear) with a time trend and include this term in the 
regression (column 1). No statistically observable trend for the mitigating impact of 
export crops was found.  
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To reaffirm that our ‘export crop effect’ is not driven by overall agricultural 
suitability, we perform a so-called ‘placebo test’ with food crop suitability. We split 
our sample into two halves (above and below median food crop suitability), and 
interact both absolute rainfall deviation with food crop suitability 
(FoodCropSuitability x AbsoluteRainfallDeviation) and export crop production 
(ExportCropProduction x AbsoluteRainfallDeviation). As shown in column 2, the 
regression results show that impact of food crop suitability on imprisonment 
deviation is close to 0. Hence, suitability to food crop cultivation does not explain 
export crop districts’ greater resilience to social distress in the wake of weather 
shocks. This finding further enhances our confidence that the actual presence of 
export crops explains our heterogeneous results.  
Additional ‘horse race tests’ are provided in Table A-6, which refute 
alternative institutional, geographical and income-related explanations that might 
(directly or indirectly) compete with export crop cultivation as an explanation for 
our heterogeneous results. The mitigating effect of export crops remain virtually 
unchanged. Finally, we also check the robustness of our estimates to the use of 
alternative samples. A first concern is the possibility that higher spikes of 
imprisonment in our below-median export crop sample is not driven by the 
absence of export crops, but by the presence of settlers (all settler districts end up 
in the below-median export crop sample).  
A potential concern is that land alienation and extractive institutions could 
potentially have an aggravating effect on social distress. We thus exclude the settler 
districts from the analysis (column 3) and find that our results remain robust. A 
second issue is that the mitigating effect of export crops is driven by districts with 
cocoa, which are sometimes portrayed as an exceptional case of successful export 
crop adoption. To rule out the possibility that our export crop interaction effect is 
driven by cocoa, we created a sub-sample excluding the cocoa districts from the 
analysis, and find that our results remain robust (column 4).  
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Table 8. Robustness Checks: Trends, Food Crops and Sub-Samples 
Dependent variable  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Prisoners deviation OLS  OLS   OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation  0.4270 0.3158  0.3613 0.3179 
  [5.22]*** [7.12]***  [7.57]*** [6.77]*** 
Export crop production  absolute rainfall deviation  
-0.2355 -0.2445  -0.2290 -0.2482 
[-2.94]*** [-3.01]***    [-2.57]***   [-3.00]*** 
      
Absolute rainfall deviation  trend -0.0103     
 [-1.52]     
Food crop suitability  absolute rainfall deviation  0.0475    
  [0.21]    
District FE Y Y  Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y  Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N  N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)                         Y                    Y  Y Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335  1909 2199 
Number of districts 143 143  117 135 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. The standard errors are  clustered 
at the district level. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 
10 percent.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This study has investigated two key questions. First, to what extent did 
weather shocks induce higher levels of social distress in colonial British Africa? 
Second, to what extent did the cultivation of export crops mitigate weather-induced 
distress? Building on newly collected data, it provides two contributions. First, our 
analysis indicates that both annual drought and excessive rainfall caused spikes in 
imprisonment. On the basis of previous literature, together with our reading of the 
colonial administrative records, we conclude that depressed agricultural incomes is 
the key pathway linking exogenous rainfall shocks to spiking imprisonment rates. 
Second, we find that the production of export crops had a mitigating effect on 
weather-induced distress. In the context of interwar British colonial Africa, districts 
with more export crops displayed less pronounced spikes of imprisonment in years 
of weather shocks, than those districts with few or none at all. The results indicate 
that the presence of export crops drives our heterogeneous results, which hold up 
to a battery of performed robustness tests, which effectively refute a wide range of 
plausible alternative explanations.  
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Our findings are set in the historical context of interwar British colonial 
Africa. However, many African smallholders today still face agricultural and 
climatological conditions resembling those found in this historical setting. We posit 
therefore, that our highly significant and robust findings on the effects of weather 
fluctuations, and the mitigating effects of agricultural commercialization, bear great 
relevance for today’s vulnerable rural societies, particularly now with the increase in 
severe and frequent weather extremes generated by accelerated climate change.  
That even in a colonial context, smallholder-based export crop cultivation was 
seen to have a mitigating effect on weather-induced distress, suggests that 
providing smallholders with the ability to produce for external markets should be a 
key policy priority. At the same time it would be unwarranted, even reckless, to 
claim that ‘state sponsored’ export crops are a ‘magic bullet’, or even that 
agricultural commercialization more generally is universally beneficial to mitigating 
rural societies’ vulnerability to weather shocks. When interpreting our findings, it is 
particularly important to recognise the fact that most of colonial tropical Africa was 
land abundant, that smallholders combined cultivation of export and subsistence 
crops, and that while inputs were low and farming techniques basic, smallholders 
generally did not have to incur debts to participate in cultivation for export. 
Moreover, in districts which were not suitable for the cultivation of export crops, 
their introduction would not be a viable strategy to mitigate vulnerability. 
Our empirical strategy allowed us to tease out a robust overall treatment effect of 
export crops on weather-induced distress at district-level. The scope of our analysis 
and the scarcity of reliable data prevented an analysis of the complex, variegated set 
of mechanisms through which agricultural commercialization mitigates vulnerability 
to weather shocks. Our findings should, therefore, be interpreted in the light of the 
existing rich case-study literature, in which such mechanisms are exposed in much 
greater detail. Three complementary sets of mechanisms require particular 
consideration.  
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Firstly, how does export crop cultivation affect agricultural incomes in years 
of abnormal weather? The cultivation of (mostly non-edible) export crops may lead 
households to forego the cultivation of surplus subsistence crops having potential 
to serve as a buffer in case of bad harvest.  Such bad harvest would be faced by all 
district farmers, resulting in overall lack of food, which may readily transfer into 
distress. The food-export crop substitution effect may be aggravated by the fact 
that export crops such as cotton or tobacco are highly labor intensive. Why, then, 
do we find a positive effect? It is possible that the introduction of new, exportable 
crops may reduce the risk of complete harvest failure. Weather conditions may 
impact export crops and local food crops differently (Maxwell & Fernando 1989; 
Morton, 2007). Moreover, ‘state sponsored’ export crops tend to include extension 
services, agricultural innovations and new inputs, all or any of which may benefit 
the climate-resilience of agriculture (Goetz, 1993). Despite few high-yielding food 
crop varieties being brought to smallholders in colonial Africa, the adoption of 
export crops did coincide with a partial switch to less labour-intensive and more 
drought-resistant food crops, such as cassava which, although less nutritious, may 
have enhanced food security (Tosh, 1980). 
Secondly, how do export crops affect the ability of households to overcome 
distress in years of depressed agricultural incomes? If the cultivation of export 
crops provokes food shortages in bad years, it may still enhance smallholders’ 
abilities to overcome such shortages through forward planning. Production for 
market enables households to convert (a part of) their harvest into storable wealth 
(such as cash or livestock), which enables the purchase of food in bad years. This 
‘consumption smoothing’ is conditional upon smallholders actually receiving the 
income benefits from export cultivation, which is not self-evident. Structural 
indebtedness or excessive taxation may negatively impact storable wealth,  
preventing smallholders from  utilizing their export crop income to alleviate 
distress (Bates, 1981; Scott, 1976). However, the positive treatment effect suggests 
that export crop growers enjoyed increased purchasing power, despite colonial 
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conditions. While the colonial tax burden on smallholder export crops was indeed 
excessive, it was not high enough to completely annul the gains in purchasing 
power arising from export crop cultivation (De Haas, 2016).  
Thirdly, how do export crops affect the ability of communities to overcome 
distress in years of depressed agricultural incomes? The adoption of export crops 
does not only have repercussions on the level of the individual smallholder, but 
also on the broader institutional and infrastructural context. While scholars have 
argued that rural commercialization erodes pre-capitalist, ‘moral economy’ 
insurance institutions (Fafchamps, 1992; Scott, 1976; Watts, 1983), the revenue-
generating potential of export crop regions may also provide the state with the 
means to invest in technology diffusion, infrastructure and food security (Govereh 
& Jayne, 2003). Some of our overall positive treatment effect may be explained by 
such investments.  
We find it plausible that each of the three channels described above 
contributes to explain our findings, whilst reiterating that colonial occupation may 
– through excessive taxation, insufficient commitment to rural development or 
insistence on a limited set of ‘state sponsored’ export crops – have prevented 
smallholders from realizing maximum available benefit from agricultural 
commercialization. Further disentangling the mechanisms suggested above should 
continue to be a top priority for scholars and policy makers.  
We suggest a number of directions for future research. Firstly, in relation to 
the discussion above, it would be of particular interest to see if the effect of export 
crops is primarily channelled through higher private income or through public 
investments in infrastructure and food aid programs. Secondly, further study may 
uncover different results for aspects of distress not touched upon in this paper, 
such as malnutrition or uneven vulnerabilities across class and gender. Thirdly, it 
would be valuable to give focused attention to the actual adoption of different 
types of export crops and identify conditions determining successful adoption. Our 
finding that export crop suitability mattered for the adoption of export crops, 
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implies that areas unsuitable for such traditional export crops require different 
agricultural commercialization strategies, perhaps based on suitable, drought-
resistant food crops such as cassava or sorghum, or even alternative, non-
agricultural ‘roads to openness’. Fourthly, while this study finds a short term 
mitigating effect of export crops on distress, it does not address the long-term 
effects; which may include the risk of a ‘commodity trap’ or the adverse 
environmental impacts of agricultural commercialization. Thus, a more complete 
understanding of the impact of export crops would require further empirical study 
into the long-run effects of these crops. 
Appendix A. Robustness Tests 
Table A-1. Main Results with Absolute Rainfall Deviation, Grids 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Prisoners deviation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute rainfall deviation (Grids) 0.1632 0.1794 0.1636 0.1689 0.1667 
 
[4.95]*** [4.89]*** [4.63]*** [5.07]*** [3.85]*** 
Population density      
0.0045 
    
   [1.35] 
Whites per 1000 of the population     
0.0117 
    
[0.45] 
World market prices      
-0.0010 
    
  [-0.52] 
District FE N Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N Y N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year)    N                   N N Y Y 
Number of observations 2680 2680 2422 2680 1827 
Number of districts 156 156 137 156 105 
Notes: Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the 
null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at the 
district level. 
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Table A-2.  The Impact of Droughts and Excessive rainfall on Social Distress 
Dependent variable: 
  
Prisoners deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exceptional positive rainfall shock 0.3256 0.3566 0.3627 0.3540 
         [3.38]***          [3.79]***        [3.84]***      [3.69]*** 
Exceptional negative rainfall shock 0.3259 0.2955 0.2461 0.2204 
 [3.32]***   [2.78]*** [2.37]**   [2.26]** 
Limited positive rainfall shock 0.2523 0.1799 0.1573 0.1558 
 [3.73]*** [2.36]** [2.12]** [2.07]** 
Limited negative rainfall shock 0.1522 0.1448 0.1585 0.1540 
 [2.32]** [2.06]** [2.38]** [2.55]** 
     
District FE N Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N Y N 
District-specific effects (unobservable 
 year) N N N Y 
Number of observations 2335 2335 2246 2335 
Number of districts 143    143     137     143 
Notes: OLS estimator. Sample period: 1920–1939. Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in 
brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
Table A-3. The impact of Lagged Imprisonment and Absolute Rainfall Deviation 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) 
Prisoners deviation GMM GMM GMM 
Prisoners deviation,  lagged  t - 1 0.4273 0.6906  
 
     [10.71]***    [14.99]***  
Absolute rainfall deviation 0.1926 0.2361 0.2073 
 
  [4.15]***    [2.79]***   [3.29]*** 
Absolute rainfall deviation, t - 1   -0.0089 
   [-0.04] 
Absolute rainfall deviation, t - 2   0.0472 
   [0.92] 
District FE Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N N 
District-specific effects  (unobservable  year)            N                        Y                    Y 
Number of observations 2216 2216 1995 
Number of districts 143 137 143 
Number of instruments 169 309 168 
AR1 statistics (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 statistics (p-value) 0.216 0.638 0.220 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.987 0.942 0.299 
Notes: System-GMM estimation for dynamic panel data-model. Sample period: 1920–1939. 
Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Second (and latter) lags were used as 
instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their once-lagged first differences were used 
in the levels equation. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite 
samples using  correction. We adjust standard errors for spatial dependency following Conley 
(1999). 
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Table A-4. The Impact of Droughts & Excessive rainfall on Social Distress 
 
Dependent variable: Prisoners deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Positive rainfall shock t  2 -0.0062     
 [-0.12]     
Negative rainfall shock t  2 0.0587     
 [-1.16]     
Positive rainfall shock t  1  0.0834    
  [1.63]    
Negative rainfall shock t  1  0.0170    
  [0.33]    
Positive  rainfall shock t   0.3354   
    [4.98]***   
Negative rainfall shock t   0.2595   
    [4.15]***   
Positive  rainfall shock t – 1    -0.0006  
    [-0.01]  
Negative rainfall shock t – 1    0.0560  
    [0.95]  
Positive  rainfall shock t - 2     -0.0210 
     [-0.37] 
Negative rainfall shock t - 2     0.0412 
     [0.72] 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Time dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Observable controls  year N N N N N 
District-specific effects (unobservable  year) Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of observations 2166 2286 2335 2211 2077 
Number of districts 143    143     143     143     143 
Notes: OLS estimator. Sample period: 1920–1939. Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at 
which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Standard errors are clustered at 
the district level. Column (3) replicates the results in column 7 of Table 3. 
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Table A-5. Clustering Standard Errors at Different Levels 
 
Dependent variable: Prisoners deviation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Rainfall Deviation Stations 0.2919 0.2744 0.2700   0.2509 
  (0.0437) (0.0408)  (0.0405)  (0.0391) 
  <0.0930> <0.0854> <0.0834> 
  [0.0905] [0.0825] [0.0759] 
     
Rainfall Deviation Grids 0.1632 0.1739  0.1636 0.1695  
  (0.0371)  (0.0355)  (0.0353) (0.0336) 
    <0.0865>  <0.0752>  <0.0725>  
    [0.0793]  [0.0716]  [0.0667]  
     
District FE N Y Y Y 
Time dummies N Y Y Y 
Observable controls x year  N  N Y N 
District-specific effects (unobservable x year) N N N Y 
Number of observations 2335 2680 2422 2680 
Notes. The specifications and the estimated coefficients in this table are the same as in Table 2 and Table A-1. The 
standard errors in columns 2–4 are clustered at the district level (in parentheses),  the country level (in angle 
brackets) as well as two-way clustered both the country and the year level (in square brackets). 
 
Appendix B. Cash crop production calculation 
We proceed in the following steps:  
(i)  We obtain annual, crop-specific, country-level cash crop export values, compiled in the 
Wageningen African Trade Database, for the years 1920 to 1939;  
(ii)  We collect annual, crop-specific, district-level, smallholder cash crop production estimates 
for the years 1920 to 1939. We use a range of sources, including colonial maps, 
annual statistics and agricultural censuses. We inter-/extrapolate if production 
data is not available for all years. The data is rough but suffices to estimate the 
shares of different districts in total country production. 
(iii) We use (ii) to distribute (i) over the individual districts, for each of the 
countries in our dataset.  
(iv) We add up the value of all cash crops grown in a district to arrive at an 
indicator of annual, district-level cash crop export values per district. 
(v)  We divide (iv) over annual, district-level population figures to arrive at an indicator of 
annual, district-level, smallholder cash crop export value per capita. We inter-/extrapolate 
if  population data is not available for all years. 
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(vi) We take the average of (v) for the years 1920-1939 to arrive our indicator of 
cash crop intensity (average annual value of cash crops in pounds per capita).  
A simple example is given below. We have followed a similar procedure for all the 
districts in our dataset. 
(i)  The total value of Nyasaland’s cotton production in the years 1920-1939, 
following the Wageningen African Trade Database, fluctuated between a 
minimum of £35 thousand in 1932 and a maximum of £205 thousand in 1935.  
(ii)  The colonial Bluebooks of Nyasaland report annual estimates of district-level 
native cotton production. The Lower Shire District’s contribution, according to 
these estimates, fluctuated between 21 and 65 per cent of the country’s total 
cotton production between 1920 and 1939. 
(iii)  By multiplying the annual value (i) with the Lower Shire’s production share (ii), 
we find that the value of cotton produced in the Lower Shire district fluctuated 
between a minimum of £14 thousand and a maximum of £67 thousand.  
(iv)  The Lower Shire District only produces cotton so we can use the cotton 
figures, without having to add up values of different cash crops. 
(v)  We deflate these annual district-level values with district-level population 
numbers to obtain an estimate of gross-export-crop-income per capita, which in the 
case of the Lower Shire varies between £0.2 (during the depression years), and 
£0.8 per capita.  
(vi)  Because both the district-level production estimates and population figures 
can only be considered rough proxies of reality, we discard annual fluctuations 
and take the average of the entire 20-year period as our indicator for cash crop 
intensity. The average gross annual per capital export income for the Lower 
Shire district is £0.4.  
Gold Coast 
District borders are the administrative borders from 1930 reported in Gold 
Coast ‘Administration Report 1930’. District-level, smallholder production shares 
for cocoa, cola nuts, copra and palm oil are estimated using maps in Cardinall 
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(1932) and Kaplan et al. (1971). No panel data on cash crop production is used. 
The 1931 map-based production shares are used for the entire period (1920-1939). 
District-level, cash crop production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s 
production estimates by the country-sum of production estimates. Annual, district-
level smallholder cash crop production values are obtained by multiplying the 1931 
production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from the WTD. 
All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. 
Annual population figures are obtained from Gold Coast Blue Books (1920-1939). 
For some districts, only data for 1930 is available. Missing years are extrapolated 
using a nearby district. Note that the maps only indicate the area in which cash 
crops were produced, and do not indicate the intensity of production or yields. 
Hence, the assigned shares are a rough approximation of reality. 
Nigeria 
District level data for Nigeria is not available. Instead, we use provinces. 
Borders are obtained from Papaioannou (2016a). Province-level, smallholder 
production shares for cocoa, cotton, groundnuts and palm oil are estimated using 
maps cited in Papaioannou ‘Climate shocks and conflict’. No panel data on cash 
crop production is used. The map-based production shares are used for the entire 
period (1920-1939). District-level, cash crop production shares are obtained by 
dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of production 
estimates. Annual, district-level smallholder cash crop production values are 
obtained by multiplying the map-based production shares with annual country-
level, crop-specific exports from the WTD. All crops are added up and the 
resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual population figures are 
obtained from Nigeria Blue Books (1920-1939). Note that the maps only indicate 
the area in which cash crops were produced, and do not indicate the intensity of 
production or yields. Hence, the assigned shares are a rough approximation of 
reality. 
Sierra Leone 
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District borders are administrative borders from 1920-30, reported  in 
Abraham (1978). District-level, smallholder production shares for ginger and palm 
oil are estimated using production estimates for 1938, reported on a map in Sierra 
Leone ‘Administration Reports’. No panel data on cash crop production is used. 
The 1938 production shares are used for the entire period (1920-1939). District-
level, cash crop production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production 
estimates by the country-sum of production estimates. Annual, district-level 
smallholder cash crop production values are obtained by multiplying the 1938 
production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from the WTD. 
All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. 
Annual population figures are obtained from Sierra Leone Blue Books (1920-1939). 
Note that the districts in Sierra Leone shifted somewhat between the interwar 
period and today. The graphical representation on the map, hence, is not fully 
accurate.  
Gambia 
Gambia is treated as one district. Cash crop production (groundnuts) in that 
district can be equated to the total annual export figure in the WTD. Population 
figures from Gambia Blue Books (1920-1939). Note that considerable numbers of 
migrants (‘strange farmers’) came annually to the Gambia to produce groundnuts. 
Since these migrants are not counted in the population figures, the cash crop 
intensity may be biased slightly upwards.  
Tanganyika 
District borders are the administrative borders from 1933 reported in Berry 
(1972). District-level, smallholder production estimates for coffee, copra, cotton, 
groundnuts, sesame and tobacco are obtained from the Tanganyika Blue Books 
(1926, 1927, 1929, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1938 and 1939). District-level, 
cash crop production shares are obtained by dividing the district’s production 
estimates by the country-sum of production estimates. As the country export data 
does not distinguish between smallholder- and expatriate-produced cash crops, 
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crops (coffee) produced by expatriate farmers are included into this country sum. 
Production shares for missing years are interpolated. The shares for 1920-1925 are 
set equal to the average share of 1926 and 1927. Annual, district-level smallholder 
cash crop production values are obtained by multiplying the annual production 
shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from the WTD. All crops 
are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. Annual 
population figures are obtained from Tanganyika Blue Books (1928, 1931, 1939). 
Missing years are inter-/extrapolated using the same procedure as for the 
production estimates. Note that some of the crops included (copra, groundnuts 
and sesame) were both consumed locally and exported. We are forced to assume 
that exports are equally divided over the producing districts, but this assumption 
has only a minor effect on the eventual cash crop intensity estimates. 
Zanzibar 
District borders coincide with Pemba Island and Zanzibar Island. District-
level, smallholder production estimates for cloves and copra are obtained by 
estimating the relative contribution of the two Islands based on production figures 
in Zanzibar ‘Administration Reports’. District-level, cash crop production shares 
are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of 
production estimates. As the country export data does not distinguish between 
smallholder- and expatriate-produced cash crops, we roughly estimate expatriate-
plantation clove production at 50% and copra production at 20% and include the 
crops produced by expatriate farmers into the country sum. Annual, district-level 
smallholder cash crop production values are obtained by multiplying the annual 
production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from the WTD. 
All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district population. 
Annual population figures are obtained from Zanzibar Blue Books (1920-1939).  
Kenya 
District borders are from Kenya ‘Administration Reports 1931’. District-
level, smallholder production estimates for cotton, wattle, sesame, groundnuts and 
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coconuts are obtained from Kenya ‘Agricultural Census 1930’. No panel data on 
cash crop production is used. The 1930 production shares are used for the entire 
period (1920-1939). District-level, cash crop production shares are obtained by 
dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of production 
estimates. As the WTD does not distinguish between smallholder- and expatriate-
produced cash crops, crops (maize and wattle) the total reported value of 
smallholder produced crops is taken as a share of total production, including 
production at expatriate farms. This share is applied to the entire period. Annual, 
district-level smallholder cash crop production values are obtained by multiplying 
the 1930 production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from 
the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district 
population. Annual population figures are obtained from Kenya Colony Blue 
Books (1927, 1929, 1934, 1938). Missing years are inter-/extrapolated using a 
procedure analogous to the production estimates under ‘Tanganyika’. Note that the 
district-level production figures are based on sales rather than production. Note 
that some of the crops included (maize, sesame, groundnuts, coconuts) were both 
consumed locally and exported. We are forced to assume that exports are equally 
divided over the producing districts, but this assumption has only a minor effect on 
the eventual cash crop intensity estimates. 
Uganda 
District borders are from Uganda ‘Administration Reports 1948’, with some 
modifications based on Wrigley (1959). District-level, smallholder production 
estimates for coffee and cotton are obtained from the Uganda Blue Books (1920, 
1923, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 and 1938). District-level, cash crop production shares 
are obtained by dividing the district’s production estimates by the country-sum of 
production estimates. As the country export data does not distinguish between 
smallholder- and expatriate-produced cash crops, crops (coffee) produced by 
expatriate farmers are included into this country sum. Production shares for 
missing years are set equal to the closest available year. Annual, district-level 
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smallholder cash crop production values are obtained by multiplying the annual 
production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific exports from the 
Uganda Bluebooks (the WTD does not break down export data for Kenya and 
Uganda). All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by the district 
population. Annual population figures are obtained from Uganda Blue Books 
(1920, 1923, 1926, 1929, 1932, 1935 and 1938). Missing years are inter-
/extrapolated using the same procedure as for the production estimates. Note that 
the district shares, as well as the smallholder versus expatriate shares are based on 
acreage rather than production, meaning that yield differences between provinces is 
not taken into account. This may slightly diminish the accuracy of the cash crop 
intensity estimates.  
Nyasaland 
District borders are from Nyasaland ‘Administration Reports 1933’. District-
level, smallholder production estimates for cotton and tobacco are obtained from 
the Nyasaland Blue Books (1923, 1925, 1927, 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937 and 
1939). District-level, cash crop production shares are obtained by dividing the 
district’s production estimates by the country-sum of production estimates. As the 
country export data does not distinguish between smallholder- and expatriate-
produced cash crops, crops (both cotton and tobacco) produced by expatriate 
farmers are included into this country-sum. Production shares for missing years are 
inter-/extrapolated (analogous to procedure described under ‘Tanganyika’ above). 
Annual, district-level smallholder cash crop production values are obtained by 
multiplying the annual production shares with annual country-level, crop-specific 
exports from the WTD. All crops are added up and the resulting total is divided by 
the district population. Annual population figures are obtained from Nyasaland 
Blue Books (1920-1938). Missing years are inter-/extrapolated using the same 
procedure as for the production estimates. Note that the district-level production 
figures are based on sales rather than production. The Blue Books explicitly note 
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that this way of measuring diminishes the accuracy of production estimates, as 
‘many natives grow their tobacco and cotton in one district and sell in another’.  
Bechuanaland 
Districts borders based on a map kindly provided by Ellen Hillbom. No 
smallholder cash crops were exported from Bechuanaland. All districts are set at 0.  
Northern Rhodesia 
No map from the interwar period was available. Instead we used district 
borders based Northern Rhodesia ‘Administration Reports 1948’. No smallholder 
cash crops were exported from Northern Rhodesia. All districts are set at 0.  
General notes 
Population figures are obtained from the Blue Books. These official 
population figures are generally considered to be much too low (see Frankema & 
Jerven, (2014). However, we are still very far from revising these official colonial 
population figures on the district level. Hence, we consistently use the colonial 
figures, taking stock of the possibility that our per capita estimates are too high all 
across the board and that some inaccuracy may enter the dataset as some districts 
may have been more accurately counted than others.  
Country-level exports of each of the crops are obtained from Wageningen 
Trade Database (WTD). These figures are generally considered highly accurate and 
hence serve as the basis of our estimates. However, we do not account for the 
possibility that a share of the export value did not accrue to others in the 
production chain.  
Historical Sources 
Statistical yearbooks and administration reports were used for the following 
colonies (various issues): the Tanganyika Territory, Nyasaland Protectorate, the 
Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, the Gold Coast Colony, the Colony of the 
Gambia, Kenya Colony, Sierra Leone, the Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and 
Bechuanaland. 
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CHAPTER 4 
‘Hunger Makes a Thief of Any Man’: 
Poverty & Crime in British Colonial Asia 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter uses rainfall variation as an instrumental 
variable for padi-rice production to estimate the impact 
of poverty on different types of crime across British 
colonies in South and South East Asia (1910-1940). 
Using original primary sources retrieved from annual 
administrative and statistical reports, it provides some of 
the first evidence in a historical setting on the causal 
relationship between poverty and crime. Extreme rainfall, 
both droughts & floods, lead to a large increase in 
property crimes (such as robbery, petty theft and cattle 
raiding) but not to an increase in interpersonal violent 
crimes (such as murder, homicides and assault). In line 
with a growing body of literature on the climate-
economy nexus, we offer evidence that loss of 
agricultural income is one of the main causal channels 
leading to property crime. Additional historical 
information on food shortages, poverty and crime is used 
to explore the connection in greater detail. 
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4.1 Introduction  
Climate change and its potential threatening impacts have spurred a growing 
body of literature examining how extreme weather conditions influence economic 
performance and human behaviour. This literature suggests that deviations from 
average rainfall and temperature levels increase the likelihood of intergroup conflict 
(Hsiang et al., 2013; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012), inter-communal conflict (Bai & 
Kai-sing Kung, 2011; Papaioannou, 2016),  onset of civil war (Miguel et al., 2004; 
Blattman & Miguel, 2010), property crime (Mehlum et al., 2006; Iyer & Topalova, 
2014; Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015), civil unrest and disobedience (Christian & 
Fenske, 2015) and even complete institutional breakdowns (Bruckner & Ciccone, 
2011). However, some of this evidence has been contested on both theoretical 
(Buhaug et al., 2014) and methodological grounds (Sarsons, 2015; Klomp & Bulte, 
2013), leaving the debate far from settled. 
The societal impact of weather variability seems to be stronger and less 
ambiguous in developing regions, where the majority of cultivated crops are rain-
fed and an insignificant share of cultivated areas is equipped with irrigation and 
artificial water drainage systems.10 . Unfortunately, we still do not fully understand 
the underlying mechanisms driving the climate-to-economy relationship (Burke et 
al., 2015). The most commonly hypothesized channel is that of falling incomes and, 
by extension, poverty (Hsiang et al., 2013; Dell et al., 2014; Miguel et al., 2004). In a 
predominantly agrarian society –being primarily a rain-fed economy– economic 
prosperity is intimately tied to agricultural output. Extreme weather conditions –
resulting in drought or flood– are associated with poor harvests and complete crop 
failures. Consequently, loss of a year’s harvest, besides bringing about near-famine 
conditions, can easily push farmers into extreme poverty.  
                                                 
10 Both types of water management systems are essential in tropical agriculture. After a flood, especially in 
areas that are flat and low-lying, water stagnates upon the soil rotting and eventually destroying the roots 
of the plants. Many scholars have pointed out that in this context ‘a system of controlled drainage is more 
important than irrigation, while a combination of both is the ideal’ (Lim, 1976, p. 43). Artificial drainage is, 
thus, necessary to circumvent surface run-offs, waterlogging, and other phytopathological diseases that 
impede root growth. 
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Poverty has long been a question of great interest within a wide range of 
fields. Multiple scholarly disciplines, including economics, political science, history 
and anthropology, have observed and documented that poverty and crime go hand 
in hand. The literature distinguishes between absolute poverty (i.e. lack of  minimal 
material necessities for survival) and relative poverty (i.e. extreme income inequality). 
A great deal of previous research has demonstrated that absolute poverty is 
associated with higher property crime rates (Patterson, 1991; Miguel 2005; Mehlum 
et al., 2006; Iyer & Topalova, 2014), while relative poverty has been linked with the 
surge of aggression and violent crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Kelly, 2000; Fajnzylber et 
al., 2002). Throughout this study, the term ‘poverty’ will be used in its broadest 
definition to encompass a wide range of conditions such as abrupt food shortages, 
starvation, hunger, subsistence crises and near-famine conditions.   
In simple economic theory of crime, originally introduced by Becker (1974), 
individuals are more likely to become involved in criminal activity when they 
experience a negative income shock. This reasoning is framed in terms of an 
opportunity cost model; as income levels decline as a result of unfavourable conditions, 
engaging in crime becomes more opportune relative to participating in more 
‘peaceful’ economic activities (Grossman, 1991; Seter, 2016). While the theoretical 
foundations of poverty and crime have been well-established, the empirical basis 
for such an argumentation is considered speculative at best (Dell et al., 2014; Burke 
et al., 2015). One plausible explanation for this omission is the endogenous 
relationship between poverty and crime: deteriorating economic conditions may 
favour criminal activity, since more people are likely to engage in crime as an 
alternative source of income, whilst  higher levels of crime may undermine 
economic stability, investment and productivity. In other words, does poverty 
generate crime –or does crime lead to more poverty? Or does some third factor, 
for example state’s institutional capacity or certain food policy reform, affect both 
simultaneously?  
Previous studies have been unable to resolve the key econometric 
identification issues and have been potentially subject to bias due to reverse 
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causality and omitted variables, both of which distort simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimates either downward or upward. For instance, OLS estimates of the 
effect may be biased downwards if colonial governments are more likely to invest 
in food relief programs in districts that experience high crime rates, as these 
investments will underestimate the poverty-effect. On the other hand, OLS 
estimates of poverty on crime would be biased upwards if, for example, high crime 
rates bring about higher poverty. Likewise, an upward bias may result from third 
factors, such as the occurrences of political and economic crises, that tend to 
increase both crime and poverty simultaneously. In our findings we show that 
simple OLS estimates are, indeed, biased downward and underestimate the impact 
of poverty on crime to a substantial degree. Although this article’s aim is to apply 
this approach in economic history, it may also be extended to more present day 
developing countries. 
Ideally, one would need to pool reliable data from a comparable set of 
countries or administrative units  within a similar agro-ecological setting (e.g. 
tropical agrarian economy),  that rely on the same staple crop (e.g. padi-rice), and 
share a rather uniform institutional framework (e.g. British colonial rule) over a 
significant period of time (1910-1940). The colonial states in South and South East 
Asia suit these conditions (Figure 1).11 Regardless of their multifarious differences, 
the unity we attribute to these states is their shared reliance on the same staple 
crop, rice, which was indisputably the most important food-grain in the economy 
(Hill, 2012; Bray, 1994; Farmer, 1977; Elson, 1997). And since we are mainly 
interested in states located within a similar agro-ecological setting, our scope will be 
confined to Asian countries that lie entirely within the tropics.12 To that end, we 
retrieve uniquely rich data from primary sources to create a novel district by year 
                                                 
11 Twenty seven states and districts were included in the analysis. The states include, the three Straits 
Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca; the four Malay states of Selangor, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, 
and Pahang which form the Federated Malay States (F.M.S.); Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and 
Trengganu which collectively are known as the Unfederated Malay States (U.M.S.); North Borneo with its 
five administrative districts; the protectorate of Brunei; and Ceylon with its nine administrative districts. 
Sarawak had to be dropped due to lack of consistent data. 
12 India, for example, was not included since rice was largely competing with wheat as the main staple crop 
and almost half of its land lies outside the tropics. 
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panel dataset. Our analysis exploits high-frequency (e.g. year to year) changes in 
rainfall levels, rice production and several categories of crime.  
Figure 1. British Imperialism in South and South East Asia, c. 1914. 
 
Source: Created by the authors in ArcGIS. 
Our key hypothesis is twofold: (a) if weather shocks lead to crime through 
subsistence crises, then these shocks should primarily affect the kinds of crime that 
alleviate loss of income. We argue that this may very well be the case in both rural 
and urban areas but for different reasons. In rural areas, farmers are directly affected 
by the deficient harvest and resort to illicit activities, whereas in urban areas, waged 
labourers have to cope with food price spikes, since they  are much more 
dependent on the market for their daily calories (absolute poverty).  (b) if weather-
induced harvest failures are causing sharp increases in income inequality (relative 
poverty), for instance because some farmers or merchants benefit from exceptional 
market power during a period of food scarcity and food price hikes, we would 
expect more violent uprisings and grievances against people who were making 
money by exploiting the needs and misery of others. In other words, on the one 
hand, income losses caused by weather shocks should primarily increase petty theft 
and cattle raiding, and, on the other hand, perceptions of ‘injustice’, ‘exploitation’ 
or ‘abuse’ of miserable circumstances may induce a rise in violent crime such as 
homicides, murders and assaults. 
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This possibility is investigated by distinguishing between these two broad 
crime categories; i.e. property and violent crimes. We find that a one standard 
deviation decrease in annual rice production increased  property crime by 21.2%. 
This effect is considerably higher in magnitude to accumulated evidence from other 
studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013). There are three possible reasons why the 
effect is larger than that which the literature predicts. The first reason has to do 
with the institutional context in which this study is embedded and the limited 
attention the colonial governments paid to local food production.13 Despite the fact 
that by the early twentieth century most colonial governments were taking a more 
activist approach to promoting widespread economic development in the territories 
they controlled (Booth 2012), it remains highly refutable the extent to which they 
managed to convert growing national output into improved living standards for the 
vast majority of local population. Colonial government expenditures on transport 
infrastructure, food relief programs and irrigation/drainage systems remained 
considerably low in per capita terms.14 Conservative fiscal policies and the enduring 
food vs. cash crop substitution dilemma among colonial officials impeded local 
padi-rice cultivation and substantially increased reliance on imported foodstuffs 
(Lim, 1977; Elson, 1997).  
A second reason why the effect was so large has to do with the substantially 
low living standards prevailing among rural communities at the time. While exports 
may have boomed and government revenues expanded, nutritional intakes for the 
mass of the population did not improve, and as a result mortality rates were high 
(Booth 2012). That the effect between rainfall shocks and property crime rates 
declined considerably throughout the twentieth century, suggests that modern 
economic growth and its ensuing technological improvements in agriculture have 
enhanced the ability of vulnerable rural societies to withstand climate-induced 
calamities. Lastly, in seeking to explain the high magnitude of the effect, it should 
                                                 
13 For instance, in British Malaya around two thirds of total rice availability was supplied by imports, 
mainly from Thailand and Burma. 
14 See Booth (2012) for a detailed discussion on fiscal spending variation across colonial systems in South 
East Asia. 
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be reasoned that we are dealing with a non-industrial part of the world, where the 
vast majority of the total income was  derived from agricultural practises, and 
where wage labour opportunities were limited, and wage rates low. (Drabble, 1974; 
Farmer, 1977; Bray, 1994; Elson, 1997).  
 In line with our second hypothesis, it is found that the effect of poverty on 
violent crimes was insignificant and nearly zero, suggesting extreme income 
inequality was not (as) crucial in inciting crime. Additionally, it is shown that a 
standard deviation decrease in rice yields increased begging and vagrancy by 13.8%, 
suggesting that rice production was a key determinant of poverty during this 
period. 
This study yields three contributions. First, we find strong evidence that both 
drought and excessive rainfall cause substantial increases in property crime. The 
results are robust to using alternative econometric specifications, to using lagged 
dependent and independent variables, to cross-sectional spill-overs, and finally, to 
clustering standard errors at the country level, the year level as well as two-way 
clustered at both the country and the year level. These results are in accord with 
recent studies indicating that property crimes are more likely to increase in years of 
depressed incomes than violent crimes (Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015; Iyer & 
Topalova, 2014; Melhum et al., 2006; Miguel, 2005), as well as with simple 
economic theory of crime (Becker, 1974; Grossman, 1991; Bourguignon, 2000). 
Second,  a causal relationship is established  between poverty and property 
crime in an agrarian historical setting, and the channel of causality identified by 
using rainfall as a source of exogenous variation in food production. While it is 
intuitively plausible that the rainfall instruments are exogenous, we have to evaluate 
whether they satisfy the exclusion restriction: rainfall shocks should affect property 
crime only through reduced agricultural production. One potential concern may be 
a direct causal link (without any changes to real income) between high temperatures 
and aggressive and/or violent behaviour, as several psychological and empirical 
studies have documented (Anderson, 1989; Anderson et al., 2000; Ranson, 2014; 
Iyer & Topalova, 2014; Blakeslee & Fishman, 2015). Our results confirm this direct 
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extra-economic channel, since high temperature shocks are associated with more 
violent crimes (coeff.= 0.043,  s.e.= 0.018). However, temperature shocks yield no 
association with property crimes nor with adverse effects on food production. This 
serves as an important validation of the empirical strategy and highlights the 
importance of looking beyond aggregate crime measures in this climate-crime 
literature, since they may shadow heterogeneous patterns across crime categories. 
 A further  violation of the exclusion restriction is the possibility that rainfall 
deviation may have a direct effect on crime itself; if heavy rains, due to flooded 
roads for instance, reduce criminals’ likelihood of being detained by the police or 
hamper police’ capacity to report crimes. Therefore, if such channels are present, 
IV estimates could misattribute the direct effects of rainfall to crime. Note that 
such channels are not serious threats to our estimation strategy, since excessive 
rainfall is empirically associated with significantly more (not less) crime in the 
reduced-form regressions. Thus to the extent that a bias exists, our estimates would 
be lower bounds on the true impact of poverty on property crime. 
A critical assumption underlying the use of rainfall as an IV is that rainfall 
shocks affect property crime only through their impact on agricultural income. The 
most prominent critique put forward for such an assumption is that rainfall shocks 
could also potentially operate through non-agricultural urban channels 
(manufacturing and non-agricultural wages). However, these channels are unlikely 
to be important in the agrarian and largely non-industrial context  studied here, 
where rain-fed agriculture dominates aggregate production and a relatively small 
amount of urban labourers existed (Parmer, 1960; Tregonning, 1965; Drabble, 
1974; Bruton, 1992). It is acknowledged that our identification strategy may be 
inappropriate for other more developed regions of the world, where rainfall shocks 
are not sufficiently related to depressing  agricultural  income, for instance, due to 
substantial investment in irrigation and drainage infrastructure absorbing such 
shocks (Sarsons, 2015). Nevertheless, this strategy is likely to be of interest to both 
economic historians and policy makers, since it is highly viable for poor agrarian 
societies, such as pre-industrial Europe or contemporary less developed countries.  
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Third, we make use of additional historical information on food shortages 
and crime as reported in the colonial sources. This is a substantial contribution 
since most studies in this field are solely based on econometric correlations and 
make no attempt to contextualize their findings using qualitative evidence. Using a 
systematic approach, we were not only able to confirm the empirical findings of 
this study but to find support in favour of the theoretical foundations of the 
opportunity cost model. We observe that as foodstuffs become scarcer and distress 
levels rise, property crimes and vagrancy inflate substantially –while violent crimes 
remain unaffected.  
Our work also relates to the emerging literature on the effects of weather 
shocks on crime and conflict. Interestingly, the vast majority of the studies 
published on the climate-economy nexus has been mostly restricted to limited 
comparisons in the post-1960 period, mainly due to data availability (see Hsiang et 
al., 2013; Dell et al., 2014). Only very recently have scholars begun expanding the 
temporal scope in the pre-1960 period (for example Bai & Kai-sing Kung (2011) 
and Jia (2014) for premodern China; Anderson et al. (2015) and Bignon et al. 
(2016) for premodern Europe; Papaioannou (2016) and Papaioannou & de Haas 
(2015) for colonial Africa). This study thus expands both the geographical as well 
as temporal scope of studies on the climate-economy nexus. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
historical context and the colonial reports. Section 3 describes the  data sources and 
the construction of variables used in the analysis, and Section 4 lays out the 
empirical strategy. Sections 5 presents the empirical findings and Section 6 
concludes.  
4.2 Historical Context 
In examining the possible mechanisms underpinning the relationship 
between food shortages, poverty and crime in British colonial Asia, it is important 
to consider some of the underlying agricultural, economic and political conditions. 
We begin by providing a brief historical background, including a discussion of the 
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importance of rice production and various aspects of the British colonial rule. We 
then proceed by reviewing the colonial reports are then reviewed in order to offer 
further contextualization, illustrate underlying mechanisms and validate the 
theoretical foundations of the opportunity cost model. 
4.2.1 Historical Background  
During their long history as agrarian societies, South and South East Asian 
states were very vulnerable to unfavourable climatological conditions (Hill, 2012; 
Bray, 1994). Peasant agriculture failed to rise above subsistence level during the 
period of British rule (Tregonning, 1965; Bruton, 1992). Crops continued to be 
adversely affected by natural enemies and there were limited agricultural advances 
to increase yields as the peasant’s technology had changed only slightly over the 
years . Growth of agricultural production was further impeded by the rapid 
expansion of rubber cultivation in the early twentieth century (Drabble, 1974; 
Elson, 1997; Bray, 1994). Despite padi rice being the traditional staple crop in this 
part of the world, the quantities produced were sometimes described as being 
inadequate to meet the wants of the people who grow it and several states were, to 
various degrees, dependent on imported agricultural produce (Farmer, 1977; 
Butcher, 1979). However, padi rice production formed the principal occupation of 
the peasant, and was the chief source of general prosperity (Lim, 1976; Elson, 
1997).   
Many historians have observed that deep in the peasant’s ethos was the 
conviction that padi-rice was the foundation of life and its cultivation the proper 
and most honoured sphere of toil, as emphasized by Farmer (1977) and Bray 
(1994), when they report that “to be a cultivator very nearly meant to be a padi cultivator”. 
As Hill (2012, p. 59) puts it “the Malaya states were predominantly agricultural and rice-
growing was so prevalent that it had led to the virtual exclusion of any other food crop”. For 
most Malaya states the proportion of rice growers to total economically active 
persons was above 80 per cent. Nevertheless, the Malays did not attempt double-
cropping as wet land rice required so long a period to reach maturity, that there 
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would have been a deficiency of water for a second crop. In cases where a second, 
light crop was attempted, “it often scarcely repaid the trouble of cultivation; so poor was its 
yield” (Hill, 2012, p. 111).A similar story can be deduced from Mills (1964) and 
Bruton (1992) for Ceylon, and from Tregonning (1965) for North Borneo. 
Tregonning (1965, p. 93) points out that ‘although the area devoted to rice cultivation was 
greater than that given to any other crop and its culture was the chief industry of the native people, 
there was never enough rice produced for the territory to be self-sufficient, and large quantities were 
always imported’.  
The significance of padi-rice cultivation for the overall well-being of the 
native population was also documented in the colonial sources. As we will see in 
more detail in the next section, the agricultural commissioners were required to 
report whether food supply was sufficient and well maintained to cover local needs. 
If rice production was scarce, they were requested to provide plausible 
explanations. Time and again, they pointed to climatological conditions in 
explaining the deficiency or failure of the annual padi-rice harvest and its 
consequential distress among smallholders.  
The basic function of British colonisation in the Asian states covered by this 
study, whatever its form and origin, was to establish and maintain the conditions 
under which the dynamic forces of trade could flourish (Lange, 2004; Mills, 1964; 
Parmer, 1960; Butcher, 1979; Wade, 1990).  Although the British rule was intended 
to be indirect, direct rule was the practice and it increased in scope and 
effectiveness as the years passed. The new structure was purely British in 
conception and operation. British interests dominated the vast majority of 
commercial activities as the British owned most of the plantations, the estate 
factories  processing the rubber, tea, and coconuts, the import-export trade, and 
other service activities. In areas with favourable soils and climates, cash crop export 
economies (such as coffee, tea, rubber etc.) were encouraged and promoted as they 
provided the colonial authorities with much needed revenue from customs duties 
and other forms of indirect taxation (Drabble, 1974; Booth, 1999). 
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4.2.2 Qualitative Evidence: Climate, Poverty and Crime 
The sources  used are the annual reports filed by the colonial administration. 
The British colonizers set up an extensive system of administration, where 
elaborate administrative accounts were kept. These accounts make regular notice of 
weather-induced agricultural failure resulting in higher levels of social distress, and 
in more extreme cases, subsistence crises and near-famine conditions. In practice, 
each department filed reports to provide information on and explanations of 
various incidences along with what was considered to be their causes. The goal of 
this section is not to systematically record all incidences of food shortages, 
subsistence crises, and crime, but rather to give a detailed contextual overview  of 
the reasons, mechanisms and channels appearing to be most relevant.  
(a) Rainfall Extremes: Flood & Drought   
In considering the impact that unfavourable weather conditions have on 
annual food production, it is important to stress the non-linear nature of the 
relationship. Based on primary sources, we argue that both excessive rainfall and 
droughts have been responsible for bringing about deficient padi rice harvests. The 
sources abound with examples of the curvilinear nature of the effect. For instance, 
the agricultural commissioner of Kedah, in his 1925 report, emphasises both types 
of environmental hazards in reducing farmers’ welfare: 
  
a drought at the wrong season or a flood will cause great loss to the 
country and to the padi planters. It was at one time roughly estimated 
that the present year’s padi crop would, owing to drought, be some 
25.000.000 gantangs of padi short of the previous year’s gantang. As a 
result it would involve a prospective loss of $2.500.000 to padi planters.  
(Kedah Annual Report,1925). 
 
In 1934, the same commissioner reported a severe crop failure, owing this 
time to excessive rainfall: “serious flooding was experienced during November and early 
December, doing extensive damage in several districts, and it is believed that the harvest will be less 
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abundant than that of the previous year”. His speculation came true by the end of that 
year when “the total yield was just about 33 million gantangs, showing a decrease of 17 million 
gantangs as compared with 1933” (Kedah, Annual Report, 1934). 
Likewise, in 1924, the Kelantan colonial official recorded both types of 
unfavourable weather conditions within the State and remarked that “the high 
variability of yields has been connected chiefly with droughts and floods. As one reads back through 
the annual reports, one constantly comes across reports of disastrous droughts. At other times it is 
an early flood which has drowned the padi before it has become sufficiently established.” The rice 
returns reveal that “the total production of rice has fluctuated rather more violently than the 
area planted, and sometimes in an opposite direction. Thus in the 1924 season the 148.000 acres 
yielded only 55,359 tons, whereas last year the 139,000 acres yielded 74,008 tons –a decrease 
in production of ca 25%. The reason for such a decrease was the “serious flooding 
during the early part of the season made it impossible for peasants to cultivate their land”. Thus, 
overall, our qualitative evidence supports a U-shaped parameterization of the link 
between weather and agricultural incomes. 
(b) Food Scarcity & Price Spikes 
The annual reports are very extensive and meticulous in their description of 
local agricultural conditions. These reports frequently mention the adverse 
consequences of weather conditions in inducing food shortages, food price hikes 
and resultant social distress. Shortages of rice and other foodstuffs, and subsequent 
increases in their prices were greatly felt by the people. In years of food scarcity, 
local padi-rice was sold for high prices, which were beyond the means of the poor.  
An illustrative example is taken from the annual report of Trengganu in 1914 
where the padi harvest, due to abnormally high rainfall, was a very poor one, 
resulting in substantial shortage of food supply among the local population. . It is 
important to note that such adverse conditions should be viewed in a context 
where already “the rice grown in Trengganu is far from sufficient for the support of the 
population”. A shortage of rice resulted in a “sudden panic in the market inciting food-price 
spikes and thus making food inaccessible to most farmers”. That year the price of rice had 
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risen from $14 to $27 a bag —an increase of about 100%. The colonial official 
concluded that “with the high prices which prevailed the native had a hard time to make both 
ends meet and a certain amount of distress has been apparent”. The social consequences of 
such conditions can be depicted best through the annual police report of 1914, 
which recognized: 
 
that there was a large increase in the number of offences against property. A 
number of causes are given for this increase...among them the most probable seem 
to be economic due to unfavourable weather conditions. The last reason applies 
more particularly to the surrounding plain, where thieves and house-breakers, 
when detected, are usually found to be young padi planters (Trengganu, Annual 
Report, 1914). 
 
Similarly, the agricultural commissioner of Central province in Ceylon 
recounted in 1927 that “the padi-planters are going through a year of almost unprecedented 
misfortune” and that “the abnormal rainfall in January did considerable damage. That was a 
truly phenomenal rainfall. Paddy cultivation has been a failure —one of the lowest crops on 
record, and it was followed by the usual food shortage. This is also shown by the fact that burglars 
take away foodstuffs, which formerly were left behind.  Owing to the shortage of paddy crops the 
price of paddy has risen dramatically. Deaths from starvation are occasionally reported”. Indeed, 
the rice crop was a poor one and totalled 300.000 gantangs as compared to 
1.200.000 the year before –a decrease of ca 75% (Ceylon, Annual Report, 1927).The 
following two cases were selected to offer a comprehensive impression of the  far-
reaching impact of rice shortages on the vast majority of households, across 
numerous aspects of ordinary life, regardless of whether they were net rice 
importers or exporters. One could hypothesize that the effect might be stronger in 
rice importing districts, as the available food supplies did not meet local demand. 
Thus, when the already insufficient padi-rice harvests fail, economic distress would 
be inflated. By contrast, one could argue that the effect might be stronger in rice 
exporting districts, as the annual rural income of households would be more 
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exposed and sensitive to weather fluctuations. Thus, a failed rice harvest would 
have a relatively more acute impact on rice exporting districts than in rice-
importing ones. While these dynamics are more systematically addressed in the 
econometric part of the paper, we illustrate the broad social impact of rice 
shortages in cases where rice was exported and imported.  
For instance, in Selangor (a rice importing state), when the rains failed and 
available incomes shrank, “the health of the people deteriorated and fell considerably below the 
normal standard. This was to a large extent due to the acute scarcity of food. Enteric cases soared 
in almost all towns”(F.M.S. Medical Report, 1919). Similarly, in 1936 Kedah (a rice 
exporting district), the adverse effects of food scarcity were felt on the general 
welfare of the people. Infant mortality rose by 11% and average daily attendance at 
government schools declined from 13.425 in 1935 to 9.912 in 1936 (approx. 27% 
decrease). “The decrease was due to the scarcity of rice and the poverty of the people. Children 
were in many cases half starved, and their parents could not provide them with clothes”. (Kedah, 
Education Report, 1936).  
(c) Poverty & Property Crime 
Poverty has been put forward as a decisive motive for crime. Individuals 
lacking the basic means of subsistence are more likely to become involved in 
criminal activity when they experience a negative income shock. As income levels 
decline, engaging in property crime becomes more opportune relative to 
participating in more ‘peaceful’ economic activities and the stolen property might 
be regarded as a buffer in alleviating distress.  This kind of criminal behaviour was 
frequently stated in the annual reports and can be illustrated best in the words of 
the colonial Administrator of Southern Galle of Ceylon, who in 1931 observed 
that:  
there is a great temptation to them [padi-growers] to commit crime in 
order to live; and reports received indicate that there has been an increase 
of cattle-stealing and theft of foodstuffs. Thefts of foodstuffs have not been 
common in the past, and the increase in this type of crime and in cattle-
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stealing is due to real poverty and difficulty in obtaining food (Ceylon, 
Annual Report, 1931). 
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the chief Commissioner of North 
Borneo in 1919, who stated that:  
 
 the year was probably the worst ever experienced in the State. The 
difficulties to be faced were great. Crop after crop was destroyed and by June 
the shortage of food was becoming very serious. Theft was rife and increased 
as food became short (North Borneo Native Affairs, 1919). 
 
These two examples serve to highlight the idea that when farmers realize 
their food yields are going to be deficient or entirely failed, the opportunity cost of 
crime is reduced and thereby increase its incidence. The more one reads into the 
reports the better insights he gets regarding  reasons behind the steep increases in 
property crimes. When the harvest fails and food becomes scarce, local farmers, in 
need of food, may resort to plundering and stealing either in the form of cash or 
kind on condition that it could alleviate distress. The Chief of the Police of the 
Malacca settlement, in 1936, summarized that: 
 
The number of offences against property –cattle lifting, burglary, and petty 
thefts–has sown a most unsatisfactory tendency. This is doubtless due to 
the scarcity of food. I have heard it said that the way in which private 
gardens are rifled is a real deterrent to enterprise in their cultivation. This 
may be an exaggeration, but the evil is rampant, and in some cases is 
caused by real starvation. 
 
His counterpart in the Malay Peninsula, in his 1932 report, also associated 
the steep increase in property crimes of that year with the widespread shortage of 
food, stressing that when house breakers and thieves were detected, they were 
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usually found to be young padi planters. In one of his journeys up country, the 
chief of Police recounted that:  
 
it was impossible to obtain padi in the villages...The harvest was late, the 
crops were entirely ruined...rice crops were everywhere poor and in many 
places destroyed by the phenomenal drought...The presence of property 
crime is undoubtedly due in no small measure to a shortage of rice 
(F.M.S., Judicial Report, 1932). 
 
Few would dispute that livestock breeding broadens the opportunities to 
store wealth, mediate risks and raise land productivity in pre-industrial societies. 
However, livestock was also seen as an object of looting, since by stealing few 
cattle in times of hardship the perpetrator gains either income by marketing the 
cattle and exchanging it for other goods, or gains calories by simply consuming it. 
This is exemplified best in the report undertaken by the colonial officer of 
Trengganu state in 1931, who related the unfavourable weather conditions of that 
year with a considerable rise in arrests, stressing that  many parts of the central 
plain were “so infested with thieves that poultry and cattle could not be kept and was stolen by 
night”.  
In many instances the colonial officials associated food shortages directly 
with cattle-raiding noting that “there was an increase of cattle theft, perhaps due to the 
shortage of food. Most cattle stolen are slaughtered” or that “cattle stealing was rife in North 
Kedah during the first nine months of the year owing to the unfavourable weather conditions of the 
country in certain localities.” 
Simple theoretical considerations suggest that income shocks should have a 
larger impact on property crimes as compared to violent ones. Our qualitative 
material confirms that logic, as the colonial officials reported sizable differences 
between the amount of property and violent crimes within the same year. We 
observe many instances where increases in property crime did not yield concurrent 
increases in violent crimes. According to the 1919 Annual Report, Kedah had 
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“experienced in succession the two driest years since rainfalls were first recorded in 1906” and as 
is anticipated, the padi crop reaped at the beginning of 1919 was poor. Theft 
returns that year more than doubled; from 403 up to 812 cases –an increase of 
more than 100%, whereas the violent offences against the person declined 
substantially. The Commissioner reports that “there is a large amount of petty thieving but 
there are remarkably few crimes of violence.”  
The evidence presented thus far supports the idea that scarcity of food and 
loss of income had led to substantially more property crime. However, unlike years 
of extreme weather fluctuations, there have also been seasons with exceptionally 
good yields. The impact of ‘feast’ seasons on reducing crime levels was noted by 
the colonial administrators as well. In years where the precipitation patterns were 
smooth, the rice-harvest was bountiful, and as a result crime rates plummeted. 
According to the 1930 Agriculture report of Kelantan: “the crop was harvested under 
ideal weather conditions and proved to be one of the best secured for a number of years. A surplus 
over the requirements of the indigenous population was obtained.” According to the Police 
report of that same year “There has been little serious crime, owing to prosperous favourable 
weather conditions.”[...]“as regards criminal litigation, increased prosperity has led to diminution 
of crime” (Kelantan, Police Report, 1930). 
4.3 Data 
The data were obtained from colonial administrative accounts (Annual 
Reports and Blue Books of Statistics) collected over a long research visit at The 
National Archives (TNA) in London. All variables are original and obtained 
directly from colonial sources, except if stated otherwise. The summary statistics 
are presented in Table 1 below. Panel (a) includes the main dependent variables of 
crime. Panel (b) includes the weather measures and their multiple modifications. 
Panel (c) reports padi-rice production and panel (d) includes few time-varying 
controls. All variables are available annually at the district level between 1910 and 
1939.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics: District by Year 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Panel (a): Crime measures per 100,000 population      
Ln(Property crime)  659 2.41 0.40 0.50 3.69 
Ln(Violent crime)  683 2.14 0.46 0.90 3.25 
Ln(Theft)  610 2.30 0.45 0.42 3.69 
Ln(Cattle-raiding)  417 1.99 0.39 0.88 3.02 
Ln(Assault)  682 2.09 0.50 0.42 3.21 
Ln(Homicides)  695 0.89 0.49 -0.68 2.33 
Ln(Vagrancy)  339 0.69 0.57 -0.39 2.22 
      
Panel (b): Weather measures      
Rainfall deviation Stations (z-score) 627 0.00 1.00 -2.42 3.19 
Rainfall deviation squared Stations 627 1.00 1.44 0.00 10.23 
Rainfall absolute deviation Stations (linear) 627 0.79 0.63 0.00 3.19 
Positive rainfall shock (1 std dev) 627 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Negative rainfall shock (1 std dev) 627 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Rainfall deviation Grids (z-score) 780 0.00 1.00 -2.87 3.38 
Rainfall deviation squared Grids 780 1.00 1.40 0.00 11.47 
Rainfall absolute deviation Grids (linear) 780 0.80 0.59 0.00 3.38 
Temperature deviation (z-score) 780 0.00 1.00 -2.25 3.05 
      
Panel (c): Food measure      
Padi rice production (z-score) 682 0.00 1.00 -3.26 3.62 
Padi rice cultivation in acres per capita 682 0.56 0.33 0.06 1.26 
      
Panel (d): Controls (time-varying)      
Ln(Population density)  810 4.25 1.56 -0.33 8.09 
Ln(Road density)  810 -2.12 2.60 -8.61 4.75 
Ln(Police staff density) per 100,000 population  797 5.06 0.51 3.81 6.25 
Cash crop production in value (£) per capita  780 13.11 6.49 2.41 28.31 
4.3.1 Crime data 
Among the crimes included are theft, cattle-raiding, assault and homicide. Of 
the crimes included in the data, we combine individual crime categories into two 
broad categories: theft and cattle raiding as property crimes, and assault and homicide 
as violent crimes. Results are presented for both individual and aggregate crimes. 
Additionally,  data is obtained for vagrancy for each state they were available. All 
variables exhibit a high year-to-year variation. Table A-1 presents the pairwise 
correlation matrix among the dependent variables. In thinking about issues of 
differential crime reporting over time, it is important to note that we have no 
evidence to believe that weather shocks would affect the incentive of crime victims 
to report crime or the incentive of colonial officials to record more or less criminal 
incidences. Even though it is not implausible that local authorities would in fact 
increase the level of under-reporting at precisely those times when crime is rife —
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i.e. after an adverse weather shock— we argue that this tendency would, if 
anything, downward our results.15 The summary statistics for the types of crime are 
presented in panel (a) of Table 1. 
4.3.2  Weather shocks 
Historical precipitation data come from meteorological stations, which were 
first introduced by the British in the late nineteenth century. The data were 
consistent throughout the period of interest. Since all districts had at least one 
meteorological station within its borders,  it has been possible to include all colonial 
districts and states. If more than one station was in place, we took their average of 
them. The measure of weather shocks applied here is the annual standardized 
rainfall deviation from the long-term panel mean of rainfall for a given district. Values 
for standardized rainfall deviation have a mean of 0.00, a standard deviation of 1, and 
range from -2.42 to 3.19. Figure 2 shows how the relationship looks when we 
scatter plot property crime (fitted values in purple) against rainfall deviation (x-axis). 
Figure 2.  Rainfall Shocks & Property Crime 
 
                                                 
15 We are aware of potential inadequacies and biases in the colonial sources (e.g. the possibility that the 
district officials would consistently under-report issues to look great to their superiors). In section 2.2, we 
were able to match several unfavourable weather conditions with widespread distress and related property 
crime, while we were able to identify a null effect on violent crimes. If this bias of under-reporting exists 
in the case of British Asia, and negative income shocks cause households to under-report crime, our 
estimates would underestimate the true causal impact of poverty on crime. Moreover, the functional use 
of the archival sources enabled us to obtain a more thorough understanding of the important mechanisms 
driving the relationship of interest, and to add a new layer of robustness by backing up the regression 
results. 
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Since there are many ways to parameterize rainfall, we also transformed our 
main explanatory variable, and defined a “negative rainfall shock” as a dummy 
which takes the value of 1 when annual rainfall in a district i is one standard 
deviation below the long-run mean of panel i, and a “positive rainfall shock” as a 
dummy  being one standard deviation above the panel’s mean. We also use an 
alternative measure of rainfall taken from the Willmott and Matsuura (2009) 
database. The data have 0.5° latitude by 0.5° longitude grids. Values for 
standardized grid rainfall deviation have a mean of 0.00, a standard deviation of 1, and 
range from -2.87 to 3.38. Although this measure gives nearly identical results, it 
reduces (a) our sample size considerably (Singapore, Perlis and a few districts in 
North Borneo had to be dropped due to lack of observations) and (b) the accuracy 
of the observations as the data compiled in this dataset is mostly based on 
extrapolation. Lastly, we construct a variable of temperature deviation to account 
for the extra-economic direct impact of extreme heat on crime. The summary 
statistics of the weather conditions are presented in panel (b) of Table 1.  
4.3.3 Rice production  
District level agricultural data on padi rice yields were obtained from the 
Agricultural Annual Reports for each state. We create a consistent indicator of 
gantangs of rice per capita for each district in our sample. As discussed above, 
peasant agriculture failed to rise above subsistence level during this period of 
British rule (Tregonning, 1965; Drabble, 1974; Bray, 1994; Mills, 1964). Padi-rice 
yielded only one harvest a year in this part of the world at the time and peasants did 
not attempt double-cropping (Elson, 1997; Lim, 1973; Bruton, 1992). Therefore, 
tying annual rainfall deviations to padi-rice production becomes straightforward. 
Figure 3 graphically presents the strong negative correlation between rainfall shocks 
and rice production between 1910 and 1939. It is evident that as rainfall deviates 
from the long-term average in either direction, food production is shrinking. 
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Figure 3. Rainfall Shocks & Food Production 
 
4.3.4 Controls 
While omitted variables should not be of great concern, a number of 
additional time-varying controls  have been included to address potential bias 
stemming from unobserved factors. We control for differences in (a) state capacity 
by constructing a measure of road density following Herbst (2000), (b) policing 
capacity by constructing a measure of police staff density (Papaioannou, 2016), and 
(c) demographic pressures by constructing a measure of population density. Lastly, 
we control for the interaction of a few spatial characteristics of districts with a 
linear time trend to take into account their heterogeneous impacts over time. We 
construct a battery of district-specific effects to control for the possibility that some 
districts would react differently over time. It should be reminded here, that we are 
dealing with a timespan of about three decades, and we, therefore, expect some 
unobservable characteristics at the district level to change over time. Thus, by 
including the interactions of district dummies and a linear time trend, we allow the 
estimates to take into account widening differences across regions and districts 
during the long time horizon of this study. For instance, we expect that the colonial 
authorities in the early 1940s (as compared to the early 1910s) to have extended 
their capacity to broadcast power and to have become more effective in opposing 
crime. In addition, it could be that a spike in property crimes in district i, may have 
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urged the colonial authorities to invest more in those crime-stricken places and, as a 
result, in the following years the capacity of police in inhibiting future crime would 
have been increased. In either case, not accounting for such systematic tendencies 
in the data might have yielded inconsistent estimates. 
4.4 Empirical Strategy  
We first establish that rainfall shocks significantly affect crime rates (reduced 
form specifications) and then proceed by focusing on identifying the causal channel 
linking poverty  and crime (first-stage and IV-2SLS results).  
To achieve our first goal, the regression specification (reduced form) is as follows: 
 
Ln(Crime)i,t    β0   β1 AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t   δZˊi,t  νi  μt  
 (District dummy  Time Trend)i,t  εi,t     (1) 
 
where Ln(Crime)i,t denotes the natural log of the incidence of the various types of 
crime (per 100,000 population) in district i and year t. AbsoluteRainfallDeviationi,t  
denotes the annual absolute rainfall deviation of each district i from the historical 
long-term mean of the same district. Zˊi,t denotes a vector of controls to avoid any 
potential omitted variable bias. νi and μt are district and year fixed effects, 
respectively. We use these to control for omitted heterogeneity at the level of 
districts and time periods. These controls are quite crucial in controlling for 
unobservable time-invariant district heterogeneity and for factors that may affect 
the levels of crime across all districts in the same year (such as during the Great 
Depression). Moreover, (District dummy  Time trend)i,t denotes the unobservable 
district characteristics (νi) when interacted with a linear time trend (t). In practice, 
we control for district-specific characteristics to capture district-specific changes in 
crime activity over time. A good example here, is changes in district capacity to 
report and restrain crime over time, since police authorities in highly criminal 
districts may become more efficient in preventing crimes. 
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 The coefficient of interest, β1, is the estimated effect of a one standard 
deviation change (either positive or negative) in rainfall on crime. A positive sign, β1 
> 0, indicates that, on average, extreme rainfall shocks are associated with more 
crime. In all estimations we cluster standard errors at the district level (no. of 
clusters = 27) to avoid any autocorrelation concerns of weather shocks and the 
possibility of measurement errors, which are more likely to be correlated within 
districts across time. For robustness, we cluster standard errors at the country (no. 
of clusters = 9)  and at the year level (no. of clusters = 30)  as well as both country-
year level by two-way clustering. This way we avoid concerns about country-year 
unobservable characteristics that vary across time, such as levels of expenditures on 
law enforcement, or country’s capacity to record crime rates.  
In addition, we control for spatial correlation (cross-sectional dependence) 
by adjusting standard errors following Hoechle (2007). To assess the importance of 
omitted variable bias we build on the method recently developed by Oster (2014) 
and Gonzalez & Miguel (2015), by estimating the reliability ratios. In practice, we 
show that the coefficient estimates on crime change little across regression 
specifications with and without additional covariates. To give one example, the 
estimated coefficient of rainfall deviation on theft when we include the full set of 
observable controls is 0.1098 with an R2 = 0.473 (column 1 of Table 2). The same 
coefficient from the uncontrolled regression (not reported in the text)is 0.1181 with 
an R2 = 0.369. Calculating the proposed equation (2) in Gonzalez & Miguel’s (2015) 
study, we get an adjusted lower bound coefficient of 0.1016 and upper bound of 
0.1098. Such a finding implies a highly stable coefficient. The same approach was 
followed for the other coefficients, yielding similar results (not reported). 
In achieving our second goal and identifying the causal effect of poverty on 
crime, we  present the OLS first-stage relationship results between rainfall and food 
production, and then  perform a IV-2SLS estimation using rainfall as an 
instrumental variable for food production. While few scholars have put the use of 
rainfall variation as instrument for income under scrutiny (Sarsons, 2015), by 
pointing to alternative non-agricultural channels (e.g. urban wages or direct 
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psychological effects) through which rainfall shocks may increase crime, a large 
body of literature argues that the use of this kind of instrumentation approach in 
rainfed agrarian settings is highly suitable (Miguel et al., 2004; Miguel, 2005; Dell et 
al., 2014; Mehlum et al., 2006). In either case, we conduct several robustness checks 
to address potential violations of the exclusion restriction (section 5.4). 
4.5 Main empirical results 
The first part of this section (4.5.1) presents the results on the impact of 
weather shocks on the various types of crime (reduced form specifications). Section 
4.5.2 presents the results of the instrumental variable approach (first-stage and two-
stage IV-2SLS). Section 4.5.3 presents a set of heterogeneous effects for different 
sub-samples. Section 4.5.4 presents the results for a set of robustness checks and 
section 4.5.5 refutes potential violations of the exclusion restriction. 
4.5.1 The Impact of Weather shocks on Crime (Reduced-form) 
The results are presented in Table 2. In the reduced-form regression, a one 
standard deviation change in rainfall is associated with significantly more crime, 
10.9% for thefts (column 1 in Table 4), 10.5% for cattle raiding (column 2),  and 
11.25% for property crimes (column 3) while it yields no significant effect for 
assaults (column 4), for homicides (column 5), and for violent crimes (regression 6). 
Their regression coefficients as well as their standard errors range are presented in 
Figure 4.  
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Table 2. The Impact of Rainfall Shocks on Crime (Reduced-Form) 
 
Thefts 
Cattle 
Raiding 
Property 
Crimes 
Assaults Homicides 
Violent 
Crimes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t 0.109*** 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.014 0.025 -0.043 
 
(0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.130) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy   Time trend) 
Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. observations 596 417 576 605 580 600 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%. Sample period: 1910–1939. OLS-FE. The dependent variables are the 
logarithm of each crime variable expresses as 100.000 of the population. Reported in parentheses are standard errors 
clustered at the district level. Controls include population density, road density and police per capita. District-specific 
effects indicate the interaction of each District dummy  Time trend. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Magnitude of Coefficients 
 
Notes:  Regression coefficients of Table 2. Confidence Intervals set at 95%. 
Table 3 presents the results when we include lagged and lead weather 
conditions as determinants of crime. The coefficient of rainfall shocks on property 
crime remains stable (about 11%) and robust to the inclusion of  rainfall lag (t - 1) 
and lead (t + 1) (columns 2 & 3).  Columns 4 to 6 show that rainfall shocks do not 
impact on violent crimes.  
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Table 3. The Impact of Lagged and Lead Rainfall Shocks on Crime 
 
Ln(Property Crime)  Ln(Violent Crime) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.102***  0.007 0.006 0.017 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t - 1  0.019    0.023  
  (0.015)    (0.013)  
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t  1   -0.004    -0.001 
   (0.021)    (0.008) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Controls (time-varying) Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy   Time trend) 
Y Y Y 
 
Y Y Y 
No. observations 576 502 502  600 518 518 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%. Sample period: 1910–1939. OLS-FE. The dependent variables are the logarithm 
of each crime variable expressed as 100.000 of the population. Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the 
district level. Controls include population density, road density and police per capita. District-specific effects indicate the 
interaction of each District dummy  Time trend. 
 
Next, we present the results solely for property crime, since that is our main 
dependent variable of interest.16 In Table 4, we include the square term of 
RainfallDeviationi,t and find that the effect of rainfall shocks on property crime is 
curvilinear (U-shaped), meaning that both drought and excessive rainfall increase 
crime (columns 1-4). The coefficient of rainfall deviation square remains highly 
consistent across these specifications. Population density yields a negative 
correlation with property crime, suggesting a more moderate response to weather 
fluctuations in areas that are less densely populated. Road density yields a positive 
coefficient but it is statistically insignificant, not allowing for further interpretation. 
Police staff per capita yields a strongly negative correlation with property crime, 
implying that more policing lowers the rate of offenses and crime (see also Roeder 
et al., 2015). 
                                                 
16 For comparison purposes, Table A-8 in the Appendix presents the results for violent crime following an 
identical structure. 
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We also test for the symmetricity of the effect by including the ‘positive 
rainfall shock’ and ‘negative rainfall shock’ variables into the analysis. A standard 
deviation increase in rainfall increased property crimes by 17.7% and similarly, a 
standard deviation decrease in rainfall increased property crimes by 8.3%. This 
result is in line with previous findings by Papaioannou (2016) for Nigeria and 
Papaioannou & de Haas (2015) for colonial British Africa. A possible explanation is 
that in years of excessive rainfall farmers would lose their entire harvest in a 
relatively shorter time, whereas in years of drought farmers could hope for late 
rains. In the former case, the certainty of a failed harvest more rapidly reduces the 
opportunity cost of crime. Another possible explanation is that in tropical regions 
with relatively abundant rainfall regimes, excessive precipitation causes flooding 
and acute surface run-offs which, in turn, hurt harvests considerably more. 
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4.5.2 Poverty & Property Crime: An Instrumental Variable Approach 
We now proceed by identifying the income channel as the causal explanation 
that drives the underlying relationship between income shocks and property crime. 
We use absolute rainfall deviationi,t as an instrument to generate exogenous variation in 
food production. The rainfall instrument is reasonably strong (the F-statistic is 18.3 
in column 3 of Table 5).  
Table 5. Rainfall Shocks & Food Production (First-stage) 
 
Dependent variable: Food Production  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t -0.547*** -0.530*** -0.516*** -0.545*** -0.504*** 
 
   (0.084)      (0.086)     (0.084)  (0.096) (0.083) 
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t - 1      -0.067  
    (0.093)  
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t - 2    -0.074  
    (0.086)  
Absolute Rainfall Deviation t  1     -0.022 
     (0.065) 
District & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls  N N Y Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy  Time trend) 
N Y Y Y Y 
No. observations 552 552 552 401 483 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%. Reported in parentheses are standard errors clustered at the district 
level. The dependent variable is the standardized annual rice production (z-score). Controls include population 
density, road density and police per capita. District-specific effects indicate the interaction of each District 
dummy  Time trend. The F-statistic of our preferred specification (column 3) is 18.3. 
This way it is argued that loss of income from agriculture in year t causally predicts 
higher levels of property crime in year t (while having no effect on violent crime). 
As shown in Table 5, the first-stage relationship between rainfall and food 
production is strongly negative: current (and not lead or lagged) rainfall deviation is 
significantly related to padi rice yields at 99 percent confidence (Table 5, column 1), 
and this relationship is robust to the inclusion: of time dummies, fixed effects and 
district-specific time trends (column 2), of additional controls (column 3) and of 
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lagged rainfall deviation from the previous two years (t-1 & t-2) (column 4). As an 
identification check, we estimate a “false experiment” specification in which lead 
rainfall deviation (t+1) is included as an additional explanatory variable. We find 
that the coefficient estimate is indeed near zero (column 5). 
The second-stage equation estimates the impact of loss of income on the 
incidence of property crime by performing a two-stage least square estimation (IV-
2SLS): 
Ln(Property crime)i,t   β0   β1 FoodProductioni,t [IV: AbsoluteRainfalldeviationi,t ]   
  δZˊi,t  νi  μt   (District dummy  Year)i,t  εi,t  (2) 
The estimated coefficient of food production on property crime is -0.085 (or -
8.5%)  in the OLS specification with time and fixed effects (Table 6, regression 1) 
and -0.088 (-8.8%) when district-specific effects and controls are included 
(regression 2). Both estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 99% 
confidence. The IV-2SLS estimates also indicate a negative and significant 
association between poverty and crime. A one standard deviation increase in rice 
production decreases property crime by 21.2% (regression 3). Notice that this is 
about double the magnitude of the analogous OLS estimate (-8.5%), suggesting 
that the bias in the OLS regression is large and underestimates the effect of poverty 
on crime.17 In other words, simple correlation between rice production and crime 
may appear misleading, highlighting the value of the IV approach we develop.   
We next estimate the impact of loss of income on vagrancy arrests. Under 
the British colonial rule, begging was illegal and destitute people ended up in police 
reports. Even though vagrancy can hardly be characterized as crime, it could serve 
as a suitable proxy for dire poverty. We expect vagrancy to yield a similar robust 
correlation as property crime. Indeed, the results show that the relationship 
between food production and vagrancy is negative and highly significant, which 
suggests that depressed incomes were a major determinant of poverty. One 
standard deviation decrease in rice production increases the amount of arrested 
                                                 
17 In addition, there can be classical measurement error, which would lead to attenuation bias.  
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vagrants by 13.8% (regression 6). Table A-6 reports the IV-2SLS results on violent 
crime. All the estimated coefficients are nearly zero.  
Table 6. Baseline IV-2SLS Results: Poverty & Crime 
 
Ln(Property crime)  Ln(Vagrancy) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS  OLS IV-2SLS 
Food production t -0.085***  -0.088*** -0.212*** -0.198***  -0.047*** -0.138*** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.013) (0.047) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
Controls N Y N Y  Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy   Trend) 
N Y N Y 
 
Y Y 
No. observations 552 552 510 510  339 303 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%.  Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the district level. 
Controls include population density, road density and police per capita. District-specific effects indicate the interaction of each 
District dummy  Time trend. The instrumental variable is rainfall deviation at year t. Vagrancy statistics were not available for 
the whole sample. 
4.5.3 Heterogeneous Effects 
To further enhance our understanding on the role played by agricultural 
income in driving the relationship between rainfall shocks and property crime, we 
explore heterogeneous compliance in treatment effects across districts, conditional 
on several contextual factors including market access, commercial agriculture, 
percentage of the population working in rice agriculture, public spending and 
districts being net rice importers or exporters. Table 7 presents the results for 
different sub-samples, reporting a wide range of compliers. This exercise is similar 
to Dell (2012) and Fenske & Kala (2015). Column 1 reports the baseline second 
stage relationship from the full sample, reproducing Column 3 of Table 6 for 
comparison purposes. Column 2 presents the results for districts that were net rice 
importers and Column 3 for net rice exporters. While both yield a statistically 
significant correlation with property crime, the difference between the two 
coefficients is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.231), suggesting that this 
relationship was not particularly influenced by whether a district was rice importer 
or exporter.  
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Column 4 limits the sample to districts that showed a lower percentage of 
padi-rice cultivation than the median district, and Column 5 limits the sample to 
districts that showed a higher percentage of padi-rice than the median. Both 
coefficients are statistically different from zero, and they are not statistically 
distinguishable from each other (p-value= 0.183). Despite the slightly higher 
coefficient of districts with a lower percentage of padi-rice production than the 
median district (coeff.= -0.181, s.e.= 0.028), the results suggest that the vast 
majority of households suffer a loss in income when food production is low, 
regardless of the total volume of per capita rice produced in that particular 
district.18 This finding is in line with Iyer & Topalova (2014), who find that rainfall 
shocks in India decrease average consumption across the full range of the income 
distribution, impacting all segments and production classes of society. 
Columns 6 and 7 divide the sample by whether the district was exporting 
considerable volumes of cash crops (mainly rubber, coconut, tea and cocoa) than 
the median district. The correlation between food production and property crime is 
statistically significant in both samples, and it is substantially larger in the less 
commercial agricultural sample (coeff.= -0.312, s.e.= 0.096) than in the more 
commercialized sample (coeff.= -0.157, s.e.= 0.088). Moving from the more 
commercialized districts to the less commercialized ones, the relationship become 
more pronounced and property crime increases by almost half. We argue that the 
widening gap seen in the estimated coefficients is due to the lack of economic 
diversification. It seems likely that agricultural commercialization and crop 
diversification acted as an insurance mechanism to local households by generating 
an alternative source of income. This result is in line with that of Papaioannou and 
de Haas (2015) for colonial British Africa and Burgess & Donaldson (2012) for 
colonial India; both effectively arguing that crop diversification and openness to 
trade mitigated the adverse effects of weather shocks.  
                                                 
18 In results not reported, we find that vagrancy rates exhibit a similar outcome for both high and low 
percentage of per capita padi-rice cultivation. The effect was statistically significant in both sub-samples, 
but it was not statistically distinguishable from each other (p-value= 0.344). 
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Next, we hypothesize that districts possessing less infrastructural density 
experienced higher transportation barriers and costs and were more difficult to 
reach by potential food relief programs. Columns 8 and 9 divide the sample by 
whether the district had less barriers to market access than the median district. We 
proxy market access with infrastructural density. We expect districts with relatively 
more dense road network to be less susceptible to shocks, since high road density 
facilitates inter-regional and international trade. The correlation between food 
production and property crime is statistically significant in both samples but is 
substantially larger in the districts with higher infrastructural density. The two 
coefficients are statistically distinguishable from each other (p-value = 0.038). The 
greater responsiveness of property crimes to food shocks in more isolated districts 
is a reflection of the scarcity of alternative income opportunities from trade. 
Columns 10 and 11 divide the sample by whether a district had a higher level of 
public expenditure than the median district. The reasonable assumption is that 
districts with a relatively higher budget could intervene and invest in years of 
agricultural loss, hence the poverty-crime effect would be attenuated. Nevertheless, 
we find this not to be the case. The difference between the two samples is 
insignificant (p-value= 0.311). 
Lastly, Columns 12 and 13 tackle potential concerns related to the likelihood 
of some districts receiving more rainfall shocks than the median district. To achieve 
that, we have transformed our rainfall data following the coefficient of variation 
(CV) formula, also known as relative standard deviation (RSD). This is a 
standardized measure of rainfall dispersion which is expressed as a percentage. It is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation σi  to the mean μ of each district i. 
The values for CV rainfall range from 0.0919 to 0.2574. The sample is split by 
whether the district is more likely to face a rainfall shock than the median district. 
Our results show that while both are statistically different from zero, they are not 
statistically distinguishable from each other (p-value = 0.167).  
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4.5.4 Robustness Checks 
We now check the robustness of the preferred IV-2SLS estimates as 
reported in Table 6. First, Table A-2, shows that replacing rainfall deviation 
obtained from meteorological stations with an alternative measure of rainfall, based 
on the Matsuura and Wilmott (2009) world rainfall database (0.5 x 0.5 grid), gives 
nearly identical results. Second,  account is taken of widening differences across 
countries as well as heterogeneity during the 30 year horizon of this study and 
Table A-3, presents the IV-2SLS results of standard errors clustered at the country 
level, year level as well as two-way clustered at both country and year level.  
Third, we examine the sensitivity of the main estimates to the use of 
alternative instrumental specifications. Column 1 of Table A-4 reports estimates 
using rainfall in the lagged year t-1 and two years earlier t-2 as instrumental 
variables. Similarly, as an identification check, we estimate a “false experiment” 
specification in which leads of rainfall deviation in year t+1 and t+2 are included as 
instrumental variables, and  find that the coefficient estimate is indeed near zero 
(column 2). As an additional falsification test, we re-estimate our main IV-2SLS 
results by using temperature shocks as an instrumental variable (column 3). These 
checks provide additional validation to our empirical strategy. 
Table A-5 reports the IV-2SLS estimates for each individual category of 
crime, and Table A-6 for violent crimes. In results not reported, we obtain 
statistically identical results, if we use standardized beta coefficients (z-scores) for 
transforming the main dependent variables. Thus, the IV-2SLS results are not 
specific to the choice of functional form. Lastly, to ensure that our results are not 
driven by spatial spillovers, since rainfall patterns could be spatially correlated, we 
control for spatial and serial correlation using methods suggested by Hoechle 
(2007). The results remain largely unchanged. 
4.5.5 Potential Violations of the Exclusion Restriction 
While it is intuitively plausible that the rainfall instruments are exogenous, 
we have to evaluate whether they satisfy the exclusion restriction–i.e. weather 
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shocks should affect property crime only through falling agricultural income. We 
acknowledge the possibility that economic channels (either direct or indirect ones) 
other than annual rice production may affect crime in the aftermath of adverse 
rainfall shocks. One possible violation of the exclusion restriction may occur in the 
case when rainfall shocks directly impact on crime; in an extreme rainfall scenario, 
flooded roads for instance, may reduce criminals’ likelihood of stealing due to 
transportation difficulties or may hamper police capacity to report crimes. If such 
channels are present, IV estimates could misattribute the direct effects of rainfall to 
poverty. Note though that such alternative explanations do not pose a serious 
threat to the estimation, since excessive rainfall is associated with more (not less) 
crime in the reduced-form regression (coeff. +0.172 in Table 4 column 7). Thus to 
the extent that a bias exists, our estimates would be lower bounds of the true 
impact of poverty on property crime. 
Another possible concern is that the colonial states may have intervened by 
investing more in places with extreme poverty. If extreme poverty was declining, 
and property crimes were to a large extent driven by poverty, one might expect the 
impact of food production on crime to decrease over time. To test for such a 
concern, we include interaction terms between food production and a time trend, 
which we instrument with interactions between rainfall shocks and a time trend. 
However, we do not find support for the claim that the effect of poverty on 
property crime attenuated during the study period (results not reported).  
Another possible channel is psychological, as rainfall may affect people’s 
moods by making them more or less inclined to commit a crime. A clear candidate 
here is high temperature shocks which have been found to cause elevated 
aggression (Anderson 1989) and violent crimes (Ranson 2014). We find that 
temperature shocks are not positively or negatively associated with rice yields 
(Table A-7, column 1) nor with property crimes (column 2). However, consistent 
with the relevant literature (Anderson et al. 2000; Iyer & Topalova 2014; Blakeslee 
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& Fishman 2015), we find that temperature shocks are associated with 4.3% more 
violent crimes (column 3).  
4.6 Conclusion  
This article suggests that income shocks, and by extension poverty, are a key 
underlying cause of property crime in British colonial Asia. We estimate the causal 
effect of reduced rice production on crime using rainfall variation as an 
instrumental variable for rice production, and find that the effect of abrupt income 
shocks on property crime is indeed considerably large. A one standard deviation 
decrease in annual rice production is found to increase property crime by 21.2%. 
This effect is considerably higher in magnitude to accumulated evidence from other 
studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013). One explanation for such a large effect 
may arise from the fact that we are dealing with a highly agrarian/non-industrial 
part of the world, where the vast majority of the total income is derived from 
agricultural practises , and where urban labour was limited. Another possible 
explanation has to do with the institutional context in which this study is embedded 
and the limited attention the colonial governments paid to local food production. 
Lastly, it may has to do with the substantially low living standards prevailing among 
rural communities at the time, where nutritional intakes for the mass of the 
population did not improve, and as a result mortality rates were high. 
With the use of rainfall as an instrumental variable for padi-rice production, 
this  article also addresses a  methodological challenge; i.e. endogeneity and reverse 
causality, since the effect between poverty and crime is larger than simple OLS 
estimates would suggest (8.5%), thus highlighting the importance of using 
instrumental variable methods. Additionally, we show that a one standard deviation 
decrease in rice production increases begging and vagrancy by 14.1%. This finding 
strongly suggests that rice production was a key determinant of absolute poverty 
during this period, which in turn led to increased crime.  
Although no effect was found between income shocks and violent crime, the 
results confirm a direct extra-economic channel between high temperature and 
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violent behaviour. A one standard deviation increase in temperature is associated 
with 4.3% increase in violent crime. This serves as an important validation of the 
empirical strategy and highlights the importance of looking beyond aggregate crime 
measures in this climate-crime literature, since they may obscure heterogeneous 
patterns across crime categories.  
The Asian renaissance of the second half of the twentieth century has been 
primarily associated with substantial gains in agricultural output and productivity. 
However, that was not always the case as there were fears in the 1950s and the 
early 1960s that the tropical Asian rice-based economy would be experiencing 
massive famine and starvation because the region had already reached its 
cultivation frontier (Otsuka & Larson, 2014). Prior to the Green Revolution 
(beginning in the 1960s), food shortages and famines were considered a typical 
Asian phenomenon (O’ Grada, 2009). Nutritional intakes for the mass of the 
population did not improve, and mortality rates were considerably high in that part 
of the world (Booth, 2012). The results contained herein add supporting evidence 
to this idea, since it is found that falling agricultural incomes, and by extension rural 
poverty, primarily affected the categories of crime that alleviated economic distress. 
Beyond improving our understanding on local conditions of early twentieth 
century South and South-East Asian states, the implication of this study may be 
important from a public policy perspective in contemporary developing countries. 
Taken together, the results of this research securely support the idea of improved 
high-yield weather-resistant grains and investments in irrigation and drainage 
technology. The promise of a stable annual harvest would potentially eliminate 
much of the adverse crime-induced poverty traps, as well as the subsequent 
unfolding vicious cycle of crime and further disruptions to human welfare 
(Bourguignon, 2000). Unfortunately, climate change continues and will  bring about 
more erratic weather events, adversely affecting the poorest and economically 
vulnerable smallholder farmers the most. A key policy priority should therefore be 
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to aim at  long-term protection of the most vulnerable and precarious farmers of 
the global south. 
Appendix A 
Table A-1. Correlation among Crime Measures 
 
Property 
crime 
Violent 
crime 
Theft  
Cattle-
raiding  
Assault Homicide Vagrancy 
Ln(Property crime) 1.000       
Ln(Violent crime) 0.117 1.000      
Ln(Theft)  0.824* 0.097 1.000     
Ln(Cattle-raiding)  0.628* -0.018 0.409* 1.000    
Ln(Assault)  0.330 0.772* 0.267 0.367 1.000   
Ln(Homicides)  0.524 0.456* 0.240 0.199 0.371* 1.000  
Ln(Vagrancy)  0.364* 0.085 0.306* 0.312* 0.509* 0.476* 1.000 
Notes: Correlation coefficients are reported. * Denotes significant at 5%. All crime measures are expressed as the 
logarithm of per 100,000 of the population. 
 
 
 
Table A-2. Poverty & Property Crime: using rainfall grids 
 
Ln(Property crime)  Ln(Vagrancy) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS  OLS IV-2SLS 
Food production t -0.085***  -0.088*** -0.168*** -0.179***  -0.037** -0.269** 
 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.053)  (0.013) (0.110) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y Y  Y Y 
Controls N Y N Y  Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy  Trend) 
N Y N Y 
 
Y Y 
No. observations 552 552 531 531  339 303 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%. Sample period: 1910–1939.  Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors 
clustered at the district level. Controls include population density, road density and police per capita. District-specific effects 
indicates the interaction of each District dummy  Trend. The instrumental variables are rainfall deviation at year t and in the 
lagged year (t-1).  
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Table A-3. Clustering Standard Errors at Different Levels 
 
Dependent variable: Ln(Property crime) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Food Production t -0.202 -0.212 -0.206   -0.198 
  (0.0302) (0.0327)  (0.0328)  (0.0326) 
  <0.0375> <0.0.378> <0.0393> 
  [0.0358] [0.0371] [0.0413] 
  
 
Dependent variable: Ln(Vagrancy) 
     
Food Production t -0.151 -0.145 -0.116 -0.138  
  (0.0483)  (0.0501)  (0.0462) (0.0471) 
    <0.0485>  <0.0300>  <0.0369>  
    [0.0628]  [0.0460]  [0.0507]  
     
District  & Year FE N Y Y Y 
Controls  N  N Y N 
District-specific effects 
(unobservable x year) N N N Y 
Notes. The specifications and the estimated coefficients in this Table are the same as in Table 6. 
The standard errors in columns 2–4 are clustered at the district level (in parentheses),  the country 
level (in angle brackets) as well as two-way clustered both the country and the year level (in square 
brackets). 
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Table A-4. Poverty & Property Crime: 
using Lags and Leads Rainfall as Instruments 
 
Ln(Property crime) 
(1) (2) (3) 
 IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Food production t [IV: Rainfall t – 1 & t – 2]  -0.525 
 
 
 
(0.385) 
 
 
Food production t [IV: Rainfall t  1 & t  2]  -0.332  
  (0.451)  
Food production t [IV: Temperature t]   0.261 
   (0.389) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy  Trend) 
Y Y Y 
No. observations 366 358 552 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%. Sample period: 1910–1939.  Reported in 
parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the district level. Controls include 
population density, road density and police per capita. District-specific effects indicate the 
interaction of each District dummy  Trend. Column 1: the instrumental variables are rainfall 
deviation in the lagged year (t – 1), and two years earlier (t – 2). Column 2: the instrumental 
variables are rainfall deviation in the lead year (t + 1), and two years later (t + 2). Column 3: the 
instrumental variable is temperature deviation in year t. 
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Table A-6. Poverty & Violent Crime 
 
Ln(Violent crime) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
Food production t -0.056  -0.001 -0.007 0.002 
 
(0.048) (0.059) (0.176) (0.189) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Controls N Y N Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy  Trend) 
N Y N Y 
No. observations 600 600 575 575 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%.  Reported in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered 
at the district level. Controls include population density, road density and police per capita. District-
specific effects indicates the interaction of each District dummy  Trend. The instrumental variables are 
rainfall deviation at year t and in the lagged year (t-1).  
 
 
Table A-7. Temperature Shocks & Crime 
 
Food 
Production 
Ln(Property 
Crime) 
Ln(Violent 
Crime) 
(1) (2) (3) 
 OLS OLS OLS 
Temperature deviation t 0.070  0.035 0.043** 
 
(0.084) (0.025) (0.018) 
District  & Year FE Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
District-specific effects  
(District dummy   Trend) 
Y Y Y 
No. observations 552 576 600 
Notes: *Significant at 10%, **5%, ***1%.  Reported in parentheses are robust standard 
errors clustered at the district level. Controls include population density, road density and 
police per capita. District-specific effects indicates the interaction of each District dummy 
 Trend. 
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Historical Sources 
Statistical Yearbooks & Government Reports 
All documents were retrieved from The National Archives, London. Government 
Printing Office: various issues, reported in alphabetical order. 
Brunei Annual Report: Department code: CO 842, Series number: 1–2. 
Ceylon Administration Report: Department code: CO 57, Series number: 176–258. 
_____________Blue Book: Department code: CO 59, Series number: 120-152. 
Federated Malay States Administration Report: Department code: CO 576, Series 
number: 5–65. 
_____________Blue Book: Department code: CO 575, Series number: 1-37. 
_____________Provincial Report: Department code: CO 435/437/438/439, 
Series number:1-4. 
Johore Annual Report: Department code: CO 715, Series number: 1-5. 
Kedah & Perlis Annual Report: Department code: CO 716, Series number: 1-4. 
Kelantan Annual Report: Department code: CO 827, Series number: 1-2. 
North Borneo (Sabbah) Annual Report: Department code: CO 648, Series number: 1-
22. 
_____________Blue Book: Department code: CO 966, Series number: 1. 
Straits Settlements Annual Report: Department code: CO 275, Series number: 84-151. 
_____________Blue Book: Department code: CO 277, Series number: 53-91. 
Trengganu Annual Report: Department code: CO 840, Series number: 1-2. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Rainfall Patterns & Human Settlement in Tropical Africa & 
Asia Compared: 
Did African Farmers Face Greater Insecurity? 
 
Abstract 
We explore a new dataset of annual and monthly district-
level rainfall patterns to assess the longstanding idea that 
climatological conditions were more conducive to the 
development of dense rural populations in Asia than in 
Africa. We test whether there existed significant cross-
regional differences in both the frequency and intensity 
of rainfall shocks (i.e. annual mean deviations exceeding 
one standard deviation). Our results confirm that rainfall 
shocks in tropical Africa were both more frequent and 
more severe. Second, we test the separate effects of 
precipitation levels and variability on district-level 
population densities from colonial population censuses. 
We hypothesize that higher mean levels of precipitation 
facilitate agricultural intensification and human 
settlement, while unpredictability of rainfall has the 
opposite effect. Controlling for average rainfall levels, we 
indeed find a strong negative effect of rainfall variation 
on population densities. This study thus lends further 
support to a wide literature arguing that the ecological 
conditions of agricultural intensification were more 
challenging in the African than in the Asian tropics. 
 
 
 
Publication Status: Papaioannou, K. J. & Frankema, E.H., 2017. Rainfall Patters and Human 
Settlement in tropical Africa and Asia: Did African Farmers Face Greater Insecurity? Working Paper 
DP 111795, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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5.1 Introduction 
Environmental conditions for sedentary agriculture have been a major 
determinant of the spatial distribution of the human species throughout 
recorded human history. Millennia ago, the world’s prime peasant-based 
civilizations emerged in major river delta’s with abundant access to fresh water 
or in mountainous terrains where differences in altitude and associated rainfall 
patterns allowed for highly diverse cropping systems in a relatively confined 
geographical area. Of course, access to fresh water –be it through regular 
precipitation or stored in lakes and rivers– wasn’t all that mattered for the 
settlement and expansion of historical populations. The spread of human and 
animal diseases, the location of transportation networks and trade routes, and 
the presence of sub-soil deposits all played their part. Moreover, changes in 
agricultural and transportation technology allowed some sparsely inhabited 
regions to become more densely settled, while degrading environmental 
conditions had opposite effects in some former high density areas. Yet, despite 
long-term ecological and historical dynamics, the spatial connections between 
climate, agricultural development and human settlement are still visible at 
present (Diamond, 1997). 
Adverse climatological conditions have been an oft-mentioned cause for 
disappointing productivity growth in African agriculture, and an important 
factor in explaining low historical densities of population as well as persistent 
poverty (Gallup et al., 1999; Sachs & Warner, 1997). Even though climates have 
varied over the past millennia, considerable parts of Africa such as the Sahara, 
parts of the Sahel, the Kalahari and parts of the East African lowlands have 
long been too arid to support agriculture (Mainguet, 1999; Strahler & Strahler, 
1992). Recent global warming seems to have compounding disadvantageous 
effects on conditions for agricultural production, particularly in the Horn of 
Africa and the West African Sahel (Verschuren et al., 2000; Giannini et al., 
2008). But there are also vast areas in sub-Saharan Africa with abundant rainfall 
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supporting the cultivation of a wide range of food and cash-crops (Tosh, 1980, 
p. 80). 
That rainfall patterns in tropical Africa may exhibit a greater degree of 
year-to-year variability than in other tropical areas has been given far less 
attention. Rainfall variability poses constraints to agricultural intensification and 
the growth of historical populations, even in areas where average precipitation 
levels are high enough to support the cultivation of a large range of crops. 
Under predictable rainfall regimes farmers can adapt their production strategies 
(e.g. by cropping drought resistant crops, practicing seasonal transhumance 
etc.), but when rains vary from year to year, such adaptations are more difficult 
to make. 
Contrary to studies using contemporary climate data (Bloom et al., 1998; 
Gallup et al., 1999; Le Blanc & Perez, 2008), this study ventures into two 
questions of historical significance: has rainfall, on the whole, been more 
insecure and thus less predictable in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia? And if 
so, can this explain part of the difference in population densities that existed in 
both regions before the impact of modern medical and transportation 
technologies that created conditions for the major demographic boom and 
urbanization patterns of the post-1950 era?  
We address these questions using historical rainfall data from colonial 
meteorological stations. We compiled a new dataset of annual and monthly 
rainfall levels collected from local weather stations set up by former colonial 
governments for 221 districts in tropical Africa (141) and Asia (80), parts of 
which were drawn from earlier studies by Papaioannou (2016; 2017) and 
Papaioannou and de Haas (2017). We refine existing measures of rainfall 
variability by distinguishing the overall variation in annual rainfall (expressed in 
coefficients of variation picking up deviations from the mean) from the frequency 
of rainfall shocks (defined as the no. of annual mean deviations exceeding one 
standard deviation) and the intensity of rainfall shocks (the average magnitude of 
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the deviation). We use these measures to explore whether differences between 
tropical Africa and Asia were indeed significantly large to argue that African 
societies faced greater climatological insecurity. 
As visualized in Figure 1, we are also interested in the impact of rainfall 
variability on population densities as a separate channel next to mean rainfall 
levels. Given the lack of reliable fine-grained data on agricultural output, we use 
district-level population densities taken from colonial population censuses 
(which we corrected for possible biases), as a proxy for conditions of 
agricultural intensification and associated stimuli to expanding human 
populations. In our regressions we control for several other factors that are 
likely to have impacted human settlement patterns, such as proximity to the 
coast, the presence of natural rivers and revealed mineral deposits. We find 
that, controlling for mean rainfall levels, rainfall variability indeed explains a 
substantial additional part of the variation in population densities across 
tropical Africa and Asia. Since we are unable to explore the causal channel in 
detail, and we also neglect possible negative feedback loops from increasing 
populations on agricultural production conditions, these tests only offer indirect 
support to the idea that climatological instability translated into higher 
cultivation risks and worsened long-term prospects of agricultural 
development. 
Figure 1: Schematic Overview of Second Hypothesis 
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5.2 Tropical agriculture and environmental conditions 
To explain the principles behind economic agglomeration and 
concentrations of human settlement, the new economic geography literature 
makes a critical distinction between first and second nature geography (Krugman, 
1993). First nature geography refers to all environmental conditions such as 
climate, natural resources, natural transportation routes and so on, which jointly 
create advantages and disadvantages for economic production and related 
human reproduction. Second nature geography refers to the path dependence 
in locational choices of economic activity, by which historical accidents give 
rise to agglomeration effects because of the clustering of economic activities 
and agents in an earlier stage.  
For tropical agriculture in Africa and Asia, where larger concentrations 
of people in cities were historically scarce, first order geography has arguably 
been more important in explaining the variation in population densities across 
space before modern technologies in medicine, transportation and food 
conservation established conditions for unprecedented rates of population 
growth and urbanization. Given the importance of these historical changes, it is 
helpful to further disentangle first order ‘geography’ into conditions that directly 
affect the reproduction of crops, livestock and human beings, from conditions 
that affect the preservation and exchange of agricultural commodities, and related 
possibilities of rural-urban labour specialization. 
The idea that ‘geography’, in the broad sense of the term, has been less 
conducive to productivity growth in African agriculture than in other world 
regions has been expressed for centuries. Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations 
alluded to the lack of opportunities for sea-bound trade and related division of 
labour, as Africa had none of the great water inlets such as the Baltic or 
Mediterranean seas to ‘carry maritime commerce into the interior parts of that 
great continent’ (1776, p. 30, quoted in Bloom et al. (1998), p. 237). Fernand 
Braudel also emphasized the importance of environmental conditions, or 
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‘geography’, in explaining divergent development paths between Europe and 
Africa in the longue durée. According to Braudel, Africa’s lack of navigable 
waterways inhibited the commercialisation of subsistence economies (Braudel, 
1995, p. 123). The view that prohibitive transportation costs resulting from a 
highly uneven spread of populations in large landlocked areas, have hampered 
long-term economic development in Africa is a recurrent theme in studies of 
African development (Collier, 2008; Gallup et al., 1999).  
Food preservation is also more challenging in warmer climates, with 
modest seasonal variations in temperature. Gallup et al. (1999) show a strong 
adverse effect of tropical ecozones on the market value of agricultural output, 
which may lead to a productivity decrement of 30%-50% compared to 
temperate zone agriculture (p. 197). Without the possibility to store food in 
colder winters, the time between harvests and consumption of foodstuffs is 
shorter, limiting opportunities to transport food and produce for (distant) 
markets. It is also argued that farmers in tropical regions are confronted with 
lighter soils, facing rapid nutrient depletion in absence of artificial regeneration 
methods (Austin, 2008). Torrential tropical rains can cause the leaching of soil 
nutrients. But there is no direct reason to suppose that tropical soils and the 
complexities of food storage have put a larger constraint on agricultural 
development in the African tropics than in other tropical regions of the world. 
Neither is it self-evident that tropical climates would inhibit agricultural 
development in all respects. Tropical areas are usually characterised by unique 
degrees of bio-diversity and there are many crops suitable for human 
consumption that grow in the tropics but cannot be grown in temperate areas. 
There is also no indication that conditions for crop domestication were less 
frequent in semi-tropical or tropical areas, although the evidence does seem to 
suggest that tropical regions with strong variation in elevations such as the 
Mexican cordillera, the Andean highlands and the Ethiopian highlands offered 
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particular advantages for domestication efforts because of larger genetic 
diversity (Vavilov, 1951;  Diamond, 1997).  
It may indeed be the case, as Diamond (1997) has famously argued, that 
tropical areas pose additional barriers to the diffusion of domesticated plant 
and animal species, as well as related agricultural innovations (see also Olsson 
& Hibbs, 2005), because they require very high adaptive capacities. In particular 
the incidence of endemic tropical diseases has been notably worse in tropical 
Africa than elsewhere. Severe strains of trypanosomiasis have affected the 
reproduction of  humans, horses and cattle, constraining the availability of 
animal draft power, animal manure and horseback transportation opportunities 
(Goody, 1980; Alsan, 2014; Frankema, 2015). Malaria and a number of other 
tropical diseases were also more severe in tropical Africa than elsewhere. Such 
endemic tropical diseases had a direct effect on human reproduction, but the 
indirect effects were substantial as well: it hampered the human capacity to tend 
soils, to herd cattle and to exchange agricultural commodities. That higher 
altitudes tended to have lower rates of human and animal infection also helps 
to explain why these areas became more densely populated than many of the 
lowland areas. 
Technological innovations can erase barriers to agricultural productivity 
growth, but even then environmental factors remain important. The powerful 
combination of ‘green revolution’ technologies such as high-yielding varieties 
(HYVs) of rice, wheat, maize and chemical fertilizers, also require a regular 
supply of sunlight and fresh water to flourish. Areas with both abundant and 
predictable rains thus held a distinctive advantage over areas with low and/or 
variable precipitation. As the index series in Figure 2 show, gross per capita 
production of cereals diverged strongly under the influence of ‘green 
revolution’ technologies. The per capita output of cereals - especially paddy rice 
- in South-Eastern Asia had risen with ca. 75% in 2013 over 1961 levels. In 
Western Africa per capita production also rose, after a considerable setback in 
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the 1970s and early 1980s, but not as impressive as in Southeast Asia, while in 
Eastern Africa per capita production levels have barely come back to the levels 
recorded in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Although differences in state capacity are often cited as a key factor in 
explaining why tropical Africa, contrary to large parts of tropical Asia, failed to 
herald a ‘green revolution’, it has also been widely acknowledged that the 
environmental odds were stacked against Sub-Saharan Africa in some 
important respects (Conway, 1998; Djurfeldt et al., 2005; Otsuka & Larson, 
2013; Frankema, 2014; Booth et al., 2015). The composition of African soils 
appear to be more heterogeneous than elsewhere, which complicates re-
generation efforts based on fertilizers (Smaling & Braun, 1996) and the vast 
ecological diversity and large variety in food production systems in tropical 
Africa has also prevented the use of ‘silver bullet’ HYVs, such as the IR8 rice 
and Norin 10 wheat varieties (Hayami et al., 1998; Hayami, 2000). Many 
scholars have argued that the vast ecological diversity of tropical Africa requires 
a different ‘green evolution’, a process of tailor-made interventions that 
generate lower economies of scale, and which will be more costly to effectuate 
(Conway, 1998; Otsuka & Larson, 2013, p. vi-vii; Frankema, 2014).  
Sub-Saharan Africa is not just generally dryer, with larger arid areas than 
in East and Southern Asia, rainfall patterns also tend to be more erratic (Bloom 
et al., (1998), p. 222). The unpredictability of rainfall raises risks of harvest 
failures and thus affects cultivation choices (e.g. preference for drought 
resistant crops). Indirectly, these conditions also affect long-term investments 
in soil improvement, transportation networks and commercial infrastructures. 
In the past few decades the World Bank has composed drought indicators 
showing that a large group of tropical African countries experiences droughts 
more frequently and that there are significant differences in rainfall variability 
with other parts of the tropical world. Le Blanc and Perez (2008) have shown 
this statistically in a cross-country study using present-day climate data.  
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We will now take this research a step further by exploring the 
relationship between rainfall patterns and human settlement using a more fine-
grained dataset on a district level for a historical era that precedes large scale global carbon 
emissions and the major demographic boom in the developing world, thus avoiding part of 
the noise inherent in studies using contemporary country-level data.  
Figure 2: Index series of gross per capita cereal production, 
 1961-2015 (1961 = 100) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT, Production statistics, data retrieved at 10-11-2016; 
http://faostat3.fao.org/download/Q/*/E 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Geographical demarcation 
We obtained district level data on rainfall patterns and population 
densities for 221 districts in 10 Sub-Saharan African colonies (141 districts) and 
7 Asian colonies (80 districts) for the period 1920-1940. The areas are 
presented in the map of Figure 3 and listed in Table A-1. The spatial coverage 
of this dataset is motivated by three considerations. First, all these African and 
Asian colonies/countries are located between the tropics of Cancer and 
Capricorn. Second, we selected areas in both West and East Africa to ensure 
that we capture sufficient intra-continental spatial variation to test our first 
hypothesis. Third, for reasons of data availability and data consistency, we 
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focussed on former British colonies in which meteorological data were 
collected at weather stations with comparable high-frequency observations of 
rainfall and temperature.  
Colonial administrations collected demographic data in decadal 
population censuses throughout the British empire. These census data, as we 
will highlight below, are certainly not fully reliable and many of the estimates 
require upward adjustment, since undercounting was common. That said, the 
census estimates definitely improved over time, and the  estimates for the 1920s 
and 1930s have a (much) greater degree of accuracy than the censuses 
conducted in previous decades. Moreover, in view of the fact that most 
estimates for the 1950s and 1960s are more or less reliable, the error margins 
involved in adjusting the census figures through backward casting using default 
growth rates are relatively small (Manning, 2010; Frankema & Jerven, 2014). 
We made one exception to our focus on British colonial climate and population 
data by adding data for the Netherlands Indies (Indonesia), which exhibits a 
comparable degree of detail and accuracy. 
Figure 3: Tropical African & Asian countries included in our sample, c.1920 
 
Source: Created by the authors in ArcGIS. 
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5.3.2 Rainfall data 
Our rainfall data were recorded at meteorological stations that were first 
introduced by British colonial governments in the late 19th century. The rainfall 
data were consistently reported throughout the period of interest and all 
districts included in our sample had at least one meteorological station within 
its borders. If districts had more than one weather station, we took the average 
of them. Our main measure of weather variability is the coefficient of variation 
(CV) of annual rainfall, also known as relative standard deviation (RSD). This is 
a standardized measure of rainfall dispersion which is expressed as a 
percentage. It is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation σi to the mean μ 
of each district i. The values for CV rainfall range from 0.094 to 0.435 (and 
from 0.034 to 0.156 in log form).  
Since there are many ways to parameterize weather variability, we also 
transformed our data into two additional measures, capturing the frequency and 
intensity of rainfall deviations from the mean. We define a rainfall shock as a 
deviation from the long-term annual mean exceeding one standard deviation. 
Our frequency of shocks measure is then defined as the ratio of years with extreme 
rainfall variability exceeding one standard deviation from the long-term mean 
(i.e. 1920-1940). The values for frequency of shocks range from 0.055 to 0.714 with 
a mean of 0.356 and a standard deviation of 0.102. In other words, the average 
district in our sample experienced a rainfall shock every three years or had a 
35.6% annual probability of having a shock. 
The intensity of shocks measure is defined as the sum of values exceeding 
one standard deviation between 1920 and 1940, and it indicates the magnitude 
of these shocks. The higher the intensity of the shocks, the stronger the 
hypothesised impact on local farming conditions and long-term patterns of 
human settlement. The summary statistics of the weather measures are 
presented in panel (a) of Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Panel (a): Weather measures      
Ln(Variation of Rainfall)* 221 0.083 0.022 0.034 0.156 
Ln(Frequency of Shocks) *  221 0.132 0.033 0.023 0.234 
Ln(Intensity of Shocks) * 221 2.127 0.257 1.028 2.580 
Average Rainfall * 221 64.316 38.482 15.80 248.74 
      
Panel (b): Population Measures 
     
Population (1931 census) * 221 411863 557840 1860 2539610 
Land Surface (sq. miles) * 221 11871 21895 81 149277 
Ln(Population Density) * 221 1.651 0.676 0.063 3.401 
Adjusted Population † 221 463646 628414 2023 2876156 
Ln(Adjusted Population Density) † 221 3.848 1.638 0.782 7.572 
      
      
Panel (c): Controls 
     
Ln(Rainy Season) in months * 221 1.624 0.392 0.693 2.484 
Bi-modal Rainfall Dummy * 221 0.318 0.467 0.00 1.00 
Coastal Dummy 
¢
 221 0.389 0.488 0.00 1.00 
Navigable River Dummy 
¢
 221 0.251 0.433 0.000 1.000 
Terrain Ruggedness ¥ 221 0.808 0.704 0.003 3.563 
Elevation ° 221 674.321 565.525 9.027 2305.878 
Soil organic carbon stock ф 221 64.203 55.366 28.000 253.000 
Cation exchange capacity of soil ф 221 21.162 10.877 2.000 41.000 
Malaria Stability Index 
Ẍ
 221 9.528 8.815 0.000 32.751 
Source: * indicates that these variables were assembled by the authors from primary archival 
sources. See Table A-3 in Appendix for an overview of the sources. Bi-modal Rainfall: 
assigned “1” for every district that has two rainy seasons within a year, and “0” otherwise. 
  † indicates that these variables were authors’ calculations based on Frankema & 
Jerven (2014) and Maddison’s (2010) methods. See Table A-2 in the Appendix for a detailed 
description. 
¢
 indicates that these variables were constructed by consulting FAO maps, obtained 
from http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/maps/index.stm. Coastal dummy: assigned “1” 
for every district located at the coast and “0”otherwise. Navigable River dummy: assigned “1” 
for every district that a navigable river runs through it and “0”otherwise. 
¥ indicates that these variable were authors’ calculations by consulting Nunn & Puga 
(2012), obtained from http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/. Terrain Ruggedness: We compute 
the mean score of terrain ruggedness for each district in our sample using ArcGIS. 
° indicates that these variables were authors’ calculations by consulting Jarvis et al., 
(2008), obtained from http://www.cgiar-csi.org/data/srtm-90m-digital-elevation-database-
v4-1. Elevation: We compute the mean score of these variable for each district in our sample 
using ArcGIS. Elevation measures the height (in meters) above mean sea level. 
ф indicates that these variable were constructed by consulting world soil grids 
database, obtained from http://www.isric.org/content/data. Soil organic carbon stock and cation 
exchange capacity of soil: We compute the mean score of these variable for each district in our 
sample using ArcGIS. Elevation is measured in meters. Soil organic carbon stock is 
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measured in tons per hectare for depth interval 0.05m – 0.15m. Cation exchange capacity of 
soil is measured in cmolc/kg at depth 1.00m. 
Ẍ  indicates that this variable was constructed by consulting Kiszewski et al., (2004), 
obtained from http://gps.ucsd.edu/faculty-directory/gordon-mccord.html. Malaria stability 
index measures the average prevalence of malaria transmission within each colonial district. 
The index takes into account the prevalence and type of mosquitoes indigenous to a region, 
their human biting rate, their daily survival rate, and their incubation period.  
5.3.3 Population density estimates 
Our population data are obtained from the colonial population censuses 
conducted in the 1920s and 1930s, and especially the 1931 census that was held 
throughout the British empire. The difficulties of making accurate population 
counts are well-known, even for present-day governments, but especially for 
the poorly equipped colonial administrations of that time. The various biases in 
African colonial population estimates are widely acknowledged in the literature 
(Kuczynski, 1948, 1949; Tabutin & Schumacher, 2004; Manning, 2010; 
Frankema & Jerven, 2014). For the Asian colonies the data are believed to be 
more accurate, but certainly not flawless. For 19th century Indonesia, for 
instance, consecutive census estimates suggest almost impossible rates of 
population growth, even though the estimates for the interwar era are 
considered to be much more accurate.  
The most important problem is that colonial census data tend to 
underestimate actual population size because of a) a lack of census taking 
capacity of colonial administrations, who had to rely largely on indigenous 
chiefs, district officers and village headman to assemble the numbers and b) the 
political incentives associated with census taking efforts. As information on 
population size offered a crucial tool to colonial administrations to expand their 
tax base, respondents and local political leaders often had an  incentive to 
underreport - this wasn’t always the case, since promises of subsidies related to 
population size sometimes had the opposite effect.19  
That said, the capacity of colonial bureaucracies to conduct censuses did 
improve over time and as a result the gap between the estimated and actual 
                                                 
19 The Nigerian census of offers a clear example for this mechanism, but that doesn’t distort our 
estimates here, see Frankema and Jerven (2014). 
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number of inhabitants was substantially reduced. This is corroborated by 
studies pointing out that the inter-census growth rates between 1850 and 1950 
were often on the high end, and in numerous cases even beyond all probability. 
In a seminal study by Patrick Manning, a method has been proposed to 
backward extrapolate population estimates from the 1960s on the basis of a 
series of decadal default growth rates, to compute the possible error margins of 
earlier census estimates. For Sub-Saharan Africa Manning’s method has been 
criticized and adjusted by Frankema and Jerven (2014), but their study by and 
large subscribed to the basic idea of using bandwidth growth rates to adjust 
disputably low census estimates. But what is more important, their alternative 
population estimates for the 1930s don’t deviate that much from Manning’s, 
since the assumption of different default growth rates doesn’t weigh so heavily 
in the relatively short term interval between 1950 and 1930.  
We adopted the backward extrapolation method to check the population 
estimates in our dataset. We take the 1960 figure as the ultimate benchmark and 
compute the average annual growth rate between the census estimates of the 
1920-1940 era in our original dataset. In line with Frankema and Jerven we 
assume for African colonies a default annual growth rate of 1.6 in the 1950s, 
1.3 in the 1940s, 1.2 in the 1930s and 0.4 in the 1920s. We then compare this 
level estimate with the actual census estimate and adjust (in virtually all cases 
upward) the district counts with the obtained percentage. For the Asian 
colonies we adopt existing adjusted population series from Maddison (2010), 
which we also checked for population growth rates.    
Making overall adjustments on a colony level and thus applying similar 
rates of correction to all districts within the colony, leaves us with the possible 
concern that the accuracy of population estimates has also differed across 
districts. One way to correct for this is to take district level data for 1960 and 
then apply the backward extrapolation method on a district level. There is a 
great disadvantage to this method, however, as it erases the possible effects of 
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inter-district migration. We may thus end up correcting one bias by introducing 
another. We thus decided against it, while knowing that the intra-colony 
variation in the biases of our district estimates will have to be extremely large to 
alter the inter-district variation we observe and this gives us considerable 
confidence that the data we use in the regressions are sufficiently adequate to 
put our main hypotheses to the test. The summary statistics of population, 
population density and their adjusted measures are presented in panel (b) of 
Table 1. Appendix Table A-2 presents the original census estimates along with 
our adjusted estimates and the rates of adjustment in percentages of the original 
figures. Table A-3 presents the historical sources. 
5.3.4 Controls 
Our second hypothesis considering the negative relationship between 
rainfall shocks and population density, will be tested in a multivariate regression 
framework. This allows us to include a number of additional controls to 
address omitted variable biases emerging from a range of unobserved factors 
that are likely to influence historical patterns of human settlement. We control 
for differences in general climatological conditions such as (a) average rainfall 
levels, (b) the length of rainy seasons (measured in months), and (c) the 
existence of bi-modal rainfall patterns. Additionally, we control for differences 
in physical geography by constructing indicators for (d) elevation, (e) soil 
ruggedness, (f) cation exchange capacity of soil, (g) soil’s organic carbon stock, 
and by constructing dummies of (h) access to the coast and (i) presence of 
navigable rivers. Lastly, we control for the (j) prevalence of malaria by 
calculating for each district the malaria stability index (Kiszewski et al., 2004). 
The summary statistics for these controls are presented in panel (c) of Table 1, 
along with the sources used to compute them. 
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5.4 Did Africans face greater climatological insecurity?  
The first part of this section (4.1) focuses on the climatological 
differences between the tropical areas in the two continents, questioning 
whether people in tropical Africa, on the whole, faced greater climatological 
insecurity than in tropical Asia. It presents the results of differences pertaining 
to the average variation of rainfall, and to the frequency and the intensity of rainfall 
shocks. Section 4.2 investigates whether the significant inter-continental 
difference we find in rainfall variability is produced by any intra-African 
heterogeneity, and especially a difference in climate systems between East and 
West Africa, or that it can be regarded as a truly ‘African’ feature. 
5.4.1 Climatological Differences 
Figure 4 presents a scatter plot of rainfall variability (Ln rainfall CV) and 
long-term annual average rainfall levels. We separated our 221 observations 
into Asian and African districts. The figure shows that the two dot clouds only 
partially overlap: tropical Africa is dryer than tropical Asian and the variability 
of rainfall is higher in Africa as well. The scatter plot also shows that the intra-
continental variation in rainfall variability is larger in Africa than in Asia. 
Figure 4. Rainfall Variation & Rainfall Mean 
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To test the statistical significance of these observations we employ a 
simple cross-sectional ordinary least square (OLS) regression. The model can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
y = α + β1 Continenti + β2 Xiˊ+ εi,                            (1) 
 
where y refers to the tree different measures of climatological variability (panel 
(a), Table 1), Continent  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a district 
i is located in  Africa and 0 otherwise (i.e. Asia is the reference category). The 
coefficient of interest is β1. A positive sign, β1>0, indicates that, on average, 
Africans were confronted with greater climatological instability.  Xiˊ denotes a 
vector of determinants which we control for, α is a constant, and εi is the error 
term. 
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates for the three dependent variables in 
turn. Columns 1-3 show the Ln(Variation of Rainfall) results. The Africa dummy 
is statistically significant at the 99% confidence interval and suggest that on 
average African districts, and by extension African countries, experienced 
higher levels of climatological variability during the 1920s and 1930s (coeff.= 
0.018, SE= 0.002, p-value= 0.000). The results are robust to controlling for 
average rainfall mean (column 2), and to clustering standard errors at both the 
country and district level (column 3).  
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The estimated coefficients are presented graphically in Figure 5, together 
with the error bars set at a 95% confidence interval. It shows that the African 
districts in our sample experienced significantly more rainfall variation than the 
Asian districts. Moreover, the mean difference between African and Asian 
districts is large enough to be meaningful. To illustrate this, we calculated the 
maximum likelihood estimator (or Cohen’s d) as a measure of effect size 
(Cohen, 1988). Cohen’s d considers the standardized mean difference between 
two groups using the following formula:  d =(𝜇1 − 𝜇2)/𝑠 , where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 
are the means for the two groups (in our case Africa and Asia), and 𝑠 is the 
pooled standard deviation.  
            Figure 5. Variation of Rainfall in Africa & Asia 
 
Notes: Mean difference between the two continents. This figure presents the 
estimated coefficients of column 1 in Table 2, including error bars at 95% 
confidence intervals. 
The results point to a substantial difference d = 1.789 (Figure 6). In 
other words, 96.4% of the treatment group (i.e. Africa in our case) will be 
above the mean of the reference group (Asia), 36.8% of the two groups will 
overlap, and there is a 89.9% chance that a district picked at random from the 
treatment group will have a higher score than a district picked at random from 
the control group. Taking in mind how important rainfall is for systems of rain-
fed agriculture in an age where modern farming technologies were just starting 
to have some impact, the sheer magnitude of the inter-continental difference is 
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a strong indication that the difference in rainfall variability had an impact on 
the possibilities for agricultural development. 
Figure 6: Visualization of effect size using Cohen’s d 
 
Notes: Author’s calculations. 
 
Columns 4-6 in Table 2 show the Ln(Frequency of shocks) results. The 
positive and significant Africa dummy coefficient suggests that, on average, 
Africans experienced a higher frequency of weather shocks than Southeast 
Asians (coeff.= 0.027, SE= 0.004, p-value= 0.000). The high effect size result 
(Cohen’s d= 1.724) again points to a crucial difference. Figure 7-a illustrates the 
mean difference between the two continents, together with the error bars. 
Columns 7-9 show the Ln(Intensity of Shocks) results. The positive and significant 
Africa dummy coefficient suggests that, on average, the intensity of the rainfall 
shocks was larger in tropical Africa, than in tropical Asia  (coeff.= 0.189, SE= 
0.038, p-value= 0.000). The large effect size (Cohen’s d= 2.845) reveals the 
climatological adversities African farmers were facing compared to their Asian 
counterparts. Figure 7-b graphically illustrates the mean difference between the 
two continents, together with the error bars.  
Taken together, our results indicate that rainfall shocks in tropical Africa 
were both more frequent and more severe than in tropical Asia, translating into 
higher cultivation risks. In addition, we would like to emphasize that if we 
would extend this cross-continental comparison with districts or provinces in 
former French, Belgian or Portuguese African colonies, the results would 
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probably be even more pronounced, for the historical literature generally agrees 
that the British colonized areas with relatively favourable conditions for tropical 
agriculture (Burbank & Cooper, 2010, p. 315).    
Figure 7-a. Frequency of Weather shocks, by Continent 
 
Source: Mean difference of frequency of shocks between the two continents 
as estimated in column 4 of Table 2. Error bars at 95% confidence interval are 
included 
 
 
Figure 7-b. Intensity of Weather Shocks by Continent 
 
Source: Mean difference of intensity of shocks between the two continents as 
estimated in column 7 of Table 2. Error bars at 95% confidence interval are 
included 
 
Did African Farmers Face Greater Insecurity? 
 
198 
 
5.4.2 Intra-African Heterogeneity? 
We now proceed by investigating whether the estimated difference 
between African and Asian districts is driven by any intra-African 
heterogeneity. To that end, we sub-divided the African sample into two groups 
(i.e. West and East African districts) and ran a one-way ANOVA that compares 
rainfall variation of these two groups and Asia separately.20 Figure 8 illustrates the 
estimated mean differences across the three regions. While both West (p < 
.001) and East (p < .001) Africa exhibit significantly more rainfall variation than 
Asia, the difference between West and East Africa is small and statistically 
insignificant (p = .632). In other words, both regions in the African tropics 
experienced significantly more rainfall variability than we observe in the Asian 
tropics.21 
Figure 8. Variation of Rainfall across Regions 
 
Source: Mean difference of rainfall variation across the three regions. Error bars at 
95% confidence interval are included 
 
A similar method for the frequency of shocks result demonstrates that there 
exists no intra-African difference (p = .129), while in Southeast Asia the 
                                                 
20 Between-groups comparisons were conducted with Bonferroni corrected t-tests. We preferred this method to 
simple separate t-tests to avoid inflation of Type I error.  
21 The results remain largely unchanged when we only include districts that are located at the coast. Both West 
(p < .001) and East (p < .001) African coastal districts exhibit significantly more rainfall variation than Asian 
coastal districts. The difference between West and East Africa is statistically significant at 90% confidence 
interval (p = .073).  
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frequency of rainfall shocks was significantly lower than in either West (p = 
.013) or East Africa (p < .001). Finally, our results for the intensity of shocks 
indicate that there is a significant intra-African difference (p < .001), as is 
illustrated in Figure 9. West Africa experienced more severe shocks than East 
Africa. However, the intensity of shocks in both West (p < .001) and East 
Africa (p < .001) was significantly more severe than in Asia. These findings thus 
underpin our argument that the Asia-Africa distinction in climatological 
variability is real.  
Figure 9. Intensity of Shocks across Regions 
 
Source: Mean difference of intensity of shocks across the three regions. Error bars at 
95% confidence interval are included 
5.5 Rainfall Variability & Population Density  
We now proceed to test our second hypothesis regarding the negative 
relationship between rainfall variability and population densities in a 
multivariate regression framework. Section 5.5.1 presents our baseline results 
and section 5.5.2 deals with several concerns that may violate our empirical 
strategy in order to indicate how robust our findings are. 
5.5.1 Baseline Results 
Figure 10 shows scatter plots with mean rainfall on the y-axis and the 
lognormal of population densities on the x-axis. The dots represent African 
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districts, the triangles the Asian districts. Figure 10 shows that the clouds are 
only partly overlapping, with Asian areas generally characterized by higher 
average rainfall levels and higher population densities. The figure also shows a 
positive correlation between both variables, although the variation around the 
linear trend line is large.  
Figure 10. Rainfall Mean & Population Density 
 
Figure 11 shows the relationship between rainfall variability and 
population densities, again showing only a partial overlap between the clouds. 
Figure 11 also shows a negative relationship between rainfall variability and 
population densities.  
Figure 11. Rainfall Variation & Population Density 
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Table 3 presents our baseline OLS regression results, with rainfall shocks 
as the main independent variable of interest, and rainfall means as our most 
important control variable. The dependent variable is the adjusted population 
density. Column 1 shows the OLS result without any controls (coeff.= -26.061, 
SE= 4.913, p-value= 0.000). The R2 suggests that rainfall variability explains 
approximately 14.4% of the variation in population density. To avoid potential 
multicollinearity problems, we include our controls one by one. Columns 2-7 
present the results after controlling for continental differences (column 2), 
mean rainfall levels (column 3), length of rainy season (column 4), uni-modality 
of rainfall (column 5), access to the sea (column 6), navigable rivers (column 7), 
terrain ruggedness (column 8), elevation (column 9), cation exchange capacity 
(column 10) and malaria stability index (11). Across all specifications, the 
results of Ln(RainfallCV) remain robust and statistically significant at a 99 per 
cent confidence interval. Moreover, all controls yield the expected sign, which 
serves as an additional validation of our analysis. Finally, in column 12, we 
jointly include all the controls and add country fixed effect dummies. This last 
specification is the one we use for our conclusions, as it controls for a range of 
omitted variables and yields the highest R2 of 0.476 (or 47.6 per cent). 
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Notes: Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1  percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 
percent. Reported in parentheses are t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. Asia is the 
reference group [continent=0]. Country effects denote country dummies. Wet season is measured in 
months. Bi-modal rainfall refers to the presence of two wet periods within a year. For a full description of 
the control variables see Table 1. 
5.5.2 Robustness Checks  
We now check the robustness of our results as reported in Tables 2 and 
3. One potential concern is that the estimates are driven by outliers both in our 
dependent and independent variables. To deal with such concerns, we follow a 
conservative and strict method of excluding outliers as developed by Leys et al. 
(2013). In practise, we exclude any observation that exhibits a higher than 3 and 
lower than -3 standard deviations from the mean. The results remained largely 
unchanged (not reported). 
Another possible concern is that the problems of undercounting in the 
population census of 1931 were more serious in the colonial hinterlands than in 
or around the capital districts, where the bureaucratic capacity required to 
conduct censuses was obviously higher. To check the possible impact of 
uneven biases in the population census, we classified the districts in our sample 
in three groups: 1) the capital district, 2) districts bordering the capital district 
and, 3) a rest category of so-called ‘hinterland districts’. To correct for the 
possibility that undercounting was more severe in the hinterland districts, we 
differentiated the mark-up rates which we hitherto had applied on the colony 
level; we maintained the national mark-up rate for districts bordering the 
capital, added another 50% to hinterland districts and allocated to the capital 
districts whatever there was left. The results remained largely unchanged and 
are presented in Table A-4 in the Appendix. 
Lastly, to be sure that our sample is not driven by sample selection, we 
included historical rainfall observations for India. We obtained data from the 
Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology (IITM).22 These data have been 
previously used by Michalopoulos (2012) and Fenske and Kala (2015). The 
                                                 
22 See http://www.tropmet.res.in/static_page.php?page_id=53. 
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results yield nearly identical results (not reported).23 Unfortunately, we were not 
able to test our second hypothesis related to population density, since, 
throughout the colonial period, several reorganization of district and other 
administrative boundaries occurred in India, restricting us from getting 
consistent estimates for population density.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Studies in the New Economic Geography have made it overly clear that 
the spatial distribution of economic agglomerations and associated 
concentrations of human settlements have deep ecological roots. Abundant and 
predictable rainfall is one of the key variables for explaining such settlement 
patterns, since rain-fed agriculture served as the basis of subsistence in pre-
modern societies, and still is a highly important factor in explaining divergent 
trajectories of agricultural development. 
This study has used a new dataset of annual and monthly district-level 
rainfall patterns to assess the longstanding idea that climatological conditions 
were more conducive to the development of dense rural populations in Asia 
than in Africa. Although we were not able to prove the direct causal connection 
of rainfall to population density, via its effect on agricultural intensification, we 
claim to have taken this research a step further by exploring the relationship 
between rainfall patterns and human settlement using a more fine-grained 
dataset of rainfall and population levels, and testing the impact of various 
measures of rainfall variability, for an era preceding large scale global carbon 
emissions and the demographic explosion of the second half of the 20th 
century. We thus managed to avoid part of the noise inherent to studies using 
contemporary rainfall and population data and also go beyond the level of 
cross-country comparisons. 
                                                 
23 Figure A-1 in the Appendix illustrates the estimated mean differences across the four regions (West Africa, 
East Africa, South-east Asia and India), together with the estimated error bars at 95% confidence interval. Both 
South-east Asia and India experienced significantly less rainfall variability than we observe in the African 
tropics. 
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Our study confirms the existence of significant cross-regional differences 
in both the frequency and intensity of rainfall shocks and have shown that 
these were not driven by any intra-African heterogeneity, even though climate 
systems in the tropical regions of West and East Africa are different. We also 
found evidence for the hypothesis that there are countervailing effects of 
rainfall levels and rainfall variability on the evolution of human settlements. When 
controlling for mean levels of rainfall, districts with greater insecurity of rains 
held lower population densities, and these effects were strong and robust, 
accounting for circa 14% of the variation. This study thus adds support to the 
view that the climatological challenges posed to agricultural development were 
larger in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia, and that this may be one of the 
keys to understand why large parts of tropical Asia have historically been more 
densely populated than tropical Africa. And in so far higher degrees of 
climatological variability posed more severe constraints to the adoption of 
modern productivity-enhancing farming technologies, this may also partially 
account for the diverging trajectories of agricultural development in the post-
1960 era.  
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Appendix 
Table A-1. Colonial Districts, c.1940 
Country District Country District 
Ceylon Western Province Tanganyika Arusha  
Ceylon Central Province Tanganyika Bagamoyo 
Ceylon Southern Province Tanganyika Biharamulo 
Ceylon Northern Province Tanganyika Bukoba 
Ceylon Eastern Province Tanganyika Dar es Salaam 
Ceylon North-Western Province Tanganyika Dodoma 
Ceylon North-Central Province Tanganyika Handeni 
Ceylon Uva Province Tanganyika Iringa 
Ceylon Sabaragamuva Province Tanganyika Kahama 
Brunei Brunei Tanganyika Kigoma 
Unfederated Malay States Kedah  Tanganyika Kilosa 
Unfederated Malay States  Perlis Tanganyika Kilwa-Liwale 
Unfederated Malay States Trengganu Tanganyika Kondoa-Irangi 
Unfederated Malay States Johore Tanganyika Kwimba 
Unfederated Malay States Kelantan Tanganyika Lindi 
Strait Settlements Singapore Tanganyika Mahenge 
Strait Settlements Penang Tanganyika Masasi 
Strait Settlements Malacca Tanganyika Maswa 
Federated Malay States Perak Tanganyika Mbeya 
Federated Malay States Selangor Tanganyika Mbulu 
Federated Malay States Negri Sembilan Tanganyika Mikindani 
Federated Malay States Pahang Tanganyika Morogoro 
North Borneo Sandakan Tanganyika Moshi 
North Borneo East Coast Residency Tanganyika Musoma 
North Borneo Kudat Tanganyika Mwanza 
North Borneo West Coast Residency Tanganyika Newala 
North Borneo Interior Resididency Tanganyika Njombe 
Indonesia Serang Tanganyika Nzega 
Indonesia Batavia Tanganyika Pangani 
Indonesia Buitenzorg Tanganyika Pare 
Indonesia Indramajoe Tanganyika Utete 
Indonesia Tombo Tanganyika Rungwe  
Indonesia Bandoeng Tanganyika Shinyanga 
Indonesia Malabar Tanganyika Singida 
Indonesia Semarang Tanganyika Songea 
Indonesia Kranggan Tanganyika Tabora 
Indonesia Poerwokerto Tanganyika Tanga 
Indonesia Wonosobo Tanganyika Tunduru 
Indonesia Poerworedjo Tanganyika Ufipa-Sumbawanga 
Indonesia Magelang Tanganyika Usambara  
Indonesia Jogjakarta Zanzibar Zanzibar 
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Indonesia Soerakarta Zanzibar Pemba 
Indonesia Soerabaja Kenya Digo 
Indonesia Kediri Kenya Malindi - Kilifi 
Indonesia Malang Kenya Mombasa 
Indonesia Tosari Kenya Lamu 
Indonesia Djember Kenya Kitui 
Indonesia Asembagoes Kenya Teita 
Indonesia Palembang Kenya Narok  
Indonesia Lahat Kenya Kajiado  
Indonesia Medanpoetri Kenya Machakos 
Indonesia Benkoelen Kenya Meru 
Indonesia Padang Kenya Embu 
Indonesia Sibolga Kenya South Nyeri 
Indonesia Padangsidimpoean Kenya Fort Hall 
Indonesia Koetaradja Kenya Nairobi 
Indonesia Pontianak Kenya Kiambu 
Indonesia Poetoessibau Kenya Naivasha 
Indonesia Bandjermasin Kenya Laikipia 
Indonesia Balikpapan Kenya Nakuru 
Indonesia Longiram Kenya Kericho 
Indonesia Manado Kenya South Kavirondo 
Indonesia Tondano Kenya North Kavirondo 
Indonesia Paloe Kenya Trans-Nzoia 
Indonesia Rantepao Kenya Uasin-Gishu 
Indonesia Makassar Kenya Nandi 
Indonesia Sindjai Kenya Northern Frontier 
Indonesia Ternate Kenya Kisumu-Londiani 
Indonesia Amboina Kenya Elgeyo 
Indonesia Banda Nyasaland Lower Shire 
Indonesia Manokwari Nyasaland Chikwawa 
Indonesia Merauke Nyasaland Cholo 
Indonesia Koepang Nyasaland Mlanje 
Indonesia Waingapoe Nyasaland Blantyre 
Indonesia Ampenan Nyasaland Chiradzulu 
Indonesia Singaradja Nyasaland Zomba 
Bechuanaland Francistown Nyasaland Upper Shire 
Bechuanaland Tuli Block Nyasaland South Nyasa 
Bechuanaland Gaberones Nyasaland Ncheu 
Bechuanaland Ngamiland Nyasaland Dedza 
Bechuanaland Serowe Nyasaland Ft. Manning 
Bechuanaland Lobatsi Nyasaland Lilongwe 
Bechuanaland Kanye Nyasaland Dowa 
Bechuanaland Molepolole Nyasaland Kota Kota  
Bechuanaland Kasane Nyasaland Kasungu 
Bechuanaland Ghanzi Nyasaland Mombera  
Nigeria Colony Nyasaland West Nyasa 
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Nigeria Oyo  Nyasaland North Nyasa 
Nigeria Ondo Northern Rhodesia Livingstone  
Nigeria Abeokuta Northern Rhodesia Kasama  
Nigeria Calabar Northern Rhodesia Mongu 
Nigeria Owerri Northern Rhodesia Mpika 
Nigeria Warri Northern Rhodesia Abecorn  
Nigeria Benin City Northern Rhodesia Ndola 
Nigeria Onitsha Northern Rhodesia Mazabuka 
Nigeria Ogoja  Northern Rhodesia Lusaka  
Nigeria Sokoto Uganda Mengo 
Nigeria Kano Uganda Entebbe 
Nigeria Kaduna Uganda Masaka 
Nigeria Bornu  Uganda Mubende 
Nigeria Yola Uganda  Kitgum 
Nigeria Bauchi  Uganda Bugondo 
Nigeria Zaria Uganda Teso 
Nigeria Ilorin Uganda Lango 
Nigeria Kontagora Uganda Toro 
Nigeria Benue Uganda Ankole 
Gambia Bathurst Uganda Kigezi 
Sierra Leone Freetown Uganda Gulu 
Sierra Leone Bonthe Sherbro Uganda Butiaba 
Sierra Leone Pujehun Uganda West Nile 
Sierra Leone Moyamba   
Sierra Leone Kennema    
Sierra Leone Batkanu   
Sierra Leone Kaballa   
Ghana Accra   
Ghana Addah   
Ghana Quittah (Keta)   
Ghana Cape Coast   
Ghana Seccondee   
Ghana Tarquah (Tarkwa)   
Ghana Axim   
Ghana Coomassie (Kumasi)   
Ghana Sunyani   
Ghana Kintampo   
Ghana VoltaRiver    
Ghana Eastern Dagoma    
Source: See main text.  
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Table A-2. Population Data & Sources 
Country Census 1931 
Adjusted 
Population Level Diff. % Diff. 
Africa  
Frankema & 
Jerven (2014)   
Tanganyika 4,972,807 5,647,316 674,509 11.94% 
Zanzibar 235,307  235,307 255,451 8.56% 
Kenya 2,966,993 4,486,109 1,519,116 33.86% 
Nyasaland (Malawi) 1,603,451 2,126,786 523,335 24.61% 
Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) 1,393,258 1,781,304 388,046 21.78% 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) 260,064 285,172 25,108 8.80% 
Nigeria 19,928,171 24,860,435 4,932,264 19.84% 
Gambia 185,150 217,034 31,884 14.69% 
Sierra Leone 1,667,790 1,435,083 -232,707 -16.22% 
Gold Coast (Ghana) 3,160,386 3,870,441 710,055 18.35% 
Uganda  3,553,534 3,807,693 254,159 6.67% 
Asia   
Maddison 
(2010)   
Federated Malay States 1,770,486    
Unfederated Malay States 1,487,992    
North Borneo 277,367    
Straits Settlements 1,114,015 (+)    
Malaysia 4,649,860 4,513,000 -136,860 -3.03% 
Singapore 603,163 563,000 -40,163 -7.13% 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) 5,312,548 5,312,548 5,748,000 7.58% 
Brunei 30,135 31,345 1,210 4.01% 
Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) 55,980,765 62,877,930 6,897,165 10,97% 
Notes: See Table A-3 for sources used. 
Table A-3. Historical Sources 
The data for the British colonies in Africa and Asia were obtained from the archives of the 
Colonial Office in the British National Archive (TNA, London). We used information 
published in Statistical yearbooks and Government reports: 
 
Africa 
The Colony & Protectorate of Nigeria, Blue Book. Lagos: Government Printing Office, various issues. 
______ Annual Report. Lagos: Government Printing Office, various issues,  
Nyasaland Protectorate, Blue Book. Zomba: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Zomba: The Government Printer, various issues.  
Sierra Leone, Blue Book. Freetown: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Freetown: The Government Printer, various issues.  
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The Colony & Protectorate of Kenya, Blue Book. Nairobi: Government Printing Office, various 
issues. 
 ______ Annual Report. Nairobi: The Government Printer, various issues.  
The Colony of the Gambia, Blue Book. Bathurst: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Bathurst: The Government Printer, various issues. 
The Gold Coast Colony, Blue Book. Accra: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Accra: The Government Printer, various issues. 
The Tanganyika Territory, Blue Book. Dar es Salaam: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Dar es Salaam: The Government Printer, various issues.  
The Uganda Protectorate, Blue Book. Kampala: Government Printing Office: various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Entebbe: The Government Printer, various issues. 
Northern Rhodesia, Blue Book. Livingstone: Government Printing Office, various issues. 
 ______ Annual Report. Livingstone: The Government Printer, various issues.  
Bechuanaland Protectorate, Blue Book. Mafeking: Government Printing Office, various issues. 
 ______ Annual Report. Mafeking: The Government Printer, various issues.  
 
Asia 
The State of Brunei, Annual Report. Singapore: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
The State of Ceylon, Blue Book. Colombo: The Government Printer, various issues.  
______ Administration Report. Colombo: The Government Printer, various issues.  
The State of Kedah & Perlis, Administration Report. Penang: The Government Printer, various issues.  
The State of Johore, Annual Report. Kuala Lumpur: F.M.S. Government Printing Office, various 
issues.  
Kelantan, Administration Report. Kuala Lumpur: F.M.S. Government Printing Office, various issues.  
The Federated Malay States, Blue Book. Kuala Lumpur: F.M.S. Government Printing Office, various 
issues.  
______ Annual Report. Kuala Lumpur: F.M.S. Government Printing Office, various issues.  
Crown colony of British North Borneo, Blue Book. Jesselton: Government Printing Office, various 
issues.  
______ Administration Report. Jesselton: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
Straits Settlements, Blue Book. Singapore: Government Printing Office, various issues.  
______ Annual Report. Singapore: Government Printing Office, various issues. 
The State of Trengganu, Administration Report. Singapore: The Government Printing Office, various 
issues. 
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Dutch East-Indies (Indonesia) 
Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden. Kolonien = Statistics Yearbook of the Netherlands. 
Colonies, various issues: 1899-1923. Publisher: ’s-Gravenhage, Belinfante. 
Statistch jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie = Statistical Abstract for the Netherlands East-Indies, 
various issues: 1924-1930. Publisher: Buitenzorg: Statistisch Kantoor van het Department van 
Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel. 
Indisch verslag. II, Statistisch jaaroverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie = Indian report. II, Statistical abstract for 
the Netherlands East-Indies, various issues: 1931-1941. Publisher: Batavia, Centraal Kantoor voor 
de Statistiek van het Departement van Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel.  
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Figure A-1. Variation of Rainfall across Regions
 
Source: Mean difference of rainfall variation across the four world regions. Error bars at 
95% confidence interval are included 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
“Historia est Magistra Vitae” [History is a teacher of life] 
–Cicero, De Oratore, 55 BCE 
6.1 General Discussion 
For centuries, many thinkers and scholars have sought to understand how 
climate affects society and the economy. The answer promises insights into why 
some economies have thrived historically while others languished, how contemporary 
societies can design effective policies and institutions against current climate 
extremes, and into how future climate change may impact human habitation. In 
recent years, a proliferation of rigorous studies has emerged across the social 
sciences with the aim to quantify and assess the causal effects of climate on 
economically and societally relevant outcomes. This surge can be partly explained 
by rising public concerns about climate change and its potentially ensuing distortive 
effects on societal cohesion; partly by greater popular awareness of the critical role 
that climate might play in driving economic outcomes; and partly by 
methodological advances and data availability, combined with improvements in 
computing power. This dissertation was inspired by, and is part of, this new wave 
of research.  
The main innovative aspect of this thesis lies in its interdisciplinary 
methodological approach and in its promise to provide new insights from a 
historical social context that has not yet been subjected to this kind of analysis (i.e. 
British colonial Africa and Asia). By merging the theoretical and empirical insights 
of several strands of literature –including economic history, geography and the new 
climate-economy literature, it aims to simultaneously address both an academic 
challenge (i.e. identification of the causal effects of climate on society) and a social 
question of prime importance (i.e. revealing key mitigating factors that would enable 
relatively poor rural communities to target their policy interventions). 
Conclusion 
218 
 
To achieve its research objectives, the present thesis followed a five-stage 
approach. The first stage was to systematically compile an extensive dataset on a wide 
variety of indicators, which were completely obtained from primary archival 
material. The second stage was to econometrically assess the impact of climate 
extremes on a range of selected indicators –including crop yields, crime rates and 
conflict. The third stage was to identify the underlying mechanism that drives the 
climate-society relationship –namely loss of agricultural income. The fourth stage 
was to investigate heterogeneous (either mitigating or aggravating) effects, as 
illustrated in Chapters 2 & 3. The fifth stage was to expose the medium and long-run 
consequences of climatic variability as shown in chapter 5, in which we find that 
the adverse climatological conditions posed higher challenges to agricultural 
productivity growth in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia, partially accounting for 
the diverging trajectories of agricultural development in the post-1960 era. 
Throughout this dissertation, we make functional use of novel archival 
sources (a) to formulate theoretical hypotheses by taking the local context into 
consideration, (b) to obtain a more thorough understanding of the important 
mechanisms driving the relationship of interest, and (c) to add a new layer of 
robustness by backing up the regression results. Although extensive research has 
been carried out on the climate-society nexus, no single study exists that combines 
econometric analysis with extensive qualitative evidence. We believe that such a 
two-pronged methodological approach will serve as a base for future studies in  this 
field.  
The next sections review the main lessons learned from each chapter, 
discussing the resulting policy recommendations, and the implications for future 
research. Overall, our ambition is that this study’s insights should prove particularly 
valuable to both academics as well as to policy makers interested in the impact of 
climate extremes on food crises, conflicts and societies over the long run. 
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6.2 Climate & Conflict in Africa 
While optimism abounds about Sub-Saharan Africa’s recent economic 
performance and future prospects, other communities across the continent 
continue to be exposed to episodes of violent conflict, most recently in coastal 
Kenya, northern Nigeria, South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Mali. 
While each of these episodes of conflict was motivated ethnically, ideologically or 
politically, a wide range of studies has indicated that exogenous shocks, such as 
climate extremes, play an important role in triggering and sustaining conflict 
(Hsiang et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2014). It is no surprise that violent conflicts often 
erupt in low-income rural areas which are highly dependent on rain-fed agriculture, 
have limited access to markets and trade, and are noted for the absence or fragile 
presence of the state (Blattman & Miguel, 2010; Papaioannou & van Zanden, 
2015). 
In Chapter 2, we put this theoretical hypothesis under scrutiny by looking at 
the impact of climate shocks on the incidence of conflict in colonial Nigeria (1912-
1945). This investigation takes the form of a historical micro-level case-study. We 
argue that colonial Nigeria offers an interesting case for several reasons. As West 
Africa’s largest and most populous nation, it contains a wide range of geographical 
and institutional features within its borders and consequently, meaningful 
comparisons could be derived.  Primary historical sources on court cases, prisoners 
and homicides were used to capture conflict. To measure climate shocks we used 
the deviation from long-term rainfall patterns, capturing both drought and 
excessive rainfall.  
Our findings suggest a strong relationship between rainfall anomalies and 
conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agro-ecological zones that are least 
resilient to climatic variability (such as Guinean savannah) and where (pre-)colonial 
political structures were less centralized. More importantly, we find evidence that 
the relationship is weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops 
(such as cocoa and palm oil) compared to subsistence farming areas, suggesting 
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that agricultural diversification acts as an insurance mechanism against the whims 
of nature. Besides its several contributions, the findings of this study raised 
important questions pertaining (a) to the key causal pathways that drive the observed 
correlation and (b) to the overall impact of agricultural commercialization on rural 
incomes under colonialism. Questions that we sought to address in following 
chapters. 
6.3 Did Commercialization Alleviate Social Distress?  
In societies where large numbers of people live close to mere subsistence 
and rely heavily on rain-fed agriculture, recurrent episodes of climate extremes can 
be expected to prompt food scarcity and to fuel social tension and distress among 
their citizens. The extent to which smallholder farmers might adapt to climatic 
conditions, thereby mitigating the effect of climate on their livelihoods, remains 
largely debated (Brückner & Ciccone, 2011; Auffhammer et al., 2013; Klomp & 
Bulte, 2013; Burke et al., 2015). While a consensus has emerged in the literature on 
colonial legacies that tropical economies have expanded, to varying degrees, in 
response to access to colonial trade and agricultural commercialization, there is 
significant disagreement regarding the extent to which ordinary farmers have 
benefitted from such developments (Myint, 1958; Rodney, 1972; Bates, 1981; 
Fafchamps, 1992; Fieldhouse, 1999; Bates et al., 2007; Burgess & Donaldson, 2010; 
Iliffe, 2015).  
In Chapter 3, we take up one aspect of this heated and long-lasting debate by 
exploring if and how cash crop cultivation made some districts more resilient in 
coping with climate shocks. Was agricultural commercialization beneficial or 
detrimental to rural livelihoods? Did access to external markets reduce or increase 
the uncertainty of a stable income? Did, then, relying on cash crops act as a 
mitigation mechanism to manage climate-shock exposure? Cash crops dominated the 
colonial economy, and except for some small mining and settler farming areas, 
most areas in our dataset experienced considerable smallholder-based agricultural 
commercialization (Cain & Hopkins, 1993). Therefore, the tropical economies 
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under British rule provided us with a suitable context to study whether or not the 
cultivation of cash crops increased farmers’ resilience against climate extremes. 
Our findings suggest that commercialization of smallholder agriculture has 
had a mitigating effect on rural communities, as the surplus revenues generated by 
export crops partially alleviated negative rural income shocks, enabling farmers to 
diversify their capital portfolios, spread risks, smooth their consumption patterns, 
and profit from inter-regional and international trade. In this chapter, we sought to 
address empirical shortcomings and endogeneity issues. The main challenge in 
causally identifying the mitigating effect of cash crops on social distress arose from the 
fact that our interaction term (rainfall shocks  cash crop production) had to be 
exogenously determined rather than conditional on other local characteristics. 
Therefore, instead of merely proposing an endogenous mitigating effect which 
might overshadow other omitted explanations, we performed several additional 
(robustness) tests to refute alternative explanations. These robustness tests increase 
our confidence that the greater resilience to climate shocks observed in the cash 
crop regions was, in fact, due to the adoption of cash crops. Our findings, thus, 
lend support to the mechanism running from cash crop cultivation to greater 
resilience in the wake of climate shocks, as identified in the literature. 
6.4 Poverty & Crime  
Poverty has long been a question of great interest in a wide range of fields. 
Multiple scholarly disciplines –including economics, political science, history and 
anthropology, have observed and documented that poverty and crime go hand in 
hand. The literature distinguishes between absolute poverty (i.e. lack of the minimal 
material necessities for survival) and relative poverty (i.e. extreme income 
inequality). A great deal of previous research has demonstrated that absolute 
poverty is associated with higher property crime rates (Patterson, 1991; Miguel, 
2005; Mehlum et al., 2006; Iyer & Topalova, 2014), while relative poverty has been 
linked to the surge of aggression and violent crime (Blau & Blau, 1982; Kelly, 2000; 
Fajnzylber et al., 2002).  
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While the theoretical foundations of poverty and crime have been well-
established, the empirical basis for such an argumentation is considered speculative 
at best. One plausible explanation for this omission is the endogenous nature of the 
relationship between poverty and crime: deteriorating economic conditions may 
favor criminal activity, since more people are likely to engage in crime as an 
alternative source of income, while at the same time, higher levels of crime may 
undermine economic stability, investment and productivity. In other words, does 
poverty generate crime –or does crime lead to more poverty? Previous studies have 
been unable to resolve the key econometric identification issues and have been 
potentially subject to bias due to reverse causality and omitted variables, both of 
which distort simple ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates either downward or 
upward. 
 In Chapter 4, we use exogenous variation in rainfall as an instrumental variable 
for paddy-rice production to estimate the impact of poverty on different types of 
crime across British colonies in South and South East Asia (1910-1940). To achieve 
our objective, we pooled original data from a comparable set of districts within a 
similar ago-ecological setting,  relying on the same staple crop (e.g. padi-rice) and 
sharing a rather uniform institutional framework (e.g. British colonial rule). Our key 
hypothesis was twofold: (a) if climate shocks lead to crime through subsistence 
crises, then these shocks should primarily affect the kinds of crime that alleviate 
loss of income, and (b) if climate-induced harvest failures are causing sharp 
increases in income inequality (relative poverty), for instance because some farmers 
or merchants benefit from exceptional market power during a period of food 
scarcity and food price hikes, we would expect more violent uprisings and 
grievances against people who were making money by exploiting the needs and 
misery of others. 
 Our findings suggest that climate-induced income shocks are a key 
underlying cause of property crime in British colonial Asia. A one-standard 
deviation decrease in annual food production increased property crimes by 21.1% 
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and vagrancy by 14.1%. While these effects are considerably higher in magnitude 
than the accumulated evidence from other studies reviewed by Hsiang et al. (2013), 
we argue that this may be explained, to a considerable extent, by the fact that we 
are dealing with a highly agrarian/non-industrial part of the world, where, at the 
time, the vast majority of the total income derived from agricultural practices and 
urban labor was relatively limited. As to our second hypothesis, no effect was 
found between food production and violent crime, something that serves as an 
important validation of our empirical strategy, and highlights the importance of 
looking beyond aggregate crime measures in the climate-economy literature, since 
they may obscure heterogeneous patterns across crime categories.  
Beyond improving our understanding of local conditions of early twentieth 
century South and South-East Asian states, the implication of this study may be 
important from a public policy perspective in contemporary developing countries. 
While this chapter’s aim is to apply this approach to economic history, it may also 
be extended to more present-day developing countries. Taken together, the results 
of this research support the idea of improved high-yield climate-resistant grains and 
investments in irrigation technology. The promise of a stable annual harvest would 
potentially eliminate much of the adverse crime-induced poverty traps, as well as 
the subsequent unfolding vicious cycle of crime.  
6.5 Did African Farmers Face Greater Climatological 
Insecurity?  
Adverse climatological conditions have been a frequently cited cause for 
disappointing productivity growth in African agriculture, and a key factor in 
explaining low population densities and persistent levels of poverty. So far, little 
attention has been given to the fact that rainfall patterns in tropical Africa may 
exhibit a greater degree of year-to-year variability than in other tropical areas. While 
under relatively predictable rainfall patterns, farmers adapt their production 
practices to maximize their yields, whereas under high levels of rainfall variability 
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(where more frequent and intense shocks occur) such adaptation becomes more 
difficult. Contrary to studies using contemporary climate data (Bloom et al., 1998; 
Gallup et al., 1999; Le Blanc & Perez, 2008), we use data from an era before the 
demographic explosion of the second half of the twentieth century to address two 
questions of historical significance: has rainfall, on the whole, been more insecure 
and thus less predictable in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia? And if so, can this 
insecurity partly explain the difference in population densities? 
In Chapter 5, we explore a newly constructed dataset of annual and monthly 
rainfall returns for 221 districts in tropical Africa (141) and Asia (80) between 1920 
and 1940. We refine existing measures of rainfall variability by parameterizing 
rainfall in three distinct measures: (a) the overall variation in annual rainfall using 
the coefficient of variation (CV), (b) the frequency of rainfall shocks (defined as the 
number of annual mean deviations exceeding one standard deviation) and the 
intensity of rainfall shocks (the average magnitude of the deviation). Our results were 
two-fold. First, we find that rainfall patterns and shocks, on the whole, were more 
erratic in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia, and second, that, controlling for 
mean rainfall levels, rainfall variability explains a considerable part of the variation in 
population densities across tropical Africa and Asia. Taken together, such results 
add supporting evidence to the idea that climatological instability breeds higher 
cultivation risks and causes worse prospects for investments in agricultural 
technologies, which, as a result, have impeded long-term agricultural intensification 
in tropical Africa. 
6.4 Future Research Avenues 
While this emerging body of literature is providing many new insights into 
the climate-economy nexus, it has also generated ample room for further progress 
and investigations in numerous directions. The first direction that remains to be 
elucidated is research into the key causal pathways linking climate to the societal 
outcomes of interest. It seems very likely that climate extremes influence societies 
through multiple pathways that may vary between contexts. For instance, while 
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there is, to some extent, a consensus that economic factors are important pathways 
in relatively poor countries, the strong evidence that temperature extremes (e.g. 
heat waves) increase crime rates in wealthier societies as well (see for example 
Ranson, 2014), suggests that other extra-economic factors (e.g. psychological) may 
be at play. While tentative, in Chapter 4 we were able to confirm such a direct 
(extra-economic) effect between high temperature and violent crime. 
A second direction for future work would be to better understand the 
heterogeneous effects of climate on society, as heterogeneity largely depends on the 
applied context (both within and between contexts). If we compare the findings we 
obtained in the African context (Chapters 2 & 3) with that of the Asian economies 
(Chapter 4), it appears that, in an African context, distress and conflict were more 
acute in years with excessive rainfall than in years with droughts. In the rice 
economies of Asia, however, this effect appears in reverse (relatively more crime is 
experienced in drought years than in flood years). In either case, identifying 
heterogeneity in a wide variety of contexts (both historical and contemporary) is a 
research objective that holds great promise, as it is central to designing tailor-made 
policies and institutions that best respond to imminent climate extremes. 
Overall, the findings of this study have gone some way towards enhancing 
our understanding of the heterogeneous effects of climate on historical societies. 
The principal implication of such findings is that agricultural diversification and 
openness to interregional and international trade acted as an insurance mechanism 
to African smallholders against the whims of nature. Our results are interesting also 
from a public policy perspective, as they support the idea that smallholder-based 
export cultivation (i.e. switching from subsistence or semi-subsistence farming to 
cash cropping) might lead to higher production yields per hectare, greater financial 
profits and more sustainable livelihoods for farmers. That even in a colonial context, 
smallholder-based export crop cultivation had a mitigating effect on weather-
induced distress, suggests that providing smallholders with the ability to produce 
for external markets should be a key policy priority.  At the same time it would be 
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unwarranted, even reckless, to claim that ‘state sponsored’ export crops are a 
‘magic bullet’, or even that agricultural commercialization in general is universally 
beneficial to mitigating rural societies’ vulnerability to weather shocks. When 
interpreting our findings, it is particularly important to consider the fact that most 
of colonial tropical Africa was land abundant, that smallholders combined cultivation 
of export and subsistence crops, and that while inputs were low and farming 
techniques basic, smallholders generally did not have to incur debts to participate in 
cultivation for export. 
Yet, important research questions still remain open. For example, while this 
study finds a short-term mitigating effect of agricultural commercialization, it does 
not address the long-term (positive or negative) consequences that have been 
proposed in the literature; for instance, the long-run underdevelopment of African 
living standards, the disruption of traditional insurance mechanisms or the 
environmental impact of agricultural commercialization. We expect that a natural 
progression of this work would be to investigate the long-run effects and legacies of 
cash crops. 
 A third direction would be to use the vastly important, but largely unexploited, 
African and Asian colonial archives to construct temporally and spatially consistent 
and internationally comparable climatological series for a wide range of indicators 
(such as precipitation, temperature, wind speed etc.) and to connect these to 
existing datasets. To date, we hardly possess any evidence on observed (i.e. from 
meteorological stations) monthly and annual climate data prior to 1960. To 
overcome such data gaps, researchers have developed a number of forecasted 
weather data sets, using either interpolations across space and time, or data 
assimilation algorithms. While these procedures offer free and easily imported 
climate datasets in formats that can be used by many researchers (e.g. gridded data), 
they also increase the statistical uncertainty of resulting parameter estimates 
(Hsiang, 2016). Additionally, there are also drawbacks from an econometric point 
of view. These data-generating processes often display significant spatial correlation 
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and increased risk of measurement error. Such statistical concerns may lead to 
inflated standard errors on the employed weather variables and to biased estimated 
coefficients (Wooldridge, 2010; Auffhammer et al., 2013).  
 A fourth direction would be the bridging of the well-identified short-run climatic 
fluctuations to medium and/or longer-run outcomes. Recent empirical and 
computational advances have enabled researchers to use panel techniques to 
credibly provide evidence on the impact of short-run climate fluctuations on long-
run outcomes (see for example Dell et al., 2012). A good example of such an 
approach was Chapter 5, where we show that short-run rainfall shocks had adverse 
long-run consequences by  impeding long-run agricultural intensification.  
6.5 Final Remarks 
The impact of climate on economic development and social activity in 
general, is a topic of considerable urgency today as the process of global climate 
change accelerates, generating more severe and unpredictable weather events, as 
well as more erratic rainfall patterns. While human societies have historically 
adapted, at least to some degree, to a certain range of climatic variability, climate 
change and its associated consequences are unprecedented in intensity and rapidity, 
affecting virtually all aspects of daily life –including the availability of water 
resources, the quality of water supplies, where and how food is grown, and heat 
and cold-related deaths, to name a few. While much work remains to be done in 
developing a road map of adaptation to global warming, carefully understanding 
the key causal pathways would be a vital step in developing strategies for potential 
interventions. The more we grow to understand the underlying mechanisms, the 
better we can design relevant policy responses and adaptive institutions.  
The success of such efforts will be progressively important in the coming 
decades, as changes in climatic conditions will amplify the risk of food insecurity, 
disease and conflict. Unfortunately, climate change continues and will bring about 
more erratic weather events, hitting the poorest small-scale farmers the most. A key 
policy priority should therefore be to aim at a long-term protection of the most 
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vulnerable and precarious farmers of the global south, helping them maintain and 
increase their crop productivity (whether the policy target is to develop new 
technical innovations such as heat and drought-resistant traits that can boost crop’s 
tolerance; or to introduce new agricultural implements such as high-yielding 
varieties in association with irrigation schemes to compensate for ever shorter rainy 
seasons). In either case, building resilience among small-scale farmers is not just 
about protecting their incomes and alleviating human misery, it is also about 
maintaining global food security.   
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Summary (English) 
The idea that climate may substantially influence human behaviour and economic 
performance is a very old one. In recent years, there has been a rapidly growing 
body of literature across multiple scholarly disciplines aiming to quantify and assess 
the net effect of climate on a number of socially and economically relevant 
outcomes. Building entirely on original primary sources, this dissertation provides 
some of the first evidence in a colonial setting on the causal effects of climatic 
conditions on crime, conflict and patterns of human settlement. It provides 
evidence from British colonial Africa and Asia during the first half of the twentieth 
century. The research strategy consists of both a qualitative and an econometric 
component. By merging the theoretical and empirical insights of several strands of 
literature –including economic history, geography and the new climate-economy 
literature, it aims to simultaneously address both an academic challenge (i.e. disentangle 
the net effect of climate on society from the many other contextual factors) and a 
social question of prime importance (i.e. reveal key mitigating factors that would 
facilitate targeted and effective policy interventions in rural communities). 
In Chapter 2, we begin by demonstrating the effects of climate shocks on 
inter-communal conflict in colonial Nigeria (1912-1945). This investigation takes 
the form of a historical micro-level case-study, using primary historical sources on 
court cases, prisoners and homicides to capture conflict. Our findings suggest a 
strong relationship between rainfall deviation and conflict intensity. This 
relationship tends to be stronger in agro-ecological zones that are least resilient to 
climatic variability (such as Guinean savannah) and where (pre-) colonial political 
structures were less centralized. More importantly, evidence is found that this 
relationship is weaker in areas specializing in the production of export crops 
compared to subsistence farming.  
In Chapter 3, we review a heated and long-lasting debate in African 
economic history, by exploring if and how cash crop cultivation resulted in some 
districts becoming more resilient to exogenous shocks. Was agricultural 
commercialization beneficial or detrimental to rural livelihoods? Did access to 
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external markets reduce or increase the uncertainty of a stable income? Did, then, 
relying on cash crops act as a mitigation mechanism to manage climate-shock 
exposure? Our findings suggest that commercialization of smallholder agriculture 
did have a mitigating effect on rural communities, as the surplus revenues generated 
by export crops partially alleviated negative rural income shocks enabling farmers 
to spread risk, smooth their consumption patterns, and profit from inter-regional 
and international trade. 
In Chapter 4, we use exogenous variation in rainfall as an instrumental variable 
for padi-rice production in order to estimate the impact of poverty on different 
types of crime across British colonies in South and South East Asia (1910-1940). 
Our findings strongly suggest that climate-induced income shocks were a key 
underlying cause of property crime in British colonial Asia. A one standard 
deviation decrease in annual food production increased property crimes by 21.1% 
and vagrancy by 14.1%. 
Chapter 5, explores two research questions. Have rainfall regimes been more 
insecure and thus less predictable in tropical Africa than in tropical Asia? And if so, 
can this explain part of the difference in human settlement patterns? Our results 
suggest, first, that rainfall patterns and shocks were indeed more erratic in tropical 
Africa than in tropical Asia, and second, that rainfall variability explains a 
considerable part of the variation in population densities across tropical Africa and 
Asia. These results add sound supporting evidence to the view that climatological 
instability breeds higher cultivation risks and worse prospects for investments in 
agricultural technologies, which, as a result, have impeded long-term agricultural 
intensification in tropical Africa. 
Finally, Chapter 6, reviews the main lessons learned within each preceding 
chapter, discussing the resulting policy recommendations, and the implications for 
future research. Overall, it is our ambition that this study’s insights into the 
negative relationship between climate extremes on food crises and conflict within 
vulnerable rural societies, should prove particularly valuable to both academics and 
policy makers alike.  
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